For more than four decades Anthony Smith has been intensely and productively investigating the nature, wellsprings, and ramifications of nationalism. This excellent and concise distillation of his principal findings and conclusions will prove of immense value to anyone interested in this most consequential phenomenon.

Walker Connor, Middlebury College, USA

Written with the clarity, sensitivity, and analytical nuance that have become hallmarks of Anthony Smith’s scholarship, this book presents a masterful distillation of the ethno-symbolist interpretation of nationalism – a school of thought that counts the author as its most influential founding father. In crisp and succinct prose, it presents a fair and balanced overview of the theoretical thrust-and-parry in the field of nationalism studies, while articulating a compelling defense of the ethno-symbolist approach against the attacks of its critics.

Aviel Roshwald, Professor of History, Georgetown University, USA

Anthony Smith has provided us with a conceptually powerful, clearly written statement of his life’s work devoted to the study of nationalism. By doing so, we have a compelling clarification of the nation as a historical community of culture. Thus, to view this book as merely a concise statement of the ethno-symbolic approach to the study of nations and nationalism is to fail to appreciate its significance; rather, it is a most convincing analysis of these crucially important phenomena – a book that must be read by all those who wish to understand these powerful factors that have shaped and are shaping our destiny.

Steven Grosby, Professor of Religion, Clemson University, USA
Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism

Anthony D. Smith is Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity at the London School of Economics, and is considered one of the founders of the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies. Anthony Smith has developed an approach to the study of nations and nationalism called ethno-symbolism, which is concerned with the nature of ethnic groups and nations, and the need to consider their symbolic dimensions.

This text provides a concise statement of an ethno-symbolic approach to the study of nations and nationalism and, at the same time, embodies a general statement of Anthony Smith’s contribution to this approach and its application to the central issues of nations and nationalism. The text:

- Sets out the theoretical background of the emergence of ethno-symbolism in a sustained and systematic argument.
- Explains its analysis of the formation of nations, their persistence and change and the role of nationalism.
- Demonstrates that an ethno-symbolic approach provides an important supplement and corrective to past and present intellectual orthodoxies in the field and addresses the main theoretical criticisms levelled at an ethno-symbolic approach.

Drawing together and developing earlier brief resumes of Anthony Smith’s approach, this book represents a summary of the theoretical aspects of his work in the field since 1986. It will be useful to students and to all those who are interested in the issues raised by a study of ethnicity, nations and nationalism.

Anthony D. Smith is Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity at the London School of Economics, President of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) and Chief Editor of the journal Nations and Nationalism. He is the author of sixteen books and over 100 articles and chapters on nations, nationalism and ethnicity, and his books have been translated into twenty-one languages.
Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism
A cultural approach

Anthony D. Smith
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During a life devoted to the study of nationalism, I have incurred many debts, to both students and scholars in the field. I would like to single out the many graduate and undergraduate students I have had the pleasure to teach, notably in the Nationalism and Ethnicity Workshop at LSE; their contributions have often forced me to rethink problems and amend positions taken. The same is true of various scholars working in the field, especially John Armstrong whose Nations before Nationalism (1982) has been a constant source of inspiration, and John Hutchinson whose Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (1987) and Nations as Zones of Conflict (2005) have become seminal works, opening up new vistas in the exploration of the social and cultural foundations of nationalism. I would also like to express my admiration for the path-breaking work of Walker Connor and for the fine scholarly analyses of Steven Grosby, especially in relation to the problem of nationality in antiquity.

At the same time, I have drawn inspiration from the pioneering works of the ‘modernists’: Hans Kohn, Karl Deutsch, Elie Kedourie, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, John Breuilly, and especially my former supervisor, Ernest Gellner, whose theory of nationalism opened up the field to me as to so many others and whose example, despite my differences from them, remains a powerful influence on my own approach.

It goes without saying that none of the above can be held responsible for the opinions expressed here, or for any errors or omissions.

Anthony D. Smith
London, 2008
Introduction

The purpose of this book is to provide a concise statement of an ethno-symbolic approach to the study of nations and nationalism. It aims to set out the theoretical background of its emergence, its main assumptions and themes, and its analysis of the formation of nations, their persistence and change and the role of nationalism. At the same time, it embodies a general statement of my own contribution to this approach and its application to the central issues of nations and nationalism.

‘Ethno-symbolism’ does not pretend to be a scientific theory. Rather, it should be seen as a particular perspective on, and research programme for, the study of nations and nationalism. In fact, the term itself is accidental, arising as it did out of conversations at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the late 1980s about the nature of ethnic groups and nations, and the need to consider their symbolic dimensions.

If labels should not be taken too seriously, hopefully the perspective may be found useful and salutary. As I aim to show, an ethno-symbolic approach provides an important supplement and corrective to past and present intellectual orthodoxies in the field. It is a supplement because it aims to ‘fill out’ the narrative of the ‘modernists’. It acts as a corrective because, in doing so, it necessarily disputes and seeks to amend several of their arguments, as it does those of their ‘perennialist’ opponents. While it offers an alternative paradigm of study, ethno-symbolism does not propose a novel theory. This is because, in a field so vast and complex as that of nations and nationalism, the chances of doing so in a convincing manner are necessarily limited.
Perhaps this accounts for the paucity of attempts, and the ease with which counter-cases can be adduced and hypotheses refuted. All we can hope to achieve with such a kaleidoscope of processes, ideologies and actors is to offer some conceptual frameworks and tools for their classification and investigation and, in the spirit of Max Weber, some suggestions about partial and probable causal relationships.

While I have drawn from time to time on the works of others in formulating this theoretical statement, notably those of John Armstrong and John Hutchinson, what follows must be regarded as my own account of the main elements of ethno-symbolism, and is based mainly on my own interests. Drawing together and developing earlier brief résumés of my approach, it represents a summary of the theoretical aspects of my work in the field since 1986. I offer this longer exposition in the hope that a fuller account of ethno-symbolism may be found to be useful to students and to all those who are interested in the issues raised by a study of ethnicity, nations and nationalism.
1 Perennialism and modernism

‘In the beginning’, the nation was perennial. It was everywhere and in every period. Ancient Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, not to mention Indians, Chinese and Japanese were all ‘nations’, when they were not ‘races’, these terms being often interchangeable in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For British imperialists, the ‘English race’ had conquered a quarter of the globe, just as for pan-Slavists such as Danilevskii, the young Russian ‘nation’ was the new vigorous power about to replace an ailing West. In the same terms, Europeans and Africans could equally speak of the ‘African race’ as of an ‘African nation’. And, if Napoleon was intent on eradicating a Jewish ‘nation’, so as to give individual Jews French citizenship, anti-Semites from Wagner and Drumont to Hitler were bent on exterminating a Jewish ‘race’.

The point was that nations, like races, were given in nature and therefore perennial and primordial. While individual nations might come and go, ‘the nation’ as a category and historical community was eternal, an historical datum whose origins and lineaments could ultimately be traced to human biology, but which manifested itself as a specific type of socio-cultural community. Of course, not all observers accepted this popular, and crudely nationalist, view. Ernest Renan, for example, offered a more nuanced historical account. On the one hand, he proposed a more voluntarist definition of the nation, as the sum of historical sacrifices reaffirmed in the present through a daily plebiscite – although the effect of this phrase was somewhat undermined by his likening the plebiscite to an individual’s daily affirmation of life. On the other hand, in the very same lecture, Renan
argued that the nations of present-day Western Europe, including their approximate borders, were the product of the division of Charlemagne’s realm by the Treaty of Verdun of 843 – not a view that would commend itself to many modern scholars of nationalism. But Renan was in a minority. It was the historian Heinrich von Treitschke who spoke for the great majority in linking the nature and borders of nations to their ethnographic basis, notably in Alsace-Lorraine, and binding the national community into a state of its own.¹

Classical modernism

The shock of two World Wars, and the horrors of the Holocaust, undermined both racist and nationalist ideologies, as well as the theoretical naturalism of the ‘perennialist’ understanding of nations. Not only was nationalism condemned along with fascism – the two being often conflated as forms of ‘tribalism’ – it no longer became possible to equate the concept of the nation with that of ‘race’. Already in the 1920s and 1930s, serious scholars of nationalism such as Carlton Hayes and Louis Snyder were emphasising the modern, secular content of nationalist ideologies and their close relationship to rationalism and liberalism. At the same time, in the spirit of Hans Kohn’s dichotomy of rational, liberal nationalisms in the West, and organic, authoritarian nationalisms east of the Rhine, nations were being increasingly associated with the eighteenth-century democratic revolutions and came to be seen as products of the rise of the modern West.²

In this tendency, Karl Deutsch and his school of social communications were pioneers. For Deutsch, the emergence of participant nations was based on rapid social mobilisation and increasing social communications such as the Western states had experienced from the eighteenth century. Using their experience as a model, it was possible to chart the steps by which nations were ‘built’ through urbanisation, social mobility, rising literacy rates, media exposure and voting patterns. All these were the products or dimensions of ‘modernisation’, a giant step forward in social evolution.³

These ideas inspired one of the few theories in the field, that of Ernest Gellner. Sketched in 1964 and elaborated in 1983, Gellner’s theory posited a tidal wave of modernisation sweeping out from the
West, eroding traditional societies and substituting the cement of language and culture for the earlier ties of kinship and tribal roles. Modern society was growth oriented and encouraged mobility and context-less messages. As a result, it was secular education in a specific language that provided the key to modern identity and citizenship. However, modernisation was uneven. It replaced small village units with large states able to fund and support mass, standardised education systems. But, as urbanisation proceeded, conflicts over scarce resources arose in the city between the former inhabitants and the influx of newcomers from the country who, if they happened to speak a different language, or have a different religion or skin colour, were likely to find themselves excluded from various urban benefits. At this point, their intelligentsia urged their co-cultural proletariat to secede by forming a new nation and state. In the modern epoch, therefore, it was nationalism that invented nations where they did not exist; and, whereas nations had no place in earlier ‘agro-literate’ societies with peasant masses ruled by tiny elites, they now became not merely a sociological necessity but positively functional for industrial modernity.4

The idea that nations, as well as nationalism, were embedded in a distinct historical epoch was not new. It had been proclaimed by the Marxists, from Karl Kautsky to Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, but it was now accorded a central role in the postwar theory of industrial society. The same message informed its political variant. Here, it was the modern professionalised state, rather than industry or capitalism, that generated both mass nations and their total wars and, as John Breuilly has shown, oppositional nationalist movements aiming to capture the state. It was nationalism and the state that, according to Eric Hobsbawm, engendered nations, not the other way round; and to effect this, nationalists had to invent myths, traditions, suitable history and the like. In these ways, they could control the newly enfranchised masses who, after 1870, had begun to demand a political role in many of the more industrialised and democratic European states. At the same time, according to Benedict Anderson, the new print media coupled with advancing capitalism were generating a middle class reading public. By the late eighteenth century, new ‘imagined communities’ of the nation based on vernacular print languages and perceived as moving through ‘homogeneous,
empty time’ were emerging in place of declining cosmic faiths and sacred monarchies.5

The same modernist message was applied to nationalist ideology. It too was the product of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. For Elie Kedourie, Immanuel Kant’s belief that the good will was the autonomous will and Fichte’s claim that nations, or language groups, must be self-determining, propelled nationalism onto the world stage and undermined traditional communities of family, neighbourhood and faith. Pitting sons against fathers, nationalist ideology was taken up by the ‘marginal men’ who moved between traditional societies and the promise of an enlightened West, only to be disappointed that the reality fell far short of their expectations, especially in the colonial states of Africa and Asia. For all that, their bitter experience of racial discrimination fuelled millennial dreams and channelled their energies into radical and subversive political solutions. Kedourie’s emphasis on the experiences of the intellectuals was taken up by several scholars who espoused the idea that nationalism, as a secular doctrine of autoemancipation, held a special appeal for this stratum.6

By the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘modernist’ perspective had become the established orthodoxy, all but sweeping away perennialist views from academe. Everywhere, the modernity of nations and nationalism was proclaimed as a self-evident truth. Indeed, to challenge it rendered the questioner open to the charge of ‘retrospective nationalism’, of viewing the pre-modern past through the lens of modern nationalism.

For the modernists asserted that:

1. nationalism, the ideology and movement, is both recent and novel;
2. nations, too, are recent and novel;
3. both are the products of ‘modernisation’, the global movement of societies to the state of ‘modernity’.

In this view, there could be no question of seeking the roots of nations, let alone nationalism, in pre-modern epochs, that is before the eighteenth century at the earliest. Indeed, there were those who claimed that the lineaments of nations could not be discerned before the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, as nations and
nationalism were mass phenomena and the 'masses' made their appearance in history only with the rise of the welfare state. But the modernist perspective was not confined to the question of periodisation. It made a number of other assumptions which, with some exceptions, informed the analyses of its proponents. Undoubtedly, the most important of these was the idea that nations are 'real' sociological communities, and not simply constructs of the analyst or discursive formations without enduring 'substance', in Rogers Brubaker's critical terms. For Deutsch, Gellner, Tom Nairn and others, the nation is composed of discrete populations, a given territory, a distinct set of institutions and roles, and parallel, but unique, cultures. In this sense, the nation was a specific kind of sociological community, one on whose behalf leaders could mobilise its population to make sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice.

The second assumption was that nations, as well as nationalisms, were historically embedded, not just in terms of temporal sequence, but also in geo-cultural terms. Even Gellner conceded that nationalisms required pre-existing cultural materials, albeit negative ones, on which to carry out their nation-forming enterprise. Nations might not possess ethnic 'navels', but there had to be some elements, including territory, to make it possible to differentiate a given population from others and bind it together. Following Herder, language was often the favoured cement, but a pre-existing state tradition could also provide the necessary glue. So, despite a certain strident denial of pre-existing community, the modernists' 'modern nation' was not entirely devoid of ancestral materials on which to work.

Third, the modernists saw nations as communities of action and purpose, and their creation as the work of innovative individuals and groups within the community. So, 'nation-building' was held to be intrinsic to the project of social and political modernisation, and nationalism was the ideology of dynamic collective effort and sacrifice on behalf of the nation, whose 'realisation' by nationalist leaders and their movements was in turn the outcome and goal of its developmental potential. In this perspective, power, seen as the capacity to produce effects, was necessary, not just for ending oppression, but to create the fully participant political community of the modern nation.
Critiques of modernism

Sociological realism; historical embeddedness; collective political action: these are the hallmarks of modernism and they sum up its enduring contributions to the study of nations and nationalism. But, even as they were being formulated, dissenting voices could be heard, denying some or all of the postulates of modernism. Here, I shall briefly outline three such critiques before pursuing the ethno-symbolic argument in greater depth.

Primordialism

The best known of these critiques goes by the umbrella term of primordialism. In many circles, it has become a term of opprobrium, combining the sins of naturalism, essentialism and retrospective nationalism. Certainly, some but not all nationalists could be termed ‘primordialists’: they held that nations were around from ‘the first time’ and were inherent in the human condition, if not in nature itself. Although nationalism, the ideology and movement, might be recent and novel, nations were seen as forms of extended kinship and as such were ubiquitous and coeval with the family. Of course, given nations emerged and declined within historical time-spans, and were subject to change like any organism or form of community. But the nation, as both category and form of community, was recurrent, transhistorical and cross-cultural.

In its recent manifestations, ‘primordialism’ has taken two forms. The first is sociobiological. Its chief exponent, Pierre van den Berghe, sees nations, along with ethnic communities and races, as expressions of extended kinship, deriving ultimately from individual genetic reproductive drives. The desire to maximise an individual’s gene pool through such mechanisms as endogamy and nepotism creates wider groupings of ‘inclusive fitness’, beyond the extended family; these include ethnic groups and nations. But, in these cases, biology is supplemented by culture, the recognition of affinities with others by means of cultural signs such as common food, dress, speech and customs. Recently, in answer to criticism, van den Berghe has supplemented his earlier analysis by a more specific theory of nations in terms of the rise of states exercising coercion within a given territory; but this further weakens the derivation of nations from the biological substratum.11
The second form is cultural. In 1963, Clifford Geertz, building on Edward Shils’ typology of orientations to action, distinguished between ‘primordial’ and ‘civil’ orientations of action. While the first derived from what he termed the ‘cultural givens’ of language, custom, religion, race and territory, civil actions were oriented to the secular order of the modern state and its rational efficiency, so necessary if the new states of Africa and Asia were to succeed in overcoming the deep cultural–primordial divisions of their societies. For Geertz, primordiality was attributed by individuals; it did not inhere in the cultural tie. For all that, it was felt to be prior and binding, and hence posed a threat to a rational order. For, although nationalism was oriented to the creation of a secular state order, ethnic groups and nations emerged from the cleavages created by the ‘cultural givens’.

More recently, this type of analysis has been extended by Steven Grosby. Although the thrust of his work is more that of historical ‘neo-perennialism’ (see below), Grosby, in answer to critics who complained that Geertz had treated primordial actions as asocial and even non-rational, argued that primordiality is attributed to those features of the human condition that are felt to preserve and sustain life. Foremost among these are kinship and territoriality. It is through the fruits of the earth of our homeland and in the heart of our family that life is felt to be preserved and enhanced. Hence, the nation is a relationship of temporally deep and territorially bounded but translocal nativity, and examples of this relationship can be found long before the French Revolution, extending as far back as ancient Egypt and Israel.

Grosby’s extension was, in part, meant to answer the criticism that, although the cultural primordialists had clearly highlighted the intensity and passion aroused by nations and nationalisms, they had failed to provide any explanation for so central an aspect of the field. His hypothesis, although speculative, has received support from his own investigations of what he terms nationality in the ancient Near East, to which I shall return.

**Neo-perennialism**

This is where the second critique of modernism is relevant. I have termed this critique neo-perennialism because, although it rejects the old
view that saw nations everywhere in the historical record, it does revive the belief that at least some nations flourished in pre-modern epochs. Only now, there is far more discrimination in designating named cultural populations as 'nations', and a far greater circumspection with regard to definitions and historical evidence.

Generally speaking, the historians in question are what may be termed ‘continuous neo-perennialists’. That is, they are mainly concerned with tracing the roots and continuity of specific modern nations from pre-modern epochs, maintaining that, mutatis mutandis, we are to all intents speaking about the selfsame national community in ancient or medieval as in modern epochs. In this respect, the Jews and Armenians have become prototypical. For Steven Grosby, both communities can be seen as relationships of temporally deep and territorially translocal but bounded nativity, and so can legitimately be described as nationalities. But what he does not tell us is whether the exile of many, even most, of their members from their homelands changes their designation in line with their altered political status.14

For medieval historians, it is England that has provided the test case. This is because, in England, we have one of the oldest and strongest examples of a centralised state. From the late Anglo-Saxon period, most of what is now England was ruled from a single capital, the Normans building upon an already unified kingdom. From the fourteenth century, a single English law and language supported the organs of state and its system of counties, assizes and sheriffs. For neo-perennialists like Adrian Hastings, John Gillingham and Patrick Wormald, this is evidence for the existence of an English nation by at least the fourteenth century. Similarly, for Colette Beaune, we can already begin to speak of a sense of French national identity by the fourteenth century, even if it was confined to a small elite around the court and clergy.15

If these theses are upheld, the modernist case would appear to be untenable. But, at this point, we need to distinguish between two kinds of modernism, chronological and structural. Chronological modernism claims only that, as a matter of historical fact, nations did not emerge before the late eighteenth-century democratic revolutions, and that any pre-modern resemblance to the modern nation is purely fortuitous. Structural modernism argues that the nation is, quite simply, a modern category and type of community; it could not emerge
prior to the late eighteenth century, when the first societies entered the modern era because only by then had they undergone sufficient social, cultural and political ‘modernisation’. Leaving aside the problem of explaining one ambiguous and complex concept, the nation, in terms of another equally elastic and complex concept, that of modernisation, the neo-perennialist critique, even if we were to concede that its findings undermined chronological modernism, would leave structural or sociological modernism relatively intact. Modernists could retort first that neo-perennialist historians operate without a general theory and often without having clearly defined their criteria of nationhood, and second, that, despite a few early harbingers, the vast mass of nations emerged only after 1800, the basic reason being that the nation is a novel type of community, suited to the particular conditions of modernity, and to no other.16

**Post-modern critiques**

On which note, the post-modern (in some cases, ‘post-modernist’) turn introduces a third critique of modernism. Agreeing with the modernists that nations and nationalism ‘belong to’ and are embedded in a modern epoch, this type of analysis goes on to claim that we are entering a post-modern era and therefore witnessing the emergence of a ‘post-national’ order in which the formerly dominant realm of the national state has become fragmented and superseded, and nationalism is increasingly repudiated and/or attenuated.

By its very nature, this type of critique is disparate. A number of theoretical developments fall under its general rubric, including feminist, normative, discursive and micro-level critiques. The most common unifying threads are a repudiation of grand theories and narratives, and a mainly constructivist approach, which sees nations and nationalism as the creations of various elites, often for symbolic as well as instrumental reasons. Of course, some modernists such as Paul Brass had already stressed the central role of cultural symbols in the competition of elites for mass support in the genesis of nationalism in societies such as modern India. But post-modern constructivists, reacting against the essentialism and naturalism of nationalism and ‘primordialism’, see the nation as ultimately a fiction engineered by elites using ‘invented traditions’ for purposes of
social control, as Hobsbawm and Ranger had claimed, or, taking their cue from Anderson, as a novel form of ‘imagined community’, a discursive formation of linguistic and symbolic practices.\textsuperscript{17}

The idea of studying nationalist practices on the ground became influential through the path-breaking work of Michael Billig. Yet, for Billig, the larger picture retained its importance. The ‘banal’ nationalisms of the ‘unwaved flag’ in the West were always counterposed to the ‘hot’ and active varieties elsewhere. Rogers Brubaker’s studies of Soviet and post-Soviet nationalities’ problems go further. Stressing the institutional nature of nationalist practices, Brubaker urges a change of focus, away from the idea of nation as an enduring, substantial sociological community and towards a view that sees it as simply the outcome of nationalist designs, practices and events that stem from the categorisations and classifications of modern states.\textsuperscript{18}

A similar retreat from grand theorising is apparent in recent work on cultural difference, situational ethnicity and popular national culture. For some such as Homi Bhabha, cultural difference is irreducible. As a result, traditional narratives of national identity are revealed as irremediably hybrid, and fragmented by the influx of ex-colonials, guestworkers, asylum-seekers and the like to the West. Others in turn deconstruct ethnicity. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein see it as malleable, shifting and situational, with the process of nationalisation turning the populations included within a given territorial state into naturalised ethnic communities. These nationalising practices are further analysed by Tim Edensor on a more everyday, popular level. Processes of national spatialisation, performance, materialisation and representation can be found in routine activities, as well as in the media or official culture; and they serve to embed ideas of the nation, even as those ideas become more multiple and fragmented in popular, everyday use.\textsuperscript{19}

This emphasis on hybridisation and the fragmentation of a unified sense of national identity has been challenged empirically as well as theoretically. Although many more voices have made themselves heard within the national community, official national narratives persist, as do many of the structures and practices of the national state. Global migration has certainly broadened the ethnic composition of many Western states, but there are increasingly bitter struggles over
narratives of national identity, human rights and state security, as the transnational rights of migrants and asylum-seekers are contested, sometimes violently. Theoretically, the earlier assumption of a post-modern, and hence post-national order, as a result of national fragmentation and globalisation, has also been challenged by those who see global trends reinvigorating, rather than undermining, the national state and nationalism. Even more important has been the demonstration of the dependence of post-modern critiques on grand narratives (in this case on modernist narratives), which their own empiricist, often micro-level methodology served to obscure, and the consequent need to grapple with the theoretical challenge by proposing alternative paradigms.

**The ethno-symbolic critique**

Historical ethno-symbolism proposes one such paradigm, by undertaking a radical but nuanced critique of the dominant modernist orthodoxy. Although it offers no theory in the scientific sense, it seeks to provide some conceptual tools for an alternative approach and research programme for the study of nations and nationalism.

However, before doing so, it is important to state some basic points of agreement with modernism. As against various kinds of ‘post-modern’ critique, ethno-symbolists agree with modernists on the importance of conceiving of nations as ‘real’ sociological communities. Whatever the elements of imagination that go into the making of nations, the result is much more than a construct and a discursive formation. Because, once created, national communities have ‘lives of their own’; that is, they have real consequences, and their members act in certain ways which they did not or would not were there to be no nations. One has only to try to imagine a world without nations to grasp the profound consequences of their emergence and predominance for society and politics. One might go so far as to say that, today, the idea of ‘society’ is nothing more or less than that of the ‘nation’ – with or without a state.

In the same vein, ethno-symbolists are at one with those modernists who conceive of nations as dynamic, purposive communities of action. Given the continuing and severe conceptual difficulties raised by terms such as ‘nation’, ‘national identity’ and ‘nationalism’, it is
tempting to treat nations as purely ‘discursive formations’, created and manipulated by states and their elites. But this evades the problem of ‘passion’: the strong devotion and passionate attachments felt by so many people to ‘their’ nations. People do not lay down their lives for a discursive formation. Just as ‘the nation’ is felt and willed and acted out, as well as imagined, so many of the members of today’s nations feel that their own interests, needs and welfare are bound up with the welfare and destiny of ‘their’ nation.

There is a further area of agreement. Nations for both modernists and ethno-symbolists are conceived of as historical communities, embedded in specific historical and geo-cultural contexts. As a result, their origins, character and trajectories are amenable to causal historical analysis; and the same is true of nationalist ideologies and movements. This is not to claim that nations have ‘essences’ or to reify nations and nationalisms, but to see them as forms of community and movement, located in specific contexts of space and time, with their members viewing them as resources and vehicles for their own interests and visions, and as intimate social bonds and cultural solidarities.

However, beyond these points, ethno-symbolists part company with modernists on several key issues. These include the questions of symbolic resources; *la longue durée*; *ethnie* and nation; elites and masses; and conflict and reinterpretation.

1. **Symbolic resources**

The importance of material factors for the modernist paradigm is hard to overstate. Modernity itself is held to be constituted through a novel technological and economic ‘base’, and changes in politics and culture are predicated of this material revolution. It is true that the main modernist theorists also consider cultural and political variables: for Deutsch, social communications and language; for Gellner, language and culture; for Nairn, Romanticism and populism; for Hechter, cultural solidarity; for Hobsbawm, ‘invented traditions’; for Breuilly, the modern state and, in one passage, official rites and ceremonies; and for Anderson, language and discursive practices of print technology and print capitalism, allied to changes in our conceptions of time. Nevertheless, for all the attention lavished on them, cultural
and, to a lesser extent, political factors are clearly dependent on the rise of capitalism, industrialism or both. Even Kedourie’s idealism takes its political point of departure from the example of the French Revolution.20

This inevitably results in a predominantly, although never exclusively, instrumental analysis. Attention is focused on the interests and needs of elite actors and classes, with status factors and ideologies often seen as dependent on, and sometimes masking, the ‘real’ motives of nationalist action. This is plainly visible in Ernest Gellner’s analysis of the rivalries over scarce urban resources between the old-established city dwellers and newly proletarianised arrivals. Alternatively, the motive is power maximisation. For example, John Breuilly explains how nationalism can mobilise, coordinate and legitimate the interests of competing classes and strata through movements aiming to seize control of the modern state, itself increasingly separated from society by the advance of capitalism. As a result, subjective elements are relegated, if not denied. It is not that modernists are not ready to admit the relevance of social psychological factors such as ‘will’ and ‘consciousness’. But they see them as dependent, if not epiphenomenal elements, unable to ‘switch the tracks’ along which material factors push human interests. Even the quality of ‘imagination’ which marks out Anderson’s unique departure, is dependent on a host of prior material and institutional factors that lay the basis for what can be successfully imagined in the modern epoch.

It goes without saying that material resources, and power differentials, often influence the conditions under which national communities, ideologies and movements are likely to play important roles in history. But they do not determine their content or intensity. They cannot tell us which communities, ideologies and sense of identity will emerge and take root. A ‘bearer’ class or status group may well reshape an ideology to which it is attracted, by an elective affinity, as Max Weber argued. But it does so only after its initial formulation, that is, after its contents have been proposed by individuals and adopted by key circles (and not necessarily elite circles). To account for those contents and their appeal, we must turn elsewhere.

For ethno-symbolists, that means analysing communities, ideologies and sense of identity in terms of their constituent symbolic
resources, that is, the traditions, memories, values, myths and symbols that compose the accumulated heritage of cultural units of population. This is to privilege the domain of culture only insofar as we are dealing with the form, contents and appeal of particular ideologies and sense of shared identity. Against the modernist emphasis on material and political domains, ethno-symbolists highlight the role of subjective and symbolic resources in motivating ideologies and collective actions. In doing so, they aim to enter the ‘inner world’ of the participants and understand their perceptions and visions.

2. La longue durée

For modernists, it is modernity that forms the matrix of nations. This entails both a chronological restriction and a sociological evaluation. The time of ‘modernity’ is the recent past and present; nothing before that matters. As Ernest Gellner put it, apropos of the issue of the modernity of the nation:

... and where modernists like myself believe that the world was created round about the end of the eighteenth century, and nothing before makes the slightest difference to the issues we face.

The reason he gave was that a cluster of scientific and economic changes in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had transformed the world, making nations sociologically necessary where before they had been irrelevant.21

There are two problems here. The first is the circularity inherent in the manner of their definition of the nation. For modernists, the nation, both the concept and the sociological community, is defined as modern. A pre-modern nation is inconceivable, as the nation is a product of modernity. Alternatively, modernists argue that pre-modern societies are not nations ‘in the modern sense’; and to see them as nations is to indulge in ‘retrospective nationalism’.22

More serious, and partly as a result, this definition deflects attention from the study of the long-term antecedents of particular nations. If nothing before the eighteenth century matters, if the period in question is arbitrarily restricted, then it becomes not just useless, but
misleading to search for the roots of nations in earlier centuries or even in earlier generations. Nations, on this account, can be forged, or indeed invented, over quite short time-spans; Gellner himself cited the case of Estonia which, he claimed, emerged from the mid-nineteenth century in response to European modernisation. Whereas for ethno-symbolists, such a radical truncation of history precludes any enquiry into the long-term processes by which nations are formed and related to earlier cultural and political forms of society in the same area.23

3. Ethnicity

As with culture, so with ethnicity: modernists have largely relegated, or omitted, ethnic phenomena from their accounts of nations and nationalism. While the early Gellner omitted all mention of ethnicity, and accorded it only a secondary position in his later theory, Hobsbawm dismissed it as either too restrictive if it signified descent or too vague if it was extended to include other elements of culture. For Anderson, it is language rather than ethnicity that forms the starting-point of his analysis, while for political historians or sociologists such as Breuilly, Giddens and Michael Mann, ethnicity is at best only a supplementary factor and in general a poor predictor of nations and nationalism.24

Part of the reason for this neglect has to do with the modernists’ periodisation of history, their insistence on the absolute chronological modernity of nations and nationalism, which the prevalence of ethnic groups in pre-modern periods could to a certain extent compromise. Modernists are not unaware of the problem but, for the most part, they marginalise ethnicity. Tom Nairn, for example, concedes the importance and ubiquity of ethnicity prior to 1800, but he insists that it is quite separate from the problem posed by the subsequent spread of nationalism. Gellner, too, admits that sixteenth-century England poses a problem for his theory, but he sees its precocious mobility and individualism as anticipating the full flood of modernisation. And even Hobsbawm allows that, in Tudor England, we are faced with a state-centred patriotism avant la lettre. But, like the few cases where a state-centred tradition ensured some national continuity, this is not allowed to influence, let alone alter, his
view of nations and nationalism as essentially nineteenth-century phenomena.25

For an historical ethno-symbolism, on the other hand, the ubiquity of ethnic phenomena makes it imperative to place them at the centre of an historical sociology of nations and nationalism. This can be seen on several levels of analysis. In terms of definitions, there is a relationship between nations and ethnic groups that is not found with other forms of collective cultural identities. Theoretically, ethnicity, for all its problems, provides a more fruitful basis for explaining key elements of the distinctive shape and character of nations and nationalisms. Historically, we can trace a number of important cases of transformation of ethnic communities into 'nations', and an even greater number of cases where the symbolic elements of different ethnic groups fed into, or were used by, subsequent nationalisms in their nation-forming activities. To omit all reference to ethnic elements in the past and present is to make the task of explaining the contents and appeal of nations and nationalism infinitely more difficult.

Apart from its historical importance, ethnicity also provides a vital entrée into the ‘inner world’ of the participants, and especially into the often intense devotion which the nation evokes. Too often, analyses that start from large-scale economic or political factors fail to explain the symbolic and affective dimensions of nations and nationalism. To grasp these, we must explore the ways in which cultural and symbolic elements of myth, value, memory and symbol provide frameworks for understanding and aspiration, and these are often, although not exclusively, embodied in a sense of common ethnic identity and of belonging to a cultural community of imputed common ancestry.

4. Elitism

As ethno-symbolists see it, there is a strong elitist or ‘top-down’ thrust to modernism. It is not clear whether this derives from their basic theoretical stance. Certainly, Karl Deutsch’s research programme of socio-demographic indicators focused on mass variables and activities such as urbanisation, literacy and voting; and in the first version of Ernest Gellner’s theory, the proletariat of uprooted villagers was
treated as one of the two prongs of nationalist secession movements, along with the intelligentsia. But, in Gellner’s later theory, as in Kedourie’s, Nairn’s, Breuilly’s or Anderson’s schemas, it is the elites, or subelites, that play the central leadership roles, making the ‘masses’ an object of their attentions, or simply irrelevant. Even Hobsbawm, who criticises the ‘top-down’ approach of Gellner, makes it clear that the many popular ‘proto-national’ bonds and communities of religion, region and language that he describes have no necessary connection with later territorial nationalisms.26

In contrast, as we saw, the new school of ‘micro-nationalist’ studies focuses on popular, everyday mass expressions of nationalist practices and institutions. This provides a welcome corrective to the modernists’ emphasis on elite and official representations and performances. Nevertheless, for ethno-symbolists, the issue is not so much one of levels of analysis, as of the interplay between elites and different strata, and the ways in which their ideals and needs influence each other and help to shape national identities and ideologies. So, ethno-symbolists are less concerned with studying everyday, popular national practices for their own sakes than in exploring how popular beliefs, memories and cultures have influenced the views and actions of the elites as they first propose and then promote the idea of the nation; and conversely, how far the various ideas and proposals of nationalist elites have struck a chord among the different strata of the designated populations whom they seek to mobilise and empower.

5. Conflict and reinterpretation

For modernists, the nation emerges out of the processes of modernisation: industrial capitalism, urbanisation, mobility, democracy, the modern state, secular education and so on. While not without problems and difficulties, there is no essential discontinuity or conflict over the nature and direction of the national community, once the process is under way. Conflict is directed solely against internal or external oppressors.

Here, we need to distinguish two versions of modernism. The first, found in Deutsch, Gellner and Nairn, sees nations and nationalism as necessary developments in the often jagged course of modernisation. For example, in the second version of his theory, Gellner saw conflicts
developing around the urban industrial process, between those of different skin colour and textual religion, because some cultural groups cannot be merged in the new ‘high culture’ and nation. For Nairn, the discontinuous nature of imperialist capitalism necessarily evokes resistance by the oppressed in the periphery. Only in John Breuilly’s account is conflict between different subelites accorded a central role, although nationalist movements manage to coordinate them and subsume their separate grievances and interests. In the second version of modernism, conflict is avoided or held in check. For Eric Hobsbawm the elites manage to exercise social control through ‘invented traditions’, while for Anderson, elites forge nations through a combination of administrative pilgrimages and the imaginative power of print and its purveyors. In these latter versions, the novelty of creating nations is pushed to the extreme; creation becomes ‘invention’ and ‘imagination’ – in the first place by elites.27

What these accounts miss, in the eyes of ethno-symbolists, is the social and symbolic effect of conflicts both within and between nations. In this respect, modernism tends to simplify or omit what are complex processes of nation formation, notably the cultural and psychological consequences of protracted rivalries, and especially the internal tensions created by competing definitions and mythologies of the nation. Modernism also fails to account for the ways in which ethnic myths and memories develop from both national cultural wars and internal cultural rivalries, and the often bitter legacies that they can generate. Here, the explosive power of ethnicity, as John Hutchinson has vividly illustrated, which can so often find expression in xenophobia towards migrants and outsiders, continues to be critical for periodic reassertions of historic cultural identities. Less visibly perhaps, but even more significant, a sense of common ethnicity is also central to the persistence of nations through various processes of reinterpretation of national identities, whereby various strands of ‘our’ ethnic pasts are selected and debated. I shall return to these processes in the next chapter.28

Conclusion

To sum up. While ethno-symbolists agree with the modernist emphasis on nations as active, purposive sociological communities
embedded in particular historical epochs, they differ over the periodisation of nation formation and the role of ethnicity. Where modernists tend to downplay ethnic ties, ethno-symbolism regards ethnic identities and communities as crucial for the formation and the persistence of nations. Although nations may be partly forged by political institutions, over the long term they require ethno-cultural resources to create a solidary community, mainly because of the critical importance for a sense of national identity of subjective dimensions. That is also the reason why nations cannot simply be seen as elite projects. We need to understand the often complex interplay between elites and various sections of the wider population whom they may seek to mobilise in terms of symbols, myths and memories that resonate with them. Finally, such a complex process is always subject to conflict and change. But, important as are economic, political and military developments, it is the inner changes and reinterpretations that are so critical for the shaping and persistence of nations.
2 Basic themes of ethno-symbolism

If we now enquire into the main themes and concerns of an ethno-symbolic perspective, we find that its fundamental premises spring directly from the critique of modernism that I have outlined. The various elements of that critique reveal the main motifs and assumptions of an ethno-symbolic approach to the formation and types of nations, the role of nationalisms and the persistence and change of nations and nationalisms.

Symbolic elements of ethnicity

In the last chapter, I argued that central to the preoccupations of ethno-symbolists is the need to understand the ‘inner world’ of ethnicity and nationalism through an analysis of symbolic elements and subjective dimensions. An early formulation of these concerns appeared in John Armstrong’s Nations before Nationalism (1982). In that seminal volume, he argued that the persistence of ethnic identities and nations was even more significant than the changes they undergo, and that, for this purpose, we should focus on the symbolic boundary that separated them from their neighbours. Following the lead of Fredrik Barth, Armstrong claimed that the group social boundary was more durable than the members’ cultural perceptions and attitudes that it enclosed. ‘Ethnicity’ itself was to be understood in a phenomenological manner as a bundle of shifting attitudes, sentiments and perceptions. Hence, it was necessary to account for the durability of ethnic groups in terms of symbolic boundary mechanisms such as words, signs, languages, dress and architecture, the manner in which
elites communicated symbols and the successive mythic structures in which such symbols were embedded. Myth, symbol and communication – the ‘myth–symbol complex’ – provided the essential conceptual tools for the analysis of ethnic groups and nations over the longue durée, as well as for grasping the central function of mythomoteurs – sets of myths constitutive of an ethnic polity – in ensuring the long-term persistence of ethnic identities.¹

Shortly afterwards, John Hutchinson’s The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (1987) also highlighted the significance of long-term cultural factors in explaining the rise of nationalist movements. In cases such as Ireland, we could discern the parallel evolution of two kinds of nationalist movement, the one political and oriented to the state and sovereignty, the other cultural and concerned more with the moral regeneration of the ethnic community and its creation of a self-sufficient nation. In these cases, the role of cultural nationalist intellectuals was critical to the process of defining and reviving the ethnic community through the rediscovery of ancient myths, symbols and memories, and often acted in tandem with political nationalism, or as an alternative to it when it failed to achieve its goals. In this view, cultural nationalists were as much ‘nation-builders’ as any state-oriented political nationalist.²

Myth, symbol, memory and value also came to occupy a central place in my own formulations. Originally, I was concerned with the various orientations – neo-traditionalist, assimilationist and reformist – of intellectuals in the formation of nationalist movements, and the way they reacted to the challenge to religion of the ‘scientific state’. But, in The Ethnic Revival (1981), I began to place the role of nations and nationalism in a broader historical context, and like John Armstrong, argued for the need to analyse their long-term ethnic origins. In The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986), I adopted Armstrong’s concept of the ‘myth–symbol complex’ and focused on the role of ethnies (ethnic communities) in the formation of nations, arguing the need to examine the individual symbols, myths, memories and values of which they were composed, the mythomoteurs that underpinned their polities, and the different kinds of ethnies that formed the bases for subsequent nation formation – themes to which I shall return.³

The upshot of all this was that, contrary to an English idiom that opposes the (merely) ‘symbolic’ to the ‘real’, ethno-symbolists now
claimed that these cultural elements are as much part of social reality as any material or organisational factors; indeed, social reality is inconceivable outside of symbolism. And if ethno-symbolists emphasise these cultural elements, it is to redress the balance which, in their view, has been upset by paradigms that have relegated ‘the symbolic’ to the realm of the superstructure or even the epiphenomenon, to the detriment of a fuller and nuanced understanding of ethnicity, nations and nationalism.

Beyond these general considerations, ethno-symbolists consider the cultural elements of symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition to be crucial to an analysis of ethnicity, nations and nationalisms. There are a number of reasons for this. First, various combinations of these elements have played, and continue to play, a vital role in shaping social structures and cultures, defining and legitimating the relations of different sectors, groups and institutions within a community. By these means, they have ensured a degree of common consciousness, if not cohesion, even in periods of crisis and rapid change, and even when some of the preceding myths, symbols and traditions have been amended or rejected, as occurred during the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions. Second, these same cultural elements have endowed each community with a distinctive symbolic repertoire in terms of language, religion, customs and institutions, which helps to differentiate it from other analogous communities in the eyes of both its members and outsiders, and they have raised the profile of the community and sharpened its social boundary and its opposition to outsiders, as much as the boundary has continued to define the community and divide ‘us’ from ‘them’. Finally, shared values, memories, rituals and traditions have helped to ensure a sense of continuity with past generations of the community – a sentiment greatly enhanced by the widespread acceptance of collective symbols such as the flag, anthem or national holiday whose meanings may change over time but whose forms remain relatively fixed. Such symbols are particularly important in the rites and ceremonies of public culture, which help to create and sustain communal bonds and a sense of national identity.4

By focusing on the ‘symbolic realm’, it becomes possible to enter to some degree into the ‘inner world’ of the members of ethnic communities and nations, and of the participants in nationalist
movements, allowing us to give a fuller and more balanced account of these phenomena. Too often, modernist analyses identify the structural conditions that encourage the rise of nations and/or nationalisms, but stop short of saying anything about the content of nationalist ideologies and movements or the distinctive shape of nations, or indeed which are the populations or groups that are likely to emerge as modern nations. To address these questions, we have to try to gauge the appeal of different motifs – myths, memories, symbols, values and the like – to various strata of the population, and the reasons for this affinity in terms not only of their material interests and needs but also of their visions and aspirations, the familiarity of concepts employed, folk traditions, customs and the like. Hence the need to supplement structural analyses with an exploration of the symbolic and cultural realm of ethnicity and nationhood.

This concern with the symbolic realm is sometimes characterised as a ‘subjective’ approach, i.e. one that focuses predominantly on people’s feelings and attitudes, to the exclusion of so-called ‘objective’ factors. This is very far from the truth. It is not clear whether the old opposition of subjective and objective factors has any explanatory value, given the fact that many of the traits or elements included in any account partake of both kinds of dimension; for example, should we place ‘traditions’ or ‘status needs’ in the objective or the subjective category? In any case, ethno-symbolic approaches are always crossing the (arbitrary) line between them, and the concepts they employ can be seen as simultaneously ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. For ethno-symbolists, it is culture – and culture in relation to politics – that is central, not subjective attitudes or feelings. And by ‘culture’ is meant far more than ideas or ideals, a point to which I shall return in Chapter 6.

Ethnic bases and cores

As we have seen, neither modernists nor perennialists had much to say about ethnicity and its role in the formation of nations. Moreover, ‘ethnicity’ as a fairly recent concept was largely confined to the analysis of different ethnic minority groups within a national state, particularly the United States, and was therefore conceptually and historically opposed to the idea of the nation. In contrast, ethno-
symbolists regard various networks of ethnic ties (and the activities subsumed under them) as the single most important factor in the rise and persistence of nations and nationalism. In their view, different kinds of ethnic ties form the basis and point of departure for the creation of many nations, and the sense of ethnic kinship often takes the form of an ‘ethnic core’ in an ethnically heterogeneous polity.\(^5\)

Ethnic ties come in many forms. At the simplest level, we may speak of ethnic categories: here, the population is designated by outsiders as a distinctive category on the basis of one or more cultural markers, usually language, customs or religion, and its members have no known myth of ancestry and little or no sense of solidarity. Sometimes, they may not even have a self-designating name, as with the examples of the Phoenicians or the pre-modern Estonians, or the name may not be recognised by all the other defined members. But a more active level of ethnic membership may develop and give rise to a network of mutual relations between the members. These ethnic associations may even boast some common institutions, for example a cultic centre such as the Sumerian city-states possessed at Nippur, or the Greek city-states at Delphi, and they may engage in regular trading activities between their clans and families. Ethnic communities, or what the French term ethnies, represent a yet more complex and unifying form of ethnicity. In such cases, we are speaking of a community whose upper strata, at least, possess a sense of solidarity, and whose members have a myth of ancestry that explains their sense of common origins and relatedness, in addition to cultural markers and shared memories. This allows us to define an ethnie as ‘a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata’.\(^6\)

In singling out the role of ethnicity in the formation and persistence of nations and nationalism, ethno-symbolists do not disregard or relegate the impact of other factors, economic, social and political. Politics and political institutions, as Max Weber argued, play a particularly important part in the forging of ethnic ties. This is most clearly seen in the case of protracted warfare. The mobilisation of armies, the ravages of war on the countryside, the heroic feats of battle, the sacrifice of kinsmen and the myths and memories of ethnic resistance
and expansion all help to define and crystallise ethnic communities. Sacrifice and myths of war are particularly effective in creating the consciousness and sentiments of mutual dependence and exclusiveness, which reinforce the shared culture, memories and myths of common ancestry that together define a sense of ethnic community. In this sense, political action, when combined with existing cultural differences, constitutes a powerful and recurrent source of ethnic community. It is an issue to which I shall return.\(^7\)

We may go further and claim a decisive role for political action and institutions in forging ethnic ties and a sense of national identity in certain cases. In early medieval Scotland, for example, the kingdom emerged in the ninth and tenth centuries in lands beyond the Firth of Forth in which the dominant population was Pictish and Scottish in terms of language and culture. But it can be argued that it was the dynasty of Kenneth MacAlpin and its institutions that were paramount in transforming this mixed population into a Scottish nation through the addition of Celtic and Anglian peoples in the western and border regions. At the other end of the historical spectrum, in states such as Eritrea where no single ethnic category or community predominates, it was the prolonged action of the colonial state itself, both Italian and British, that demarcated the territorial boundaries and created a sense of incipient national identity among the nationalist intelligentsia – although how far this will suffice to create a nation out of such an ethnically heterogeneous population remains to be seen.\(^8\)

Yet, for all the examples of ‘political creation’ that can be adduced, many more cases of ‘ethnic primacy’ fill the historical record. By the latter, I do not mean that nations emerged simply on the basis of ethnic ties and ethnic cultures tout court. Rather, it was on the basis of an ethnic model and around a dominant ethnic core population that political actors and institutions helped to forge the nation. Essentially, this is what occurred in medieval and early modern England and France. Without a degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity at the centre, achieved over some generations, it is doubtful whether a strong state could have coalesced long enough in these territories to forge what came to be the English and French nations and national states. This means that, however they came into being in the first place, ethnic cores and ethnic cultures became necessary but not sufficient
conditions for further development towards political nationhood. Similarly, once in being, they can act as models for locating human populations in the world in relation to each other. From this angle, ethnic cultures and ethnic cores can be regarded as means for framing and interpreting the world of human beings, and in particular as a means of classifying and situating unknown others.9

The historicity of nations

For perennialists, nations are to be found in all periods of history wherever history records a named cultural community occupying a given territory. The problem with such a broad characterisation is that there are many kinds of named territorial culture communities – tribal confederations, theocracies, empires, city-states and the like – and this umbrella definition does not allow us to distinguish the specific category of nation from other types of community. In contrast, modernists tend to restrict the title of nation to a very specific kind of territorialised and autonomous legal–political community in which the mass of the population participates as citizens, as occurred in the modern West, and for this reason they inevitably regard the nation as an inherently modern phenomenon. Ethno-symbolists share their view of the historical embeddedness of nations and nationalism, but not their relatively restrictive definition or periodisation. These, they argue, privilege Western experience and understandings, while failing to do justice to non-Western and perhaps pre-modern historical varieties of the nation. Moreover, ethno-symbolists point to the ethnic lineage of many nations in earlier, and even pre-modern, periods, and the continuing impact of ethnic community and conflict in shaping the character of modern nations.10

Clearly, we need a type of definition that will differentiate the category of nation from other related categories, but that will also be free, as far as possible, of ethno-centrism and arbitrary restriction. In this spirit, I propose to define the nation in ideal typical manner as ‘a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws’. Such a definition is inevitably stipulative and it overlaps to some extent with the definition of ethnie
given above – in respect both of naming and self-definition and of the cultivation of shared symbols, myths, values and traditions. But this only serves to reflect what ethno-symbolists believe to be a significant and often close relationship between ethnic communities and nations. On the other hand, the focus of this definition of the nation shifts towards the more legal, territorial and political (in the general sense of energy or power) dimensions, although without discarding ethnic elements. It includes those aspects – inhabited territory, public culture and standardised customs and laws – which ethnicities may have separately or together, but which they do not need to possess.  

Methodologically, we need to distinguish the concept of nation as an analytic category of community from its use in describing and enumerating the features of particular kinds and cases of the nation as an historical form. While the definition of the nation as a sociological category must be free of temporal restriction, to be of analytical use, and must therefore be transhistorical and cross-cultural, concrete cases of nations (or kinds of nations) need to be seen as historical forms of community which can be described and classified according to period, area or social and political context. The point to emphasise here is the double historicity of nations: their embeddedness in very specific historical contexts and situations, and their rootedness in the memories and traditions of their members. By and large, nations tend to emerge, as we shall see, over long time-spans through the development of particular social and symbolic processes and their combinations, although there are significant exceptions, particularly in the modern period when the ‘blueprint’ of the nation and recipes for its creation become widely available. But nations are also constituted by shared memories, values, myths, symbols and traditions, not to mention the repeated activities of their designated members; and the patterning of these varied cultural elements over the long term produces a structure of social relations and a heritage of cultural forms that constitute a framework for socialising successive generations of the national community. Little wonder that, as a result, the phenomena of nations and nationalisms have been peculiarly amenable to historical analysis; and therefore it is hardly surprising that historians have for a long time been in the forefront of scholarship in this field.
Elites and mass appeal

The fact that national communities embody the traditions, values and memories of their members means that our analysis must be sensitive to the interests, needs and ideals of different strata of the community. As already indicated, most modernist accounts are framed in terms of elites and their national projects – with certain exceptions that we noted. But this represents only part of the picture. The question for ethno-symbolists is rather how the nation is forged through the interplay of elite proposals and majority responses, which may accept, reject or reshape those projects.

The key issues here are those of ‘selection’ and ‘resonance’. Typically, the designated population is subdivided into strata and regions, as well as dialect and often religious categories and communities, and this makes it necessary to base the proposed category of the nation on a carefully selected range of symbols, traditions, memories, myths and values that will strike a chord, or rather a series of chords, in an often fairly heterogeneous population. This is exactly what various early nationalist scholars – philologists, philosophers, lexicographers and historians – attempted to achieve in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Contrary to those who claim that these traditions are ‘invented’, ethno-symbolists argue that only those symbolic elements that have some prior resonance among a large section of the population (and especially of its dominant ethnie) will be able to furnish the content of the proposed nation’s political culture. Hence, it is not enough to focus on the needs and preoccupations of the elites; as Eric Hobsbawm admits, the selected contents to be transmitted should be ‘on the same wavelength’ as the audience, if they are to have any real effect, and must allow for the reciprocal influence of different strata and regional sectors of the population.  

This is not to say that, to achieve their political ends, nationalist elites had simply to tap into the ‘atavistic’ emotions of the masses, as Elie Kedourie claimed. Citing the example of Tilak’s use of the cults of Shivaji and the dread goddess Kali in early Indian nationalism, Kedourie saw in his manipulation of the Hindu masses a ‘pathetic fallacy’, one that identified the needs and interests of rulers with those of the ruled. (This confirmed his overall negative picture of nationalism as a subversive, chiliastic ideology that invoked the ‘dark gods’ in
order to overthrow viable traditional communities and realise its deranged vision of perfectibility on earth.) Apart from positing a gulf between political elites and 'the masses', this approach fails to grasp the two-way process in which national projects initiated by elite or subelite circles can be modified by various segments and strata among the non-elites. Just such a two-way process occurred in nineteenth-century Greece when the Hellenic project of the secular intelligentsia was first challenged by other strata and institutions and then combined with a more traditional vision of 'Byzantine' Orthodoxy held by many members of the non-elites. Alternatively, elite projects may have to be curtailed or even abandoned for lack of 'mass resonance', as occurred in the case of twentieth-century Egypt's Pharaonic movement.14

This means that we need to take into account pre-existing traditions, memories and symbolism among non-elites, just as elites themselves often had to alter their own ideas and symbols if they were to carry the majority of the population with them. For example, they had to select the most promising dialect for the new 'purified' language, incorporate the most widespread customs, adapt well-known symbols for political ends, modify traditional values and politicise existing myths of heroes and saints. In some cases, it is true, nationalist regimes attempted to institute new values, myths, symbols and memories, which had little or no currency among much of the population, as was the case during the French Revolution or in nineteenth-century Italy. Yet, even revolutionary regimes such as the Jacobins in France had to build on suitably amended pre-revolutionary religious symbolism, which they then uneasily combined with their 'Roman' ideals in order to broaden their appeal. Hence the need to focus on the public culture of the nation – its political symbols and ideals, and its public rituals, ceremonies and codes – in order to grasp the interplay between the interests and ideals of its different strata, and between elites and non-elites.15

The significance of public culture and its symbols for understanding the reciprocal influence of elites and non-elites on the shaping of the nation also throws light on the processes by which the highly abstract concept of the nation became the concrete 'body' of the nation, a visible and palpable creation, to be apprehended by the senses. Central to this process of embodiment has been the rise of an aesthetic
politics in which artists of all kinds have been encouraged not just to imagine, but to fashion, the nation. Dramatists, composers and visual artists have helped to endow the nation with a distinctive character and shape, and new artistic types such as the historical novel, the tone poem, history and genre painting and landscapes were created, in part to evoke and convey the sense of national community, tied to a specific time and place. Although usually enjoyed and used by the elites, the products of such genres became increasingly popular, in the sense of being placed in the public domain as well as in the service of the nation and its citizens whom the artists were seeking to define and portray. The popularity of such images depended, in part, on the way in which they echoed and embodied the values, traditions, symbols, myths, memories and customs of those they depicted, thereby observing and delineating the nation’s specificity and its symbolic and territorial boundaries. Here, again, we can see how, and why, such images of the nation are often rooted in ethnic pasts and pre-existing cultural ties, especially in the case of ethnic nationalisms.\textsuperscript{16}

**Conflict and reinterpretation**

The fact that many different kinds of artist and writer are involved in the processes of embodying the nation also tells us that there can never be a single ‘version’ of the nation and its past, just as there can never be a homogeneous national community nor a single ‘national destiny’. Different classes, castes, confessions, regions and ethnic communities may espouse variant versions and rival narratives of the nation. This may lead to ideological conflict, as different elites propose opposed historical narratives and prescriptions for the nation. True, one of these may become the dominant narrative and even the official project at any given point in time, as was the case with the classical Hellenic ideal in nineteenth-century Greece or the imperial ideal of Meiji Japan. But the official version is often challenged by other ethno-histories and visions. Indian nationalism furnishes a good example of this social and ideological clash. Here, the dominant secular narrative and socialist vision of the middle-class Congress Party has been increasingly repudiated by the ‘Aryan’ Hindu nationalism of various religious organisations and parties, which make their appeal to different sectors of the Indian population. A similar conflict can be
observed in late twentieth-century Turkey, where the powerful, secular republican nationalism established by Kemal Ataturk and backed by the military appears to be threatened by the nationalism of the political Islamists of Erdogan’s party, who also represent a strong Islamic countryside hinterland, which was relatively less affected by Ataturk’s westernising reforms.17

In fact, most nationalisms are riven by conflict. This is not just a matter of strategy and tactics, it is even more a question of their basic visions of the nation’s character, past and future. This may be expressed in terms of class, as in the English concept of the Norman yoke, or the Danish social reform model and Grundtvig’s folk high school movement. Alternatively, it may be realised through a conflict between religion and secularism, such as the clash between Slavophiles and Westernisers in nineteenth-century Russia, or between socialist and religious Zionists in Israel. In the case of the South Slavs both before the Second World War and in the 1990s, the conflict took on an increasingly ethnic and separatist form, leading ultimately to dissolution. Through all these examples, the bifurcation of visions of ‘national destiny’ and the fragmentation of the ‘true and foreordained path’ for the nation are predicated on antagonistic understandings of the national past and, ultimately, of ‘national character’, of what constitutes the nation, indeed of the composition of the nation’s population, raising questions of ‘who we are’ and of ‘our place’ in the world.18

If the Yugoslav case represents the ultimate consequence of a conflict that could draw on historic ethnic divisions, in the great majority of cases, there was much greater ethnic unity. This did not diminish the violence of the conflict, but it did succeed in channelling it towards reform and/or revolution. Of these cases, the greater number have undergone processes of reform, and this has meant periodic reinterpretations by successive generations of the received traditions, memories, values, myth and symbols. This may be achieved by amendment of the existing national heritage, or through large-scale rejection of its basic values. But, even in the latter case, there is likely to be a search for a new synthesis through one or more reinterpretations of the nation’s heritage. In Britain, for example, the imperial heritage and its underpinning values have been largely rejected, yet the idea of Britain as a world leader, at least in moral terms, remains
intact. Empire has now been transmuted into Commonwealth, and the country has become, in its own eyes, something of a multicultural magnet for immigrants, as well as a self-styled ‘bridge’ between America and Europe. France, too, has not completely relinquished her mission civilisatrice, and holds onto great power status through her force de frappe. In this case, too, even in and after the Revolution, the legitimacy of the national community itself has never been in question, nor has its belief in the grandeur of its destiny been undermined.¹⁹

Nevertheless, no national community has withstood the pressures of change, especially in the modern age, and as a result much has had to be discarded. At the same time, as John Hutchinson has shown, earlier ethnic ties and sentiments have been revived and renewed, albeit in somewhat changed forms, and often through cultural wars, in order to meet the periodic challenges, material and spiritual, to the community. In other words, in the face of all kinds of problems, reinterpretation has meant revival and renewal, as well as alteration and rejection. In particular, large-scale migration has revitalised the ethnic core at the heart of older nations, and brought rival ethnies into conflict, or opened up various divisions and debates within the dominant ethnie over the changing composition and multicultural character of the nation. As ‘zones of conflict’, nations are well adapted to incorporating change and resynthesis. Indeed, recurrent debates about ‘national identity’, even if they do not encourage cohesion, help to raise the level of national consciousness among all participants, as they force all parties to focus on the significance of national history and the desirability of rival visions of ‘national destiny’. Once again, through the often stark opposition of their formulations, these rival visions confront the members of national communities with the basic questions of ‘who we are’ and ‘what purpose our existence’ serves.²⁰

**Past and present**

It is especially in periods of crisis and change that such vigorous ideological conflicts flourish. These are often perceived by the members of a nation as periods of decline from some putative standard of national creativity and grandeur; and this raises the issue of the ‘authenticity’ of the nation and the need for guidance for the present
generation through a return, at least in spirit, to these earlier ‘golden’ ages of the nation’s history. That is typically when grand narratives of the national history are formulated, its exemplary or golden ages are defined, and its heroes and saints selected. It is then, too, that the distance travelled by the nation – usually ‘downwards’ – is grasped and measured, and the causes of its alleged decline are sought in a variety of factors – and readings – of that trajectory. We should interpret these narratives not as inventions or fabrications, but as selective political understandings of aspects of ethnic pasts that may be supported by documentary or other evidence. What distinguishes them from other more ‘objective’ historical readings is their avowed moral import and ideological focus. They link history to destiny through exemplary heroes and authentic tales, and thereby reveal the ‘one true path’ for reversing the nation’s lamentable present decline.21

From this, it follows that, if we are to understand these deep ideological conflicts and the accompanying processes of national reinterpretation and synthesis, it becomes necessary to operate with diachronic analyses over the longue durée. Studies of national formation and projects of national destiny cannot be restricted to a single (modern) period, just as the processes of formation of several nations cannot be tied exclusively to modernisation. Although the sense of decline and the ideological conflicts I have described are most often found in the modern period since 1789, they refer back to ethnic communities and a sense of ethnic identity in earlier periods, and some assessment of the relationship between ethnies and nations is therefore essential if we are to make sense of these phenomena – of the kind that John Armstrong explored in the final chapter of his book.22

Usually, this relationship is described as one of rediscovery and reappraisal. In this model, elites, and particularly intellectuals, hark back to heroic exempla from earlier periods in the nation’s history or from cognate ethnic pasts. So Slavophiles yearned for the restoration of ‘authentic’ Old Russia before Peter the Great’s westernising reforms, and sought to regain that sense of national communion that his modernising bureaucratic regime had destroyed, at least in the cities. In similar manner, various Arab intellectuals, notably Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh in early twentieth-century Egypt, harked back to a pristine Islam in the Age of the Companions of the Prophet, as the authentic realisation of the Arab genius. In
neighbouring Iran, a similar official reappropriation of the glorious ethnic past was evident. First, the Pahlavis aimed to restore the grandeur of the ‘Aryan’ Achaemenid empire, culminating in 1975 in a grandiose display of the Shah’s might at the ruins of Darius’ palace at Persepolis. Then, just a few years later, his enemies, the Shi’ite mullahs, who had helped to overthrow his regime, turned back to the golden age of Ali and Husain in the seventh century, and commemorated the latter’s martyrdom with dramatic re-enactments. In each case, we see a significant ethnic past being ‘rediscovered’ as the golden age and reappropriated (and often manipulated) for modern political ends.\textsuperscript{23}

Modernists are wont to describe this one-way relationship between past and present and dismiss it as so much mythologisation of the past, if not outright fabrication and manipulation. This in turn assumes that our view of the past is, if not determined, then at least decisively influenced, by the needs, interests and preoccupations of current generations. But this kind of presentist analysis is liable to block even the possibility of comprehending the autonomy of the past, and to prevent us from seeing how aspects of that past (or pasts) continue to exert influence by providing us with frames of reference for interpreting our own experiences. If our changing selection of aspects of the past helps to shape our successive views of it, the converse is also true: aspects of the past help to shape our understanding of our own situation, through comparison and contrast, as well as through continuities of forms. The ethnic past or pasts that are rediscovered create the boundaries and frameworks in and through which we make sense of the community and its place in the world. They also provide cultural models for shaping the nation as well as for subsequent national practices, encouraging emulation of the perceived historical canon or standard and a desire to return to the ‘true essence’ of the community.\textsuperscript{24}

Continuity between past and present typifies a second mode of relationship over the \textit{longue durée}. Here, we are concerned with continuities of cultural elements and forms — ceremonies and rituals, institutions, customs, nomenclature, landscapes, styles, language and other codes. These continuities are particularly apparent in a field such as religion where changes in ritual and dogma tend to be slow and gradual and which continues to exert a strong influence over various aspects of
society and politics. But we also find continuity in landscapes and in architectural heritage, in many domestic and political rituals, even in rule-based activities such as languages and games, and this despite the massive changes wrought by technological innovations. From these formal continuities, perennialists as well as many a nationalist have leapt to the conclusion that most modern nations are rooted in the early Middle Ages and that successive generations of their members have continuously inhabited the homeland in its modern boundaries. For ethno-symbolists, such claims are as unwarranted as the temporal restrictions favoured by modernists are arbitrary. The question of the origins and development of given nations is strictly a matter for empirical investigation, on the basis of agreed definitions. It is a matter neither of a priori reasoning, nor of intuition. It may well be the case that certain institutionalised practices and processes long antedate the onset of modernity, as can be documented in a few West European nations and possibly for some others. But, for the most part, it is not so much national continuity tout court as ethnic ties that underpin the culture of the ethnic core population of the subsequent nation. Again, it is a matter of historical judgement how far such ties can be traced back in particular cases, and to what extent they have formed the social and cultural basis for nations, past or present.

The possibility that nations existed in pre-modern epochs returns us to the perennialists’ claim of national recurrence, and informs much of John Armstrong’s symbolic history of ethnic identities and nations. But the idea that the nation constitutes a recurrent form of territorial and social organisation needs to be treated with caution, as it carries the charge of a ‘retrospective nationalism’ and assumes what has to be demonstrated. What we can, I think, show is the recurrence of certain ethnic dimensions and elements such as myths of common ancestry, convictions of ethnic election, the ubiquity of ethnoscapes and memories of golden ages. These run like leitmotifs through the cultural history of ethnies and nations, and may provide some links with different ethnic and national formations across the ages, although only to some degree and often with major ruptures. More important, these ethnic elements may provide requisite cultural ‘materials’ and create nodes around which modern nations can form, given conducive circumstances.
A cultural history of the nation

Whether in the form of reappropriation, continuity or recurrence, the relationship of the ethnic past or pasts to the national present is central to the concerns of ethno-symbolism. That is why historical analysis over the longue durée is indispensable to investigation into the characteristics, formation and persistence of nations and nationalism, and why the modernist insistence on a single modern period for study appears unduly restrictive and arbitrary. Even if we conceded that the national community in question emerged only in the modern period, we would still need to explore its ethnic and cultural antecedents, and the models of social and symbolic community to which some of its members looked, if we want to provide a more satisfactory and rounded explanation of its distinctive cultural features and of the geo-cultural place it occupies in relation to other communities.

Hence, the main theoretical task of an ethno-symbolic analysis is to provide a cultural history of the nation as a type of historical culture community. By this, I mean an enquiry into the successive social and cultural self-images and sense of identity, the ideological conflicts and the social changes of a culturally defined population in a given area and/or polity. These self-images, identities, conflicts and changes stem from the interplay of competing cultural and political projects of the different classes, religious confessions and ethnic groups within a given area and population and/or polity, as well as the political impact of external collectivities and events, especially, but by no means exclusively, in the modern era of nationalism. They also owe a good deal to the different kinds of distinctive public culture – hierarchical, covenantal and civic–republican – that have been derived from models of public culture in the ancient world and that have historically shaped the social and political composition of increasingly ‘national’ communities from the later Middle Ages to the present. As a result of this complex interplay of factors and models, we usually find two or more visions of national destiny competing for political influence at any one point in time, with members of the community harking back to different golden ages and types of public culture, especially in periods of crisis and perceived decline, and proposing different and even opposed projects of national revitalisation. Such a situation may be resolved either by the abandonment of one or other of the
competing projects, perhaps through revolution of one kind or another, or through a process of social and cultural reform and moral revivalism which usually involves some kind of synthesis based on selection and reinterpretation of received traditions.²⁷

These considerations enable us to map out the stages of an ethno-symbolic account of nations and nationalism, which I shall elaborate later. Starting from the ethnic bases formed by the interplay of kinship ties, cultures and political action, a cultural history of the nation would first seek to trace the social and symbolic processes in its formation, before going on to distinguish various types of national community and the different routes of nation formation, as well as their successive periodisation. It would then explore the role of various kinds of nationalism, as an ideological movement, in the mobilisation of populations and the shaping of distinct nations, as well as the part played by nationalist intellectuals and professionals in this process. Finally, this would lead to an investigation of the forces for persistence and change of nations, particularly in the modern world. Such an enquiry would need to analyse the fundamental cultural and religious resources of the nation, as well as the conflicts between elites who propose different ethno-historical narratives and who seek to realise often opposed projects of national regeneration and ‘national destiny’ on behalf of ‘the people’.

This, then, provides the sequence that forms the basis of the following three chapters – with the first being devoted to the formation of nations, the second to the role of nationalism, and the third to the persistence, change and resources of nations. Once again, it is important to emphasise the benefits and limits of such an approach. In no way is it intended to supersede the standard modernist account. Rather, its focus on symbolic and social elements seeks to supplement and, where necessary, amend the predominantly political and economic models offered by modernists. In other words, it aims to continue where conventional accounts leave off, and supply those cultural and symbolic dimensions that they tend to overlook. One is often left with the sense that many modernist accounts never reach their target because they fail to enter into the ‘inner world’ of the members of national communities. This is exactly what a cultural history of the nation, such as that proffered by ethno-symbolism, aims to make good.
The main object of ethno-symbolic approaches, as of modernist and perennialist accounts, is to explain the character, formation and persistence of nations and the role of nationalism in history, and more especially in the modern world. In this chapter, I focus on the issues involved in the formation of nations.

The nation: discourse and reality

But, why nations? Why should we speak of nations in the first place? This was the question posed by Rogers Brubaker in 1996, when he criticised the conventional view of nations and ethnic groups as real groups, and as homogeneous, stable and enduring communities. Instead of the analytically dubious idea of the nation as a fixed and substantial group, what we should be seeking to explain under the rubric of ‘nations’ are categories of nationalist practices, institutionalised cultural and political forms, and contingent events of ‘nationness’. We should strip the concept of the nation of its substantial group characteristics, and think, not of nations without nationalism, but of ‘nationalism without nations’. As his main example, Brubaker pointed to the ways in which the Soviet nationalities’ policies of the 1920s had created and institutionalised ethnic communities and nations in a hierarchy of political frameworks, from autonomous areas to titular ethnic republics such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Soviet policies and state practices composed a pervasive system of social classification, an organising ‘principle of vision and division’ of the social world.
So that, when the Soviet system collapsed, the contingent events of ‘nationness’ created in the successor states a struggle, not between nations, but between institutionally constituted national elites.¹

Such a wholesale programme of anti-essentialist analysis may be attractive, but ethno-symbolists are not alone in claiming that such a radical minimalism risks throwing out the baby with the bathwater. To begin with, if the aim is to avoid a reified concept of the nation, the same consideration must apply to the state. Institutions, and states in particular, are in this account equally in danger of becoming objects in their own right. Besides, this analysis presents a somewhat simplified view of the role of states in the formation of nations. Even in the Soviet case, the Communist Party elites operated with a quasi-Herderian concept of nations as ethno-linguistic groups, albeit sometimes ‘submerged’ and unrecognised. It was the duty of Soviet ethnologists to rectify this situation and assign to each such group its proper place in the political hierarchy. In other cases, the ethnic basis of nation formation was even more marked, notably in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe and in the twentieth-century secessionist movements in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia, for example, among the Ewe, BaKongo, Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils. While different kinds of polity, indigenous and colonial, obviously influenced and constrained the character of the communities and the operation of their ethnic nationalisms, they cannot be said to have created them, let alone to have constituted their ideals, interests and actors.²

There is a more fundamental objection. The anti-essentialist thrust of constructivism and discourse analysis fails to do justice to the very dimensions that have made nations and nationalism so significant a part of the modern world, namely, the sway they continue to hold over the hearts and minds of millions of men and women. While our categories of analysis must as far as possible be kept distinct from popular perceptions, as Brubaker rightly points out, they must be able to address the powerful emotion, will and imagination that are the hallmarks of nations – in other words, the content and not just the form, the empty shell, of nations. For the members, nations are real communities of cognition, sentiment and belonging. For the analyst, too, nations must be understood as communities of power and prestige, in Max Weber’s formulation – even as conflict communities. We do not need to ascribe ‘essences’ to nations or regard them
as stable, let alone fixed and internally homogeneous, to observe their felt, lived and willed reality, and the reality of their consequences. It is the very real and lasting impact of their effects that has persuaded so many scholars to treat nations, however problematic they may appear, as ‘real communities’ in their own right, and something more than purely discursive formations. For not only is the nation ‘talked about’, it is felt, willed, consumed and re-enacted symbolically on many occasions. Although the concept of the nation may appear as a high-level abstraction of the imagination, its symbols, imagery and rituals convey a sense of close-knit community that is able to demand from its members the ultimate sacrifice.3

Nations and nationalism

But, if nations need to be treated as real communities, how do they relate to nationalism, the ideology and movement? Does nationalism ‘invent nations where they do not exist’, in Ernest Gellner’s well-known words?

For many modernists, nationalism is both historically and socio-logically prior to ‘the’ nation. If nationalism is the product of modernity, then nations can be dated no earlier than the late eighteenth century; after all, it is nationalists who bring the nation into being by mobilising its members and endowing them with national cohesion. This is what, according to Rousseau, Moses, one of three ancient lawgivers, along with Lycurgus of Sparta and Numa Pompilius of Rome, succeeded in doing with the Jewish people after the Exodus from Egypt:

The first (sc. Moses) conceived and executed the astonishing project of creating a nation out of a swarm of wretched fugitives … who were wandering as a horde of strangers over the face of the earth without a single inch of ground to call their own. Out of this wandering and servile horde Moses had the audacity to create a body politic, a free people …

In similar fashion, modern nationalists can be said to mould an inchoate population into an organised and cohesive ‘nation’ through
education, the arts and public rites and ceremonies. And modernists can point to the many cases of ‘nation-building’ in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia, as well as the ex-colonies of sub-Saharan Africa, where we can justly speak of ‘nationalism without nations’, although there it remains to be seen how far the project of nation-building will succeed.4

But this is only part of the story. In a purely conceptual sense, nations must have precedence, as the nationalism that seeks the autonomy, unity and identity of the territorialised historic culture–community presupposes the very idea of the nation. More important, many of the East European and Asian nations were created around pre-existing ethnies or ethnic networks, whether in Poland or Hungary, Slovakia or Finland, or on the basis of dominant ethnies in states such as Iran, Sri Lanka, Burma and Vietnam, and it was these ethnic ties that formed the basis of subsequent nations. The symbols, memories, traditions and myths of their dominant ethnies provided these new national states with their public cultures, their symbolic codes and repertoires, and many of their laws and customs. And these same ethnic heritages lend the discussion greater historical depth, for they suggest that, rather than being simply created by one or two generations of modern nationalists, nations were forged in stages over longer periods out of pre-existing cultural and political ties.5

Considerations such as these raise the possibility of ‘pre-modern nations’. After all, if nations are formed over long periods, we might expect to be able to trace the origins of some nations, at least, well before the advent of modernity. Unless we equate the concept of the nation with the ‘modern nation’ tout court, we could entertain the idea of nations existing in the Middle Ages, or even in antiquity. Certainly, an ethno-symbolic approach, employing the kind of ideal type definition of the nation that I outlined in Chapter 2, would allow for this possibility, even if in practice it would only apply in those cases that revealed the development of key social and symbolic processes, and as a result approximated to the ideal type of the nation.6

To these processes, I shall shortly turn. For now, I want only to signal the fact that a number of medieval historians have argued recently that certain West European populations, notably in England, can be legitimately treated as comprising pre-modern nations, certainly by the later Middle Ages, if not earlier in a few cases. And
certain historians of the ancient world have even singled out some rare cases of ‘ancient nations’, communities in antiquity, such as ancient Judea and early Christian Armenia, that displayed the key features of the ideal type.7

This is not the place to enter into the details of their arguments. Suffice it to say that different notions of the concept of the ‘nation’ are being employed by modern, medieval and ancient historians, and that different kinds of nation are being described. At the same time, ethno-symbolic analyses must be distinguished from the perennialism of a scholar such as Adrian Hastings who argued that, not only the nation, but nationalism too is pre-modern, as for him ‘nationalism’ is simply a defensive reaction to threat and equates to ‘national sentiment’ or consciousness, rather than being an ideology and movement for national autonomy, unity and identity. Undoubtedly, some of the elements of the ideology of nationalism can be traced before the eighteenth century. But, with a few exceptions, they did not come together as a single potent ideological movement until the rise of the cult of authenticity in the mid-eighteenth century; and we may therefore regard nationalism as emerging in the wake of some of the different kinds of nation and national identity that, in fact, were to provide the initial basis for its appeal in the West.8

Processes of ethno-genesis

But, if nationalism succeeds these earlier nations, how can we account for the formation of nations? This is a question that requires both a sociological and an historical approach. Here, I focus on the sociological foundations; and for ethno-symbolists, the first step is to search for the ‘ethnic core’ of the nation and trace its social and political origins, in the belief that nations are characterised by a degree of cultural unity and distinctiveness, which in turn draws much of its potency and durability from a conviction of ethnic solidarity.

It goes without saying that, as argued in Chapter 2, ethnic networks and communities are subject to the same vicissitudes as other kinds of cultural communities and collectivities, and that as a result ethno-genesis has a similar element of complex contingency, being subject to the same variety of social, political and cultural influences as any other type of community. Nevertheless, what distinguishes ‘ethnic’
from other kinds of cultural community is, in Walker Connor’s phrase, the shared belief in an ‘ancestral relatedness’, however fictive it may be. That requires us to chart the origins and development of ethnies or ethnic communities in terms of the key social and symbolic processes that encourage the creation of a conviction of ancestral relatedness among the members. These include the naming of collectivities; their boundary definition vis-à-vis outsiders; their myths of origin; and the activities of symbolic cultivation.9

In the transition from a population whose members know only who they are not to one that knows who they are, the act of conferring a collective proper name is critical to ethno-genesis. Although place-names and family names can serve to distinguish populations, and are among the first visible signs of collective similarity and difference, cultural similarity, although it speaks of distinctiveness, does not of itself confer a sense of ethnic community. I mentioned the case of the Phoenicians, the Canaanite-speaking inhabitants of the Lebanese coastal cities, whom their Greek merchant rivals categorised as phoinikes after the purple dye of the area, although the populations themselves knew and spoke only of ‘the inhabitants of Arpad, of Byblos, Tyre, Sidon, etc.’, the same appellations that appear in the Old Testament. Although the members of the ‘Phoenician’ city-states did indeed share various cultural and religious practices, they had no sense of community or political unity nor, it appears, any aspirations thereto; and it would seem no collective proper name of their own. Much the same was true of medieval and early modern Ukrainians dwelling on the South Russian plains and of Slovaks inhabiting their settlements in adjacent valleys of the Carpathian mountains. Only when a collective proper name is conferred on a population, highlighting the unity of its parts, and only when it becomes widely accepted by the members of the population, can a sense of distinctive ethnic identity begin to emerge.10

But naming is only a start, and cannot be abstracted from wider processes, and it is by no means the only ethno-symbol at work in the genesis of ethnic communities. Equally important, and closely related, is the sense of collective self-definition through boundary delineation that is so often a consequence of differentiation and exclusion of, if not suspicion and antagonism towards, neighbours and others in general. In this long-term process, symbolism and, more especially, language
plays a crucial role. The ability to communicate easily, whether through gestures, words or signs, with one set of persons, and with difficulty or not at all with other populations, undoubtedly fosters a sense of boundedness and difference. But left to itself, this sense of the Other does not suffice to form and sustain a long-term social boundary that could crystallise a sense of common ethnicity in a given population. Such an effect can only be achieved by the repeated actions of both strategic elites and the mass of the population. Especially potent in this regard has been the exacerbation of difference through conflict, and above all as a result of protracted warfare. Not only do wars mobilise large sections of the community, often under extreme circumstances, they also give rise to myths of battle and furnish examples of heroism and collective sacrifice for emulation by subsequent generations. Quite often, we find long-term conflicts involving pairs of communities, whose enmities embrace successive generations, as was the case with those great commercial rivals, the Venetians and Genoese, over several centuries, and more recently with the political conflict between the French and the Germans united not long before by Prussia. The result is a hardening of the symbolic border and the development of a vivid sense of collective self-definition.\textsuperscript{11}

The emergence of myths of common ancestry reveals the other side of the coin. The commonality of resistance and danger in war is mirrored in the widespread belief in common ancestry, and hence the sense of the community as an extended ‘family of families’, however far-fetched its basis may be in fact. Even where the myth clearly points to mixed ethnic origins, as with the well-known Roman myth of the mingling of Sabines and Romans, or the later English myth of Anglo-Saxons and Normans in medieval and early modern England, a shared belief in common origins and descent, at least on the part of elites, is gradually developed and crystallised; and this helps to explain and justify the powerful sense of a common collective fate that is encountered so frequently. Despite regular internecine quarrels, that conviction finds expression in oft-expressed genealogical ties which serve to bind the generations through common worship of eponymous ancestors. Here, religion may serve as a powerful support. Religious elites often help to underpin these popular beliefs and sentiments through their sacred texts, liturgies and ceremonies.
More generally, religious beliefs and rituals act as moulds preserving the sense of common origins and ancestry, by relating them to the gods and heroes, as in the Homeric poems or Eddic sagas, or making the ancestors exemplify the will of the deity, thereby hallowing and legitimising the communal myths of common origin.\textsuperscript{12}

Paradoxically, the frequently noted plurality of common origin myths tends to encourage ethno-genesis, as great families or clans seek to impose their versions of communal origins and descent on other clans. The result is usually a complex combination, if not fusion, of origin myths, often in the form of chronicles or epics recited in the palaces of nobles or wealthy men, as with the Homeric poems or the Eddic sagas. The ancient Greek case is particularly complicated. Without losing their sense of (sub)ethnic differences, the various branches of the ancient Hellenes were welded together by a series of overlapping myths of descent, woven around the marriages of scions of great families, and in later periods looked back to the Homeric epics as the charter of their pan-Greek identity vis-à-vis non-Greeks. In later ages, too, as we shall see, the conflicts between rival myths of origins came to mark some important lines of cleavage within nations whose members traced their origins to earlier ethnies.\textsuperscript{13}

Rivalries and conflicts were not confined to myths of common origin. They permeated the whole field of symbolic cultivation, which thereby helped to promote a distinctive self-image and reinforce a sense of common ethnicity. `Symbolic cultivation’ covers a wide range of ethnic memories, symbols, values, myths and traditions. Many of these are local in origin, but some of them may be taken up, and adapted, by specialist elites as part of the common symbolic fund or heritage, particularly, but not only, if they are supported by the institutions of state or church. Memories of heroes and battles, traditions of marriage and burial, symbols of dress, emblems and language, myths of migration and liberation, and values of holiness and heroism may all find a place in the common symbolic fund as preserved by communicators and augmented by them down the generations of the community. Where this fund has been codified and set down in legal, dramatic or sacred texts, it can gain a canonical status and assume a directive role in subsequent generations, as occurred with the Torah and the Talmud for diaspora Jews, and the Qu’ran and the Hadith for Muslim Arabs. In this way, the repeated cultivation, adaptation,
augmentation and reinterpretation of the symbolic heritage of a community not only forges a sense of common ethnicity, but also helps to preserve and enhance it in new and unexpected circumstances.14

Symbolic cultivation presupposes the rise of a specialist class of communicators with the skills to select, interpret and apply elements of the common heritage to new situations. Generally speaking, we find such a class emerging in the context of ecclesiastical or state institutions, where numeracy, literacy and archival skills are vital for economic, political and religious transactions, with priests and scribes becoming indispensable for a wide range of activities. But, even in oral cultures, the communicative skills necessary to disseminate the symbolic heritage could be found among the bards and minstrels who frequented the houses of the nobles, as in early medieval Ireland and Wales. I shall return later to the role of these cultural specialists in the persistence of nations.15

Processes of nation formation

From an ethno-symbolic perspective, nations may be regarded as named and self-defining communities whose members cultivate shared symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions, inhabit and are attached to a historic territory or homeland, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standard laws. Sociologically speaking, this means that nations, by definition, are repeatedly formed and re-formed, at least in part, on the basis of the symbolic processes of ethno-genesis such as naming, boundary definition, myths of origin and symbolic cultivation. But only in part. These processes, by themselves, do not form a nation; for this, other social and political processes are required.

Of these, perhaps the most important is territorialisation. Nations are, by definition, territorialised communities, that is, communities the majority of whose members have come to reside in an historic territory or homeland and to feel a strong attachment to it. In part, this derives from the idea of natality, of the significance attached to place of birth and of the sustenance thought to derive from it, as Steven Grosby points out. But it is also related to the process of self-definition through the creation of symbolic boundaries, which form what he terms translocal, but bounded territories. These are spaces that come
to be inhabited by communities whose experiences and sense of distinctive identity are in part moulded over the generations by the features of their historic homeland, creating an ‘ethno-scape’ in which a people and its homeland become increasingly symbiotic.16

In a further development, historical memories of personages, battles, assemblies and the like are closely linked to the intimate landscapes of the homeland, which in turn become intrinsic to those shared memories. If the community is thereby ‘naturalised’ and becomes a part of its environment, its landscapes become conversely ‘historicised’ and bear the imprint of the community’s peculiar historical development. Through these processes, the territorialisation of memories and attachments creates the idea of a homeland tied to a particular people and, conversely, of a people inseparable from a specific ethno-scape – much as the Dutch became increasingly ‘fused’ with their irrigated plains and polders, and the Swiss with their Alpine mountains and valleys.17

But the processes of territorialisation can go much further. With the growth of centralised states built around dominant ethnies, the ideal of a compact, unified and territorially distinct nation became the international norm; and in the wake of nationalist notions of ‘natural frontiers’ from the late eighteenth century, a geography of national identity took shape. This was sometimes bolstered by metaphors of the national geo-body, so illuminatingly analysed by Thongchai Winichakul in the case of a nineteenth-century Siam that was increasingly forced to redefine its traditional sacred conceptions in Western territorial terms. The result is what one may term a ‘hardening of space’: the population not only occupies the whole of the homeland, but also the latter is treated as a single, undifferentiated unity vis-à-vis other national territories with impermeable, policed borders.18

Such unity is not only the product of hardened space, but also of shared customs and standardised laws. By themselves, laws and customs do not mark out nations as opposed to any other type of community. But, once other processes have converged to propel a community towards the ideal type of the nation, shared customs and the observance of standardised laws provide powerful means for creating unity and a sense of solidarity among large numbers of people. Insofar as the customs become shared and the laws uniform across the national territory and the dominant ethnie, but differ from those beyond the
borders, they serve not only to differentiate the members of the national community from outsiders, but also to endow them with a sense of unity and fraternity – and, rather later, of sorority.

But, for laws and customs to have such effects, must not a nation have its own state, or a state forge its ‘own’ nation? Historically, both scenarios are all too common. But there are also significant exceptions. Some nations lack states of their own, such as the Scots, Catalans, Quebecois, Kurds and Tamils, or in the past, the Poles, Greeks, Jews and Armenians. In the latter cases, religion played a major role in incorporating customs on a national scale and in sanctioning and standardising laws. This was particularly marked in diaspora ethnies where, despite local variations, the ecclesiastical authorities provided a framework for interpreting shared scriptural texts and their laws, as well as in providing common legal institutions and procedures for the various diaspora communities. In the absence of a state, then, religious institutions may become the guardians as well as the source of common observance of shared customs and laws, and create a strong sense of ethnic cohesion, which in favourable circumstances can be transferred to the emerging nation.19

Religion may also furnish the basis and symbolism for a distinct public culture. By this, I mean a set of public rituals and ceremonies such as festivals of independence or remembrance, public symbols such as assembly buildings, anthems and coinage, and various public codes – of dress, gesture, image, music, name and word. Of particular significance has been the creation, or adaptation, of gendered political emblems of motherland and fatherland, symbolised by female figures such as Marianne, Britannia and Germania, along with the distinctive flags and banners that identify and differentiate one national community from others near and far. Creating and disseminating a distinctive public culture composed of these elements marks an essential development in the direction of a national community, although once again by itself it does not suffice to mark out a nation as opposed to other kinds of community. Its full national effect requires the development, and convergence, of the other social and symbolic processes of nation formation.20

For all that, its national impact in that ensemble is profound. There is no greater effect on the collectivity of members than that created by moving ceremonies, reiterated rituals, striking political symbols and
the music and imagery of choreographed mass gatherings, especially when these are linked to the ideology of the nation; nor is there any more powerful means of binding the members of the community, and separating them from outsiders. Their value to nationalists has been incalculable. But it is worth remembering that city-states, kingdoms and empires have sought to create a public culture that would distinguish their communities from others; one thinks of the New Year ceremonies in the ancient Mesopotamian empires and the performances and rituals that symbolised the marriage of Venice to the sea, her peculiar realm. Nevertheless, modern nationalists have generally preferred to create their own types of public culture, in accordance with their ideals of national autonomy, unity and identity, although even in the most radical cases, they have drawn on elements of earlier religious or political models in order to create the ideologised mass public culture of the nation.21

In enumerating these social and symbolic processes, I do not mean to imply that specific nations can only be forged through a particular sequence of developments; or that there is any inevitability in the movement from an ethnie to a nation – a vital point to which I shall return in Chapter 6. Historically, nations have been formed in various ways; and as we shall see, they have also required the impetus and guidance of nationalist ideologies and movements. Besides, sociologically, we have to distinguish different points of departure, as well as various routes, in the formation of nations, which in turn give rise to contrasting kinds of nation. To these points of origin and routes, I now turn.

Routes of nation formation

In distinguishing between broad kinds of origin and routes, there is, to begin with, an important difference between nations formed around an entire ethnic community, and those built up on the basis of parts, or fragments, of one or more ethnies. In the latter case, we are dealing with migrant communities of settlers, who have split off from the ‘motherland’ and their fellow ethnic members, whether for economic or religious and political reasons, and have sought a new life as a community, or communities, elsewhere, usually overseas. Alternatively, they may have been forcibly settled overseas by the authorities
of the home ethnie and sought over time to colonise the new lands. In these cases, the culture of the migrant community is largely that of its home ethnie or nation, but it is gradually transformed under the impact of the new surroundings. This in turn may give rise to a settler ideology, which is often bolstered by a religious and racial exclusiveness allied to some kind of providentialist ideology. Such was very much the case in the colonies of the United States, as well as in South Africa, and, to a much lesser extent, in Australia and New Zealand, where the homeland state played a greater directive role. In Canada and Argentina, on the other hand, ethnic migration and colonisation were from the first state projects; and they often lacked the biblical and providentialist ideologies that were so prominent in the colonies of the United States and among the Afrikaners.22

Nevertheless, all these immigrant nations became magnets for fragments of other ethnies, who left their homelands for economic or religious and political reasons; and with one exception, all of these developing nations sought, to a greater or lesser extent, to assimilate the new waves of migrants into the language and culture of the dominant ethnie. The exception, of course, were those Afrikaners who saw themselves, like the Israelites of old in Egypt, as increasingly oppressed by the British, and who as a result through the Great Trek of 1833–38 sought to separate themselves as a caste apart, exploiting the labour of the surrounding African population and developing a covenantal type of ethnic nationalism. Hence, the early pluralism of an immigrant South African society became increasingly hierarchical and polarised and, in the following century, the resulting race–caste system ultimately became legally entrenched under the apartheid regime. Only since the 1990s has there been a movement towards a plural nation, albeit under the leadership of the black population.23

The point of departure for the formation of nations formed around an entire dominant ethnie lies, as we have seen, in the elements of ethno-genesis. But the latter have given rise to different kinds of ethnies – not to mention large numbers of ethnic categories and networks. The most important distinction here is that between ‘lateral’ and ‘vertical’ ethnic communities. Lateral ethnies have extended and ragged borders, and low social depth. They usually include the aristocracy and higher clergy, along with some bureaucrats and wealthy traders, and theirs is often the status pride of a caste apart. In contrast,
vertical or ‘demotic’ ethnies reveal a much more intensive emotional bond between the members, and a correspondingly smaller territorial extent. Barriers to entry (and exit) are higher, and cultural assimilation, let alone intermarriage, is frowned upon. In many demotic ethnies, the sacred, missionary aspect is paramount. Frequently, too, they have an urban basis, with a following among lower clergy and artisans; alternatively, they may be formed around tribal confederations under clan chiefs, united for battle in the name of a binding religion such as Islam.²⁴

On the basis of these two kinds of ethnie, nations may be formed along distinctive routes, led by different strata and institutions. In the first of these, members of some of the powerful lateral or aristocratic ethnies may establish strong states around the dominant ethnie; examples that spring to mind include medieval England, France, Spain, Sweden and Russia. Through a process of bureaucratic incorporation, such kingdoms and their state elites tend to annex outlying regions and gradually include some of the lower strata, to whom over the generations they purvey their own culture or, as in the case of the Normans and the English, combine it with that of their linguistically and ethnically different subjects.²⁵

Over time, this process engenders a powerful elite sense of national identity tied to growing territorialisation of shared attachments and memories. At this stage, elite patriotism is taken up by members of the middle classes – a development encouraged by the standardisation of laws and legal institutions across the territory, and by the rise of a distinct public culture of ritual, symbolism and vernacular codes. That culture becomes the more unified to the degree that religious uniformity has been engineered by the state elites in their struggles with their aristocratic rivals, and has been used to mobilise public opinion against minorities and outsiders, as was the case in later sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, France and England.²⁶

But the line between ‘crown-centred’ patriotism – loyalty to the kingdom, the monarch and his or her subjects – and nationalism is thin, as patriots too desire national autonomy, unity and identity and seek the welfare of the national community through both state and private initiatives. Moreover, as Maurizio Viroli points out, patriotism requires shared historical experiences, as well as memories of collective achievement and sacrifice, exactly the requirements that Ernest
Renan laid down for the sustenance of the nation. It also presupposes the common culture and language of the ‘core’ ethnic population, as well as its public culture of symbols, rituals and vernacular codes. For this reason, patriots tend to promote cultural and linguistic unification, and demand the assimilation of minorities. After the introduction of democracy, this cultural exclusivity is, if anything, reinforced: the ‘people’ are only those who belong, or assimilate, to the dominant culture, that is, the culture of the dominant historic ethnie. And to them alone belongs the sovereignty, the state being for this purpose their instrument, as French nationalism from the Revolution onwards has repeatedly demonstrated. By this stage, the transformation of a loose, extended and aristocratic ethnie into a mass political and culturally unified nation has been accomplished.\(^{27}\)

One can detect the presence of the major social and symbolic processes of nation formation equally in the second route, that of vernacular mobilisation. Generally speaking, we are dealing with smaller, subject ethnic populations, and especially those with a high degree of self-awareness as relatively compact communities of belonging. In several areas, such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe, these communities constituted a ‘frozen mosaic’ occupying distinct niches in far-flung polities, such as the millets in the Ottoman empire. In these cases, it is not state elites, but a ‘returning intelligentsia’ that exercises leadership in the quest for national community and autonomy.\(^{28}\)

Typically, many intellectuals and some of the professionals, alienated from their own community by rapid urbanisation, secularism and westernisation, sought entry into the modern West, or its colonial bureaucracies and professions. Those among them who were, or felt, thwarted in their ambitions and denigrated by Western officialdom, and who as a result returned to their communities, tended to adopt one of three main responses. They sought to strengthen its traditions and values against what they now regarded as corroding Western values – the familiar neo-traditionalist path; or they enthusiastically encouraged the community’s enforced westernisation and hence its entry into secular modernity – a messianic assimilationist path; or they attempted to balance native community and alien modernity, by combining the inherited values and traditions of the community with Western ways and ideals – a broadly reformist path.
One significant result, particularly of the reformist and neo-traditionalist routes, was to promote far greater scrutiny of the symbols, traditions, myths and memories of the community, even as their authority and that of the religion that underpinned them came under sustained challenge from the Western ‘scientific state’ and from capitalist economic penetration.\textsuperscript{29}

The reformists, in particular, sought to resolve this conflict of authority by according value to both the traditional community and the secular Western ‘scientific state’, a situation that we can term ‘dual legitimation’. But the inherent instability of their position became painfully clear. One solution, and perhaps the most far-reaching, was to turn the community into the subject, rather than the object, of historical movement, the self-determining motor of its own destiny, and thereby to seek its revival in the political realm. This entailed a concerted effort to rediscover its ethnic past (or pasts), and to utilise ethnic culture for social and political ends, with the result that a largely apolitical, if not quietist, ethnie was suddenly transformed into an activist political nation. To this end, the intellectuals sought to furnish the community with ‘maps’, both cognitive and territorial, and ‘mor- alities’, both individual and collective, for its new destiny; and in consequence, to unify the language, culture and customs of the community in accordance with the ideology of nationalism by establishing institutions, notably schools, festivals, games and arts, which would embody the distinctive public culture of the new nation. Above all, they sought to mobilise the members through an emphasis on vernacular, and popular, culture, albeit carefully pruned and reinterpreted. Following the precepts of Herder, in particular, Romantic intellectuals such as the German philologist Jakob Grimm, the Czech historian Frantisek Palacky, the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, the Greek historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos as well as the novelist Walter Scott appealed to nativist history, shared memories of saints and heroes, vernacular languages, native customs and liturgies (suitably adapted) and folk arts to mobilise fellow members of their ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{30}

The aim of all this cultural industry was to employ history and archaeology, philology and anthropology, as well as the arts, not just to appeal to ‘the people’, but to authenticate the nation, to reveal its true ‘essence’ and its ‘pure’ nature. Not only did historians and
philologists, such as Arndt, von Ranke, Grimm, Korais and Palacky, help in the quest to establish an ancient, and preferably noble, pedigree for the new nation; they also provided stirring exempla virtutis for latterday emulation and ‘proofs’ of the primordial purity of its original language and culture. Through these ‘sciences’ and arts, the nation’s ‘inner depths’ and therefore its raison d’être could be revealed to an often sceptical people, and world.31

Social and symbolic bases of nations

Compared with the formation of nations through bureaucratic incorporation, the route of vernacular mobilisation characterised a much larger proportion of cases, and it also required, and received, a greater contribution from activist intellectuals and professionals. Their role will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. But it would be a mistake to see them as imagining the community of the nation, or inventing national traditions, as it were, ex nihilo. Not only did the social conditions of their alienation and return to the community have to be in place before the processes of vernacular mobilisation could become operative, at least some of the social and symbolic processes of nation formation had to be well developed, before the activities of a returning intelligentsia could have their desired effect. Most obvious in this respect was the survival of various ethnic cultures, replete with their own customs, languages, myths, memories and symbols, often preserved in the rituals, cults and liturgies of native churches. It also helped that, at least in some of these culture areas, distinctive ethno-scapes fusing land and people had evolved, and that several ethnic networks and communities laid claim to particular terrains as ‘immemorially theirs’. Through the various provincial and ethnic churches, too, elements of distinctive public cultures were transmitted down the generations, even where the religious tradition in question was universal in scope – as became clear in the various Orthodox churches that developed in the Balkans, or in the different Buddhist traditions of Sri Lanka, Burma and Tibet. And although in many cases we cannot perhaps speak of the development of territorial legal institutions and statutes in the same terms as those of, say, the medieval West European polities, the basis for such laws and procedures could be discerned in the traditions and regulations of the
churches and the religious orders, as well as in village and regional customs and statutes.\textsuperscript{32}

In this way, then, the major social and symbolic processes formed the basis on which, and out of which, various elites could fashion the nation, whichever the historical route of its formation. Even immigrant ‘plural’ nations owed their formation to the various processes of self-definition, symbol cultivation, territorialisation, legal standardisation and dissemination of a distinctive public culture. They too took their point of departure from the settlement of fragments of dominant ethnies whose distinctive public cultures came to provide the framework and content of the norms and values of their nations. They too were formed through the observance of shared customs and standard laws, and increasingly through uniform legal institutions and procedures, both before and after the acquisition of an independent state. And while, in the early stages of ethnic settlement, we can only speak of a more local or provincial territorialisation of the immigrants’ attachments and shared memories, over time increasing communications created a mobile public for whom large-scale and often majestic landscapes and their associations came to play an ever more significant part in the forging of national unity and a sense of shared identity, whether in the mountains or on the prairie, veldt or pampas. Something of their response can be seen, for example, in the landscape art of the United States and Canada in the last two centuries.\textsuperscript{33}

From this perspective, then, the formation of nations comprises a set of social processes that require investigation over the longue durée. This does not mean that ethno-symbolism is committed to an analysis of nation formation in terms of cumulative growth and gradualism. After all, the rate and intensity of nation formation varies considerably, and both are subject to the intervention of human agency, as well as to frequent conflicts, ruptures and discontinuities. Even less does it entail a determinism of ends. There is nothing inexorable, unilinear or irreversible about the formation of nations, nor can we trace a determinate sequence of steps in their creation, from ‘ethnie to nation’. There are, after all, plenty of ethnies that have retained their status as ethnic communities over long periods well into the modern epoch; just as there are many familiar cases where more than one ethnie or ethnic network has been involved in the formation of a
particular nation. Moreover, the rate of development of each of the social and symbolic processes that encourage the formation of nations, and the manner of their combination, vary considerably from case to case. On the other hand, without the development of these social processes, no amount of active human intervention would suffice to produce nations. Nations (as opposed to states) cannot be simply wished into existence by intellectuals or any other elite, without support from other sectors of the population, and without the development of key social and symbolic processes; the record of such attempts, notably in subSaharan Africa, has not been encouraging.

Furthermore, for there to be a measure of success in the enterprise of nation formation, the presence or creation of ethnic ties of some kind is likely to be particularly conducive. In that sense, then, elements of nationhood can be seen to precede nationalism and to create favourable conditions for its wide reception and implementation. For its appeal necessarily depends on the resonance of the popular traditions, values, memories, myths and symbols that nationalists ‘rediscover’ and adapt for novel political ends.
4 The role of nationalism

Nationalism can be defined as an ideological movement to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members believe it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’. Nationalism is not simply a shared sentiment or consciousness, nor is it to be equated with the ‘rise of nations’. It is an active movement inspired by an ideology and symbolism of the nation.

The ideological movement has several aspects. There is, first, a ‘core doctrine’ that brings together propositions about humanity and politics and prescriptions for action. The ‘core doctrine’ holds that:

1. humanity is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny;
2. the nation is the sole source of political power;
3. loyalty to the nation takes precedence over other loyalties;
4. to be free, human beings must belong to a nation;
5. nations require maximum autonomy and self-expression;
6. global peace and justice can only be built on the basis of a plurality of free nations.¹

Nationalism is a doctrine about the nation, not the state. Although in practice, a free nation often needs a state of its own for protection and the nurture of its culture, this is not an absolute requirement, as nations without states such as Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia attest to this day. For many nationalists, nations are natural organisms and ‘exist in nature’; they are therefore prior to the state. For non-nationalists, too, nations are best described as historic culture communities or
communities of prestige, and so are quite distinct from the ‘state’, which can be defined as a set of autonomous institutions exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory.²

As a result, scholars such as Walker Connor and Maurizio Viroli have insisted on a radical distinction between ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’, arguing that the former pertains to states and their territories such as city-states, while the latter must be related solely to ethnic, or ethno-national, communities. Just as one should not speak of German or Arab patriotism, so we cannot talk about American or British nationalism, for the former pertain to nations, the latter to states. And the tradition of republican patriotism is quite different from, if not opposed to, that of an ethno-cultural nationalism.³

The trouble with this clearcut logical separation is that, for many people, the two kinds of loyalty have been, and continue to be, identical. As we saw, this is because, in practice, there is considerable overlap between the two concepts. Many patriots evince the same desires for collective autonomy, unity and identity – the goals of nationalism – and much the same fervour and solidarity, even if the ‘nation’ they aspire to realise is a community of shared memories, political symbols, myths and common values and not the ancestral Volkseele and folk language community of Romantic doctrine that was adopted by some, mainly Central and East European, nationalists. This is as true of federal nations such as the Swiss and the American, as of unitary republics such as the French and the Italian. ‘Patriotism’ may differ to some extent in its emphasis on the shared memories of sacrifice and the values and symbols of a territorial political community. But this only reflects the differences in the routes of nation formation that we considered in the last chapter, and in the consequent varieties of nations.⁴

Second, and in spite of these differences, nationalisms share a number of key motifs and themes. These include:

1. **autonomy**, the aspiration on the part of the members for their national community to live in accordance with its own laws and rhythms, free from all outside interference;
2. **unity**, the desire of the members for both territorial unification and unimpeded mobility throughout, as well as for social solidarity, fraternity and sorority;
3. identity, or distinctiveness, the recovery by the members of the ‘innate’ individuality of the national community, and its tangible embodiment and visible projection in ritual and artistic form;

4. authenticity, the rediscovery by some of its members of the ‘true nature’ and sense of being of the national community in its unique origins, history and culture;

5. the homeland, a sense of belonging, memory and attachment by the members of the community to an ancestral or historic territory regarded as uniquely ‘theirs’;

6. dignity, the belief on the part of the members that their community should be accorded prestige and status commensurate with its true ‘inner worth’;

7. continuity, the conviction on the part of the members that they are linked with often remote ancestors and earlier cultures in the homeland in a relatively unbroken line of succession;

8. destiny, the conviction on the part of the members that the national community has a foreordained, and usually glorious, path of progress peculiar to itself.

Of course, the importance of these motifs varies considerably between nationalist movements, and from period to period. But, like the core doctrine, these themes recur continually, and serve to demarcate ‘nationalist’ from other kinds of ideological movement, endowing them with a flexible, rich and poetic quality, while evoking dark emotional intimations of a secular salvation drama.5

No doubt this is a rather abstract and schematic formulation. In practice, nationalist movements are also animated by all kinds of specific ideas and beliefs peculiar to the historical situation of the particular community, and it is often these that fire the imaginations of their members and to which nationalists must appeal. Ideas and cultural practices such as Ataturk’s Sun Language theory, the annual French celebration of Bastille Day, Thanksgiving Day in the United States, the sense of Poland as a martyred Christ form the specific and special myths, memories, rituals, ceremonies and symbols that so often circulate among different segments of the ethnic community or network, or in the wider polity, and which often make it so difficult to grasp and empathise with the nationalisms of ‘other peoples’.
For most analysts, and especially modernists, it is the political uses and organisations of nationalisms, as well as their varying impact and success, that are judged to be central to the study of nations and nationalism. Less attention has been given to their symbolic roots and cultural character, dimensions that are particularly significant in the eyes of ethno-symbolists, as they allow us to enter the ‘inner world’ of nationalism. Here, I shall focus on four issues: the role and character of nationalist activity; cultural nationalism and Romanticism; the question of popular ‘resonance’; and the role of nationalism as a ‘religion of the people’.

Nationalism as ‘political archaeology’

Who are the nationalists? There has been considerable debate among scholars as to the social background of the movement’s activists and followers. For some, nationalism in Europe originated among disgruntled aristocrats, lower clergy and bureaucrats. Some rulers, too, sought to appropriate nationalist ideology in order to induce patriotic sentiments and create a measure of unity among their populations, as with the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman empire and the policies of Russification in the later Tsarist empire. For others, it is a case of the ‘blocked mobility’ of the rising upper middle classes, many of whom were unable to enter the professions or bureaucracy or find employment worthy of their education and (real or perceived) merits. But then we can also find centres of nationalist activity among military officers, merchants and traders, some trades unions and the intelligentsia, especially in Asia and Africa. It seems that most social classes and strata have been involved in varying degrees in nationalist movements and activities, and there is usually either no single ‘bearer’ class in any given case, or it varies from period to period, so that the quest for the social origins of nationalism, at least in terms of class composition, can tell us little about ‘nationalism-in-general’, only about the character and role of specific nationalist movements in given historical circumstances.6

The same is true of the part played by the ‘intelligentsia’ within nationalist movements. The social origins of its members are quite varied; what distinguishes this stratum is rather their advanced education and their interest in ideas and knowledge. The term is often
used to include both intellectuals and professionals, roughly those who create and those who disseminate and apply ideas and knowledge. I shall return to the special role of intellectuals in the next chapter. As for the professionals, their role and importance within nationalist movements have been disputed. Some scholars argue that they have figured prominently in the public relations of all kinds of political movements, which is what we would expect given their skills and aptitudes, and that in any case their influence varied considerably as between different cases of nationalism. Others claim that lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists and other professionals are over-represented in nationalist movements and provide an indispensable link between the intellectuals who originate the ideals of the nation and the masses they seek to mobilise; or that, in Miroslav Hroch’s three-stage model, they have formed the bulk of the political agitators in the second phase (B) of nationalist development.7

There is some truth in both positions, although I am inclined to think that, historically, professionals have played a vital role in most nationalist movements and not just as advocates and propagandists. But, perhaps we have been posing the wrong question. Rather, we should be asking: what do nationalists do, and how do they achieve their goals? For many modernists, the answer would seem to be that the nationalists are the ‘nation-builders’, and the nation is largely their creation. And certainly, from the time of Rousseau’s national lawgivers on, there have been nationalists who conceived their role in these grandiose terms – although, in point of fact, many of their economic, technological and political activities could better be described as ‘state-’ rather than ‘nation’-building, difficult though it often is to separate the two.

For ethno-symbolists, the role of nationalists in the creation of nations, although equally significant, is more modest and circumscribed. Their task is to rediscover, select and reinterpret the past or pasts of a given community, reshape its conception of its present state and so help to regenerate the community. In this perspective, nationalism becomes a form of ‘political archaeology’ and nationalists political archaeologists seeking to place the community in its appropriate temporal and spatial contexts. Just as the archaeologist seeks to relate the excavated material culture to its historic time, so the nationalist aims to place his or her nation within its own time-frame by relating
it to a rediscovered past or pasts. Similarly, just as the archaeologist seeks to place the relics of the past in their correct local and regional setting, so the nationalist aims to locate the nation in its proper cultural and geopolitical environment. The nationalist’s overall aim is to ground the nation on firm and ‘authentic’ foundations, preferably with sound documentary evidence, and this he or she does by rediscovering, selecting and reinterpreting the past in order to provide a cognitive framework, or ‘map’, for the present-day community. But his or her ‘archaeology’ also has a social and political purpose: to unite the community, restore its autonomy and self-expression and, in this way, to prepare it to take its rightful place in the concert of nations.8

This suggests a clear role for nationalists in the formation of nations, but one that is more limited than the ‘nation-builder’ of the modernists, let alone the inventor and artificer of the ‘post-modernists’. The task of the nationalist-as-political-archaeologist is to reshape the present state of the community through a reinterpretation of its past or pasts at the point where the basic social and symbolic processes have developed and converged to create the possibility of a national form of community. It is the nationalists who forge the particular shape of that community, giving it its distinctive contours and ethos, and preparing it for its moral and political destiny.

Cultural nationalism and Romanticism

Over twenty years ago, John Hutchinson elaborated a seminal and fundamental distinction between two kinds of nationalism, cultural and political, and demonstrated its significance for the creation of the modern Irish, and other, nations. Political nationalists, he argued, aimed to secure for the nation an independent, sovereign, territorial state, and their activities and organisations were designed to fulfil these goals. In contrast to these mainly political activities, cultural nationalists sought the moral regeneration of the community, in order to create a self-sustaining and solidary nation. Both these kinds of nationalism were concerned with the welfare and autonomy of the nation, so that these different kinds of activity, Hutchinson argued, should be seen as complementary and often alternating rather than antithetical, with a political type of nationalism predominating in
one period, to be followed by cultural nationalist activities when the political route was blocked.9

More recently, Hutchinson has focused on the vital role of revivalist nationalists in generating the myths and memories of nations. It is here that Romanticism has had such an impact. While Romanticism, or better, romanticisms, as aesthetic and moral movements, knew no boundaries, and were equally at home in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England, France and Germany, the greatest political influence of their devotees was exerted where nationalism assumed an overtly ethno-cultural form, especially in Eastern Europe. Unlike the more civic and territorial–political forms of nationalism common in Western Europe, ethnic nationalisms emphasised the importance of genealogical ties for national belonging, vernacular culture such as languages, customs and cults, a nativist ethno-history and shared folk memories, and popular mobilisation – the appeal to ‘the people’ as the ‘authentic’ voice of the nation. These motifs encouraged the diffusion of romantic sensibilities and gave them greater scope.10

Of course, we can find romantic elements in the civic and territorial nationalisms of Western Europe, notably in England, France and Switzerland. The return to medieval epochs and to Saxon, Celtic and Norse themes by writers and artists such as Thomas Gray, Bishop Percy, William Blake and James Barry, and later Sir Walter Scott, fed a strong sense of cultural diversity and a quest for an authentic English, Scots, Welsh and Irish national distinctiveness, but equally a vivid British national sentiment, invoking a longstanding image of ‘Britannia’. In Switzerland, Lavater’s *Alpenlied* (1732), Füssli’s *Oath of the Rütli* (1778–81), and the literary and historical research of Jakob Bodmer and his circle, paved the way for the historic association of a sense of Swiss national identity with the surrounding Alpine landscape, already evident in some of the pronouncements of members of the Helvetic Society in the 1760s. Romantic currents are also found in many of Rousseau’s writings, and even in the pent-up emotion and yearning of David’s paintings such as the *Brutus* of 1789 and the *Assassination of Marat* of 1793, both of which stress the role of individual sensibility and the moral Will, obstinately subjective elements that helped to undermine the harmonious system of Enlightenment rationalism. In Rousseau, too, we may discern the beginnings of that cult of free self-expression
that was to be echoed in French artists such as Girodet, Ingres and (later) Gericault and Delacroix. Even in the new lands of America, the Republic founded on the Greco-Roman model was soon invaded by Romantic currents, expressed in both literature and painting.\textsuperscript{11}

Nevertheless, it was in Germany, Eastern Europe and the Balkans that Romanticism’s political influence was most evident. Here, the three fundamental Romantic themes of unfettered individual will and action, the cult of specificity and cultural diversity, and the yearning for authentic self-expression were articulated most forcibly, with unmistakeable political results. All three fed the major ethnic nationalist preoccupation with ‘national identity’, a recurrent concern in areas of politically divided ethnicity such as Germany and Italy, or mixed ethnicity as in much of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The idea that each people had its unique voice and style, its original culture and individuality, as Herder had taught, struck a powerful chord among the small coteries of intellectuals and middle classes of the different ethnic communities and networks in these areas. Here, revivalist cultural nationalists often took the lead, forging vernacular languages, rediscovering historical texts and epics such as the \textit{Nibelungenlied}, the \textit{Chanson de Roland} and the \textit{Kalevula}, and celebrating ‘authentic’ peasant music, dance and customs, in order to unite and regenerate their designated communities as self-sustaining political nations.\textsuperscript{12}

Romantic ideological devotion to a sense of national identity was one aspect of a wider search for ‘authenticity’. Although there had been some interest in recalling great events from the national past in, for example, sixteenth-century England and seventeenth-century Netherlands and Denmark, this was actuated more by a need to reaffirm the noble origins and greatness of the nation, or to remind people of their ancestors’ uplifting struggles. The eighteenth century added a novel passion for historical roots and archaeological verismilitude as a means of discovering the ‘true essence’ of the nation, the original and distinctive spirit that from its inception had animated its parts, and continued to do so, even if it was hidden from view. Authenticity signified not only the original and primordial, but also that which was peculiar to ‘us’ and to us alone, our sense of being, the quintessential ‘Englishness of English art’, the Gallican spirit, Deutschtum, the indigenous Mexican Indian as ‘rediscovered’ by
Manuel Gamio, etc. – culture values that could not be replicated and whose discovery and depiction therefore attracted a host of writers, composers and artists. This was the cult that brought to the fore the memories, symbols, myths and traditions of ‘the people’, embodied above all in the rustic folk and their arts, customs and mores, the people who for nationalists embodied the ‘essence’ of the nation and who enabled them to unite the elites with various sectors of the larger population. Analysis of the quest for ‘authentic’ dimensions of the nation in these cultural elements furnishes an important key to entering the ‘inner world’ of nationalism.13

For Rousseau and the English writers and poets who preceded him, this quest for authenticity was, in turn, part of a more all-embracing ‘return to nature’. It is in Nature, and especially on the soil of the homeland, that ‘we’ can ‘find ourselves’. The homeland is our place of birth, the home of our family, the land of our education and employment, the last resting-place of our ancestors. This is what has formed the ‘character’ of the people and endowed them with their distinctive traits. In the eighteenth century, the notion that national character was the product of soil and climate was widely believed, and to this determinism, Rousseau, Burke and the poets added an idealisation of and a subjective attachment to intimate and homely, or wild and sublime landscapes. Reacting against the overly rationalist, urban culture of the early Enlightenment, these prophets of Romantic naturalism prepared the ground for the cultural nationalists by extolling the simple and healthy life of the countryside and its inhabitants and by identifying the land with the ‘real’ people.14

The cult of Nature was matched by that of the heroes. The hero and heroine embodied the innate virtue and ‘true essence’ of the nation, and it was his or her exemplum virtutis that could help to restore a sense of dignity to downtrodden peoples and inspire and mobilise them to resist oppression and fight for self-rule. As embodiments of the national spirit and the national Will in action, canons of heroes, heroines and geniuses became the most prized instruments, and possessions, for the forging of nations and their sense of self-worth. The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the propagation throughout Europe of myths and memories of distant heroes and half-forgotten battles, as cultural nationalists rediscovered and published epics and chronicles of the early Middle Ages, as painters
read about and sought to depict often obscure episodes from distant pasts, and as archaeologists uncovered the remains of tombs, palaces, villages and even whole cities such as Pompeii and Herculaneum, revealing both the succession of ‘cultures’ and the early history of each community. Nor were these concerns confined to Europe. Such cults spread to Asia, Africa and Latin America, whether by direct colonial European example, or indirectly, through identical naturalising, historicising and authenticating impulses, producing similar historical quests for ancient chronicles and epics such as the Ramayana in India and the Shahname in Iran and parallel archaeological discoveries such as those of ancient Karnak, Persepolis, Teotihuacan and Great Zimbabwe. Once again, the cults of the hero and the genius help to open windows into the inner world of nationalist ideas and relations.15

Romanticisms, then, provided cultural nationalists, particularly in ethnically mixed areas, with powerful weapons for the political mobilisation of whole communities. By extolling the vernacular, elevating individual will and spurring heroic emulation, their many currents helped to bring together the developing trends of self-definition, territorialisation, symbolic cultivation and the like, and to give them an immediacy and tangibility for many people in the cults of Nature, authenticity and the heroic.

‘Popular’ nationalism

But how can the often tiny circles of cultural, or political, nationalists hope to influence and mobilise the large numbers of their designated co-nationals so necessary to realise their project of regenerating the community as a nation? Broadly speaking, intellectuals remain ineffective as cultural entrepreneurs unless supported either by the state and its agencies or by segments of ‘the people’. In the former case, there are undoubted benefits for the nationalists, but the danger is obvious: state elites tend to take over, not just the activities and organisations of the nationalists, but in varying degrees the content of their ideas. This has often led to tension and conflict, as was the case in the colonial setting. Nevertheless, the format and many of the ideals of the early African and Asian nationalists (who were often professionals) were defined by the geopolitical setting, institutions
and culture created by the imperial powers. Even the ideas used to challenge the latter’s hegemony, such as the Christian doctrine of equality of all believers, were often borrowed from their masters. In these cases, the role of revivalist cultural nationalists tended to be secondary: Cheikh Anta Diop, even Leopold Senghor, may have given African nationalisms a new cultural inflection and depth, but in the short term at least, they did not alter their political goals. The same was true of the West itself. Various groups of political intellectuals in France or Britain may have proposed alternative models of national destiny, but these were either ignored or circumscribed and subject to the controls exerted by state elites and bureaucrats and the guidance of established political parties.16

There was far more latitude for revivalists in ethnic communities where the nationalists had to seek support from different sections of the wider populace. As we saw in our earlier discussion of the vernacular mobilisation of demotic ethniess, the nationalists had to appeal to ‘the people’ through various folk memories, myths, symbols, customs and traditions current in the ‘homeland’ area they had designated for their ‘nation-to-be’, which was itself based on ‘ethnic demography’ and myths of political history. However, many of these memories, myths and traditions were local. They needed to be pruned, and some of the more politically promising among them generalised to cover adjacent districts, so as to produce a worthy national history and mythology. While there have been examples of arbitrary selection, even of nationalist forgery, cultural nationalists were intent on recreating a vernacular culture and history that would meet the two basic criteria of historical plausibility and popular ‘resonance’. As far as the former is concerned, the limited state of historical knowledge and, in some cases, the paucity of records for the period in question meant that the nationalists could only hope for a plausible, and approximate, reconstruction of the successive epochs of the community’s ethno-history, one that could fulfil their requirement for continuity in the designated homeland, but always within the parameters of received knowledge. By seeking documentary evidence and using the ideas of the new social ‘sciences’, cultural nationalists hoped to place their political projects on firm historical foundations and convince their kinsmen, as well as a hostile world, of the truth of their claims.17
Popular ‘resonance’ posed even greater problems. First, there was the question of who constituted ‘the people’. Was it the ‘authentic’ peasantry, or the workers, or the artisans and small traders? And which people, and where? In some cases such as Finland or the Basque country, the answer was fairly clear. But, in much of Eastern Europe, as well as parts of the Middle East, the designated nation was much more heterogeneous and its homeland far more ragged; and it was often divided into cultural regions, each with its own dialect (if not language) and separate customs, arts and folk memories. Even where there existed a relatively cohesive core ethnic community around which to base the nation-to-be, as in Poland, Serbia, Iran and Burma, it usually failed to extend over the whole territory of the projected homeland. This did not mean that the nation had to be artificially fabricated de novo, but it did require, as we have seen, careful selection of popular ethnic traditions, symbols and memories, and the elevation of some of them to the exclusion of others. It meant reinterpreting and adjusting the historical narratives conceived by different intellectuals to the ethnic realities on the ground, or choosing a narrative and dialect from one region or ethnic community to represent the whole. Nationalist selection, then, had to respond to the needs, values, memories, symbols and traditions of different segments of the designated population, just as the latter in turn had to be taught the virtues and ideals of ‘their’ nation at the very moment of its creation.18

There was also the question of how to reach ‘the people’. This is where the intelligentsia played an important part, acting as intermediaries between the cultural nationalists and various sectors of the population, particularly in the growing cities. For example, the links between the Greek intelligentsia and the merchant communities in places such as Vienna, Odessa and Constantinople are well known, although its members found it much harder to reach the klephtic fighters and shepherds of the Peloponnese. In the Arab world, too, the teachers helped to purvey the ideals of Arab nationalism to a wider urban audience, and lower civil servants and teachers did much the same for the idea of an Indian nation. As clerks, teachers, journalists, doctors and lawyers, the professionals’ advocacy and politicisation of the national idea propounded by revivalist intellectuals helped to make it familiar and accessible to wider audiences. Their only rival (and
sometimes ally) in this respect was the lower clergy, who could and often did challenge their generally secular reading of the nation. The often close links between clergy and peasantry, and later the lower middle classes, enabled them to project an alternative, religious ideal of the national community, one ironically often more attuned to the needs and outlook of the very class, the rural folk, that nationalist literati regarded as the bedrock and ‘essence’ of their distinctive nation.19

A key question is how far elite ideals and projects could be said to correspond with the sentiments and notions of the majority of the designated population. Could one also speak of a ‘popular’ nationalism, an everyday nationalism of ‘the people’, separate from the national projects of the elites? This has been the subject of considerable debate following Michael Billig’s path-breaking analysis of ‘banal’ or engrained nationalism in the West. Remarking on the many ‘unwaved flags’ on display, Billig argued that national assumptions underlay much of our everyday activities and thinking, in such diverse fields as politics, sport, travel and the news and weather reports. The dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, he argued, are firmly entrenched in our linguistic practices, and the avowed multiculturalism of Western societies is anchored in the still unshaken framework of nationalist beliefs and practices.20

In the same vein, a number of scholars, forsaking the older ‘grand narratives’ of nationalism, have increasingly concentrated on nationalist ideas and cultural practices among the vast majority of the population, the ‘ordinary people’. They have been particularly interested in popular discourses about the nation, in its symbolic re-enactment and in popular consumption of nationalism, the expression of differences in national tastes and preferences. The result is to create a subfield of ‘micro-nationalist’ studies, separate from and sometimes counterposed to the ‘elite narratives’ of an older scholarship.21

In many ways, this represents a refreshing approach and a fruitful field of analysis, given the relative neglect in the existing literature of popular national ideas and preferences. By revealing the workings of national ideas and sentiment among non-elites and the underlying, if intermittently expressed, importance to them of national ideas, the study of ‘everyday nationhood’ has undoubtedly enlarged our understanding of the field. Yet, it also suffers from a number
of limitations. For one thing, it often fails to differentiate the various strata, regions and ethnicities of ‘the people’, each of whom or which may have different ideas and contain a variety of sentiments and preferences. For another, its analyses tend to be confined to the populations of national (and mostly Western) states, if only because of the national methodologies employed in this type of research. But, from an ethno-symbolic perspective, the main problem with the study of everyday nationhood is its lack of historical dimensions. There is little sense of successive generations of a community building on earlier foundations, or the continuous role of national institutions and of the centrality of underlying beliefs and ideas about the nation, expressed in its heritage of memories, traditions, rituals, myths and symbols. Besides, nationalism is at once an elite and a ‘mass’ phenomenon: an ideological movement of elites that places ‘the people’ and its memories, myths, symbols and traditions at the centre of its concerns, and a popular movement that seeks expression and action through the ideals and goals of nationalist elites. So that ‘everyday nationhood’ as a concept can only have meaning and direction within the framework of a conception of ‘historic nationhood’, the widespread, if often tacit, sense of national identity or distinctiveness founded on popular and elite ‘ethno-histories’ – the stories told by the members of a national community to each other, which distil shared memories, values, myths and traditions handed down through the generations of a community.22

‘The religion of the people’

For most scholars, nationalism is a secular ideology and movement, and its political manifestation would normally be civic and republican. This tallies with modernist readings of its philosophical pedigree, from Rousseau and Kant through Herder to Fichte and the German Romantics. For Rousseau, it is the General Will, for Kant, it is the autonomous will, and for Herder, it is the diversity of cultures that form the foundations of national self-determination. These are thoroughly secular concepts: the General Will is sovereign, the autonomous human will obeys only its own inner moral laws, and the diverse cultures reflect the variety of human aptitudes and
achievements. Indeed, on this reading, nationalism can only appear when God has been removed to the margins of the world and society. In its main tenets, too, nationalism has no place for the divine. The doctrine that teaches that humanity is divided into unique nations, that political power resides in the nation, that to be free, human beings must belong to a nation and owe it supreme loyalty, and that nations must have maximum autonomy and self-expression, underpins a secular ideology and a belief system of this world, one in which humanity, not God, is the measure of all things. Nationalism’s chief goals – autonomy, unity and identity or individuality – speak of human autoemancipation, not divine intervention. And its preoccupation with territory, landscapes and borders speaks of terrestrial rather than other-worldly concerns.

It is no wonder, then, that the first great outburst of the national idea and of a nationalist movement occurred in France, during the Revolution. Here was proclaimed, as doctrine for the first time, the unity of the nation within its natural frontiers, the sovereignty and self-determination of the people, and the unique identity of a nation, its language and its public culture. Here, the nation adopted a new flag, inaugurated a new calendar and sang a new hymn to the republic. Here too were held the first plebiscites, in the enclaves of Venaissin and Avignon, to decide the allegiance of their people. In their campaign of de-Christianisation, France’s Jacobin leaders could not have made their radically secular nationalism clearer. In this, as in other respects, France was not only able to export her nationalist revolution by force, but more important, her example was followed for the next two centuries by most of the newly formed nations of the world.

And yet, this is only part of the story. In the last few decades, we have seen a turn towards what is commonly referred to as ‘religious nationalism’. In the Muslim world, in India and parts of southeast Asia, as well as in north America, traditional religious leaders have embraced the nation, and sought to prise it out of the hands of secular nationalists. In India as well as Iran, neo-traditionalist intellectuals and clergymen have attempted to wrest their nations out of westernising assimilation, in order to reinstate older religious values, beliefs, symbols and traditions. This is something more than the
tactical alliance of nationalism with traditional religion that Elie Kedourie had described; it bespeaks a new form of nationalism and makes us question the widespread assumption that nationalism is a purely secular ideological movement.²⁶

But is it really a new form of nationalism? If we think back to the origins of nationalism, we find not only the radical philosophical lineage of Rousseau and Kant, but also the legacy of Lord Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke and Montesquieu, and the still earlier examples of Puritan ‘covenantal’ national movements in England, Scotland and the Netherlands. The keys to this dual heritage are the concepts of ‘chosen people’ and ‘national genius’. As a by-product of its quest for salvation through ‘election’, Reformist Protestantism elevated chosen nations on the Pentateuchal model; the Dutch Calvinists, in particular, saw themselves as latterday children of Israel who had escaped Pharaonic (Spanish) oppression and come into the Promised Land of liberty and riches. Late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Scotland witnessed successive movements for a National Covenant of the people, which was also built on Old Testament foundations, and embraced the ideal of a purified Church of the elect. In England, too, the legacy of the Puritan Commonwealth under Cromwell was the missionary idea of English, and later British, election, which was subsequently to be carried over into her imperial role. This was the cultural context for the idea of ‘national genius’ propounded by Lord Shaftesbury and others, and the widespread belief in national character and distinctiveness, a latterday expression of the analogy of a special relationship to the divine once enjoyed by the children of Israel. So that, even if we continue to regard France during the Revolution as the first case of nationalism, we shall have to revise our ideas of the intellectual lineage of nationalist ideology, and with it of its purely secular nature.²⁷

But there is a more fundamental reason for questioning the thesis of the purely secular nature of nationalism, and that has to do with its role as a species of public culture, with its own political symbols, codes, rituals and practices. Considered strictly as a political doctrine, nationalism may be secular; but, seen as a set of reiterated cultural practices, it appears in a new guise, as a form of religion, one that is of this world and human centred, certainly, and thus secular, but a religion nonetheless, with the nation as its exclusive
divinity, the sovereign people as the elect, a distinction between sacred national and profane foreign objects and symbols, a strong conviction of national history and destiny and, above all, its own national rites and ceremonies. As the Petition of Agitators put it in 1792: ‘The image of the patrie is the sole divinity whom it is permissible to worship’.

We can see this insistence on the role of national rites and ceremonies already in Rousseau’s advice to the Poles in 1772 to promote national schools, festivals and games, in order to keep alive their national spirit, now that they were about to lose their independent state. We can find it also in his Revolutionary followers’ penchant for organising great fêtes in Paris and other French cities to celebrate the patrie and mobilise the citizens for virtue and heroism on its behalf. It can also be seen in the various choral, student and gymnastics societies that flourished in many nineteenth-century European nationalist movements, and which helped to stage periodic popular celebrations such as those at the Wartburg Castle in 1817. In each case, the rituals helped to create a community of believers: the members of the nation who engaged in acts of collective self-worship and declared their readiness to live and die on behalf of the nation.

Of course, this ‘secular religion’ is both different from and opposed to traditional religions, although it may coexist or even ally itself with them. It is an ‘inner-worldly’ religion, a ‘religion of the people’, and the object of its cult is the ‘sacred communion’ of the nation, linking the dead, the living and the yet unborn. As a secular and political form of religion, nationalism elevates the people and citizens as the chief object of worship and ties them to the land of their ancestors and the shrines and landscapes of their saints and heroes. In this respect, nationalism appears novel and modern. At the same time, it draws on many of the motifs, beliefs and rituals of traditional religions, not just for its forms, but also for some of its contents such as myths of ethnic election, the sanctity of the homeland and the messianic role of the leader.

Perhaps the clearest example of this secular religion is provided by the many rituals and ceremonies of national remembrance for soldiers fallen in war ‘for their country’. Here, it becomes hard to disentangle religious from secular-national motifs. On the individual level, the ceremony marks a rite of private grief and a recognition of brutal
carnage and incalculable loss. But at the collective level, it is also a grim and solemn reminder of communal fate, of the trauma and survival of the nation in the face of its enemies and of the repeated blood sacrifice of its youth to ensure the regeneration of the nation. The idea of sacrifice brings with it the hope of renewal and redemption, and the symbolism of that promise takes on religious overtones or borrows directly from religious motifs and liturgies. In the West, it is the symbol of the cross that has epitomised human sacrifice and resurrection; and in the World Wars, it was the resurrection of the soldiers themselves, as in Stanley Spencer’s gigantic fresco *The Resurrection* (1928–32) at Burghclere, each soldier holding his own cross, that embodied the triumphant destiny of the nation. Just as the Cenotaph in London’s Whitehall, the tomb of everyone and no one, embraces the death and the resurrection of the whole community, so the annual re-enactment of the service of remembrance at its steps retraces the harsh narrative of loss and death and the promise of ultimate victory.

Of course, the idea of civic religion is hardly new. We find it already in Rousseau and de Tocqueville. What is perhaps less often recognised is that nationalism as both a belief system and a set of ritual practices is a form, perhaps the most widespread and enduring form, of civic religion, and one that is intimately related to both the heroic individual and the masses. On the one hand, it holds up the national hero or heroine – Hermann, Joan of Arc, Alfred, Wilhelm Tell, Alexander Nevsky – and his or her noble exploits as a model for the community to admire and emulate. On the other hand, it elevates the people in their masses, and especially the ordinary soldier, as the embodiment of the community and its fate. This means that nationalism is grasped simultaneously as a religion of the heroic individual and of the long-suffering masses. It also means that nationalism should not simply be compared with other political ideologies. It is always something more: deeper, more pervasive, darker, more encompassing, more attuned to the ultimate questions of life and death. Rather, as Anderson observed, for all its ‘inner-worldly’ concerns, nationalism must be compared with other religions, above all, because in its concepts of posterity and national destiny, it echoes the concerns of traditional religion with immortality and the after-life. Uniquely, perhaps, nationalism combines the religious and the secular, seeing the salvation drama of
collective death and national resurrection in and through the everyday world of the individual and the masses of the nation.\textsuperscript{32}

**Diversity and unity**

In describing nationalism as a secular form of religion of the people as well as an ideological movement for national unity, autonomy and identity, I do not mean to minimise the varieties of its historical forms, nor the political differences between the forms that the movements take. There are differences in organisation, rituals, leadership and social adherence. There are differences in ideological orientation, especially between the more organic and more voluntarist varieties of nationalism. There are also differences that, as we have seen, stem from the route by which the nation that the nationalists sought to establish and promote came into being, notably between those that resulted from processes of bureaucratic incorporation, including colonialism, and those others that emerged through the various modes of vernacular mobilisation against multi-national empires. These differences have profoundly influenced the ideological hue and the political policies of different nationalisms.\textsuperscript{33}

Nor should we overlook the impact of wider factors such as the geopolitical situation of the designated community, and its history and shared memories of antagonisms and alliances. As critical has been the period of European, and world, history which saw the inception of the nationalist movement, not only have the technological means for furthering its aims varied between periods, but also the language and concepts in which it framed its claims have changed. But, perhaps the most profound differences relate to the political traditions of a society’s public cultures – its rituals, ceremonies, codes and political symbols – and how far these have reflected a hierarchical and imperial, a covenantal and popular, or a civic and republican ethos. As I have sought to show elsewhere, these three great traditions gave rise to different historical forms of nationalism in successive periods, and their interrelations continue to shape the character of various nations and their nationalisms to this day.\textsuperscript{34}

Nevertheless, for all these differences, it makes sense to speak of ‘nationalism-in-general’, to use Ernest Gellner’s phrase. Indeed, we can hardly avoid treating nationalism as a distinctive ideological and
practical phenomenon, with its diverse historical movements exemplifying in varying degrees and forms the key features of the pure type, and its proponents subscribing to the propositions of the ‘core doctrine’. The key features of the ideal type of nationalism include not only the three main goals of autonomy, unity and identity or distinctiveness of the nation or nation-to-be, but also the central themes of cultural diversity, authenticity, collective dignity, the historic homeland, national sacrifice and national history and destiny. Although the emphasis will vary from movement to movement, and between successive periods, we can expect to find many of the cardinal themes and rituals, not to mention the main goals and the core propositions, in ‘nationalist’ as opposed to other kinds of ideological movements; and, other factors being equal, the more intensely and widely they are evidenced, the more powerful the ideological movement in question.

For ethno-symbolists, the unity and the diversity of nationalism are equally significant. The former allows generalisation about the symbolic and social dimensions within a unified field, and its characterisation as a form of ‘secular religion’ opens up comparison with other kinds of religion. The latter encourages scrutiny of the specific symbols, values, traditions, myths and rituals of particular nationalisms, suggesting comparisons and contrasts across the field of nationalist movements; and emphasis on the diversity of national experiences and practices also helps us to place the movement within its historical context of meaning and memory. In either case, ethno-symbolic analysis complements and expands, even when it challenges, the modernist framework. By employing concepts such as political archaeology, authenticity, historic nationhood, revivalism and secular religion, an ethno-symbolic approach directs our attention to the subjective and expressive dimensions of nations and nationalism, and to the motivations of the actors, both of the national elites and of the various groups that make up the wider population in question. Finding the key to understanding neither in elite projects nor in popular nationhood alone, but in their mutual interplay and interrelations, ethno-symbolists seek to give each of them their due weight in the processes of nationalist mobilisation and in their contribution to the formation of nations.
5 Persistence and transformation of nations

Nationalism is often thought to be a nineteenth-century phenomenon. In many quarters, nations, too, are regarded as mementoes of a past age. In the ‘post-national’ era that we are entering, with its dialectic of the local and global, only large power blocs and federations such as the European Union are held to be capable of coping with such problems as environmental pollution, drug trafficking, migration, terrorism and global epidemics, over which national states have little control and which respect no borders. Moreover, within state borders, the growing ethnic and cultural mingling of populations has rendered traditional narratives of national identity increasingly hybrid and fragmented. The national state and its elites may preach official values and traditional myths and symbols, but the various communities that make up its population go their own ways and cleave to their own cultures and religions. Above all, liberal individualism has undermined the political solidarity of the national state, and replaced it by a welfare arena for individual interests and preferences.

In many respects, there is little that is new about these developments. Global pressures and trends have been prevalent for several centuries, if not earlier. Mass communications may have accelerated and diffused these trends but, as William McNeill has demonstrated, they merely resume processes and changes that were widespread before the ‘age of the nation-state’. More important, perhaps, the above picture depends on a rather mythical portrait of the national state, which as a result of migration and war was never as compact, unified or homogeneous as is sometimes assumed, or as some nationalists might have desired. As for political solidarity, at the alleged zenith of the national state around 1900, most national states
were racked by intense class, religious and regional conflicts. In fact, the pertinent question is really one of survival: how did national states manage to remain (more or less) intact, and retain their appeal for ever greater numbers of their designated populations? And on what resources, material and symbolic, could they draw for their continued existence and development?¹

The material resources are well known and frequently discussed in the literature. Modernists underline the importance of the industrial infrastructure, the financial resources, the political institutions and the military organisation of the national state. Here, the emphasis is on the state-building component, with the national community subordinated in an adjectival position. In contrast, for ethno-symbolists, it is the community of the nation that must occupy centre stage and, as a result, symbolic resources merit much greater attention. This is not to say that nations do not require material resources, notably educational and cultural institutions. But these are difficult to separate from their symbolic dimensions and purposes and, while I will begin by considering some aspects of these institutions, the discussion will lead imperceptibly into a consideration of the more profound symbolic and cultural resources of nations.

**Language and public institutions**

Two of the most influential modernist theories of nationalism have focused on cultural resources. The education system is central to Ernest Gellner’s theory. It is the standardised and mass character of modern education, and its systemic and academy-supervised quality, that marks it out from previous kinds of education, and makes it so effective in generating nations and nationalism. The need for mass education is what gives nations their large scale, just as modern societies’ requirement for mass literacy turns language into their effective boundary marker. Language is also central to Benedict Anderson’s theory. Nations for Anderson are essentially bounded print communities, and the dissemination of literature through ‘print capitalism’ makes it imperative to standardise the languages disseminated by printed books and, later, newspapers. This process was greatly abetted in sixteenth-century Europe by the advance of Protestantism with its insistence on Bible reading by individuals and groups,
and by the administrative requirements of monarchs and bureaucrats for effective territorial authority through a single standardised written language. Together, these developments helped to forge territorialised language communities with a sense of inner cohesion.²

Both theories take as their starting-point the Herderian concept of the nation as a language community. Given the influence of Herder in Eastern Europe, the home of classic nineteenth-century nationalism, and the importance of philology and lexicography to the rise of their nationalisms, this is hardly surprising. But, for both theorists, the role of language and culture is largely determined by its uses for, respectively, mass education or print communities. Even Anderson, although he explores literary texts to establish the sociological content of the imagined community that they evoke, ties that content firmly to the advent of urban modernity and does not enquire into the visions of the nation, or the ideologies of self-determination, entertained by the nationalists who seek to unify and mobilise their designated co-nationals for autonomy or sovereign independence. Language and culture serve to fix and demarcate communities, but not to shape and colour the content of their nationhood.

However, given the fluidity of language and dialect, and the many factors that affect the choice of language for a given population, it is doubtful whether so much weight can be attached to linguistic divisions. We see these limitations both in the English-speaking countries and in the Arab world, where a common language has been insufficient to unify politically populations with separate histories over large areas and continents. As John Armstrong points out, despite the ‘fault-lines’ in Europe between Slavic, Germanic and Latin language groups, language choice is dependent on religious and political factors. This is not to say that languages and their idioms are of little significance, rather that they must be treated as part of the cultural ensemble that serves to create intimacy and communion between members of a population, as well as a sense of difference from those outside.³

Similar considerations apply to the various kinds of educational and academic institutions – libraries, museums and universities – that so often accompany the rise of nations. Modernists usually emphasise the socialising effects of cultural institutions and the continuity they give to nations. But, equally important is their role in the creation of the nation’s narratives, images and moralities, again as part of a cultural
network that serves to unify the members of the nation and distinguish them from outsiders. This is clearly illustrated by the ways in which national public museums have evolved, often from private collections, but thereafter under the auspices of the state, and guided by aesthetic or historical criteria. In either case, the criteria are largely national: the objects and artefacts displayed are arranged to tell the story of the nation and its great predecessors, whether in terms of distinct civilisations or of national schools of painting, sculpture and architecture. Even the buildings in which they are housed, whether classical or Gothic, have until recently had a national inflection and superscription.4

Modernists would of course claim that the national purpose of cultural institutions was yet another example of the translation of modern nationalist ideologies into concrete terms. Public galleries in England, France and Spain, for example, formed for encyclopaedic purposes in the era of Enlightenment, only became ‘national’ galleries after the Napoleonic Wars, and their choice of paintings to highlight ‘national schools’ was equally modern. Yet, this is only part of the story. The contents of many public museums, libraries and galleries embody, indeed epitomise, quintessential national dimensions insofar as they bear witness to the ‘origins’ of the nation or to an ‘earlier age’ in its alleged development; and these dimensions in turn have come to form essential symbols of the modern nation in the popular consciousness. Certainly, the quest for ‘authentic’ symbols was a late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century preoccupation. But the artefacts that were deemed to embody the nation were circumscribed by their style or provenance or dating, and were generally pre-modern and not culturally substitutable. More important, key artefacts, such as the Mask of Agamemnon in the case of Greece, the Ardagh Chalice in Ireland, the Lurs and ‘Golden Horns’ in Denmark, or the Declaration of Arbroath in Scotland, have helped to shape people’s images of the character and history of their nation, as much as their own concerns influenced the selection of artefacts that came to embody the ‘essence’ of the nation.5

The role of intellectuals

The same relationships to past and present can be seen in the role of the intellectuals and artists who were so influential in proposing the
category of the nation and delineating its form and ethos. I have already considered the debate over the role of the intelligentsia in nationalist movements, and much the same views and arguments can be found in discussions of the much smaller group of creators of ideas and images of the nation. But here, it seems to me, there is a much stronger case for the seminal role of intellectuals and artists in developing the ideologies of nationalism, as so many nationalist movements originated in small circles of philosophers, poets, philologists and historians, and so many of their ideas were given tangible form by writers, artists and musicians. These were the men and women who rediscovered, selected and reinterpreted existing ethnic symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions, and out of these elements forged the narratives of the nation.6

It is customary to regard these intellectuals as forming a strictly modern stratum, developing *pari passu* with the nation, and hence as modern counterparts of priestly and scribal castes in traditional societies in antiquity and the Middle Ages. But this is not only to forget the independent contributions of the humanists of the Renaissance as well as the poets, philosophers, sophists and orators of the ancient world; it is to overlook the longstanding tradition of their creative and critical role that has shaped the attitudes and outlook of so many modern intellectuals in relation to the ‘national’ past, as well as to their characteristic ‘national’ activities. Of course, in many cases, it was only a minority of intellectuals and artists who were involved in the national project. But, even among those who remained relatively apolitical, the idea of the nation and of a ‘world of nations’ played a large part in shaping their philosophical and aesthetic outlook, if only in terms of their linguistic and cultural audience. We can see this both in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century poetry, such as that of Wordsworth and Schiller, and also in European music where, in some of the works of Beethoven, Schubert and Carl Maria von Weber, if not already in Mozart’s *The Magic Flute* (1791), a romantic German influence is felt, more especially in vocal music; although it was not until a generation later that a more determined pursuit of ‘national’ themes and motifs became prevalent in classical music. But, while the political uses to which they were put were decidedly modern, some of the cultural contents of the national idea were derived from older, elite or folk, traditions. For the nationalist intellectuals, it became a question
of selecting from these traditions, symbols, myths and memories those that could ‘authenticate’ the nation, that is, reveal its ‘true essence’ stripped of later, derivative accretions. Just as late eighteenth-century architects such as Ledoux and Laugier sought to return to the primitive simplicity of the hut and lintel, so nationalist poets, painters and musicians yearned for a new simplicity of expression that was felt to embody the natural and ‘authentic’ origins of the nation. Hence the quest for popular forms and motifs that would echo the well-springs of the nation, in contrast to the artificiality and frivolity of court and urban life.7

Music and the visual arts

Attention has usually been focused on the role of humanist intellectuals – lexicographers, philologists, philosophers, poets and historians. Equally important for the realisation and interpretation of the national idea, as well as for its wider dissemination, was the part played by various kinds of artist in giving palpable ‘substance’ or ‘body’ to the national idea, turning an abstraction into tangible forms. From the early nineteenth century, the burgeoning nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe began to stir the imaginations of composers and musicians, who sought out new musical forms in which to express various themes and aspects of national belonging. In piano music, Chopin translated into his own terms some of the rhythms and genres of Polish elite and folk dances such as polonaises and mazurkas, as well as expanding the new forms of ballade, waltz and nocturne. In opera, Carl Maria von Weber, and later Wagner and Verdi, sought out romantic medieval episodes and legends, often magical and supernatural, to portray both ancient heroism and the dark forces of nature. These scenes were not confined to the composer’s nation and its traditions. The same energies and mysteries could be purveyed through the ancient legends of other peoples: Verdi portrayed the lost loves and patriotism of ancient Egyptians in Aida and of Jewish captives in Babylon in Nabucco, along with the triumphs and tragedies of the Genoese leader Simon Boccanegra and the jealousy of the Venetian Moor Othello, while Wagner was equally at home in Celtic Breton legend in Tristan and Isolde as in the Icelandic and Germanic sagas of The Ring of the Nibelungen.8
A similar ‘historical mobility’, to use the term Robert Rosenblum applied to late eighteenth-century artists, can be found among composers of that peculiarly Romantic musical form, the symphonic or tone poem. Although it had precursors in Berlioz’ Symphonie Fantastique, Mendelssohn’s music for A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony, it was essentially a novel form which sought to translate into relatively free musical ideas the spirit of poetic texts. The great pioneer of the form was Franz Liszt, but the vogue spread to several lands – to Bohemia with Dvorak’s Noonday Witch and Smetana’s evocatively patriotic Ma Vlast, to Russia with Tchaikovsky’s Romeo and Juliet and Rimsky-Korsakov’s orientalist Scheherazade, to Finland with Sibelius’ darkly mysterious The Swan of Tuonela and his bleak Tapiola, and to England with Elgar’s theatrical Falstaff. Like the Romantic movements themselves, symphonic poems appeared to be particularly well suited to the expression of national feeling, and especially to the depiction of national–historical heroic drama, as well as unique national landscapes. Sibelius’ tone poems furnish vivid examples of both. On the one hand, the four Lemminkainen Legends purvey the poetic atmosphere of successive episodes in the life and encounters of the Finnish hero, recounted in the Finnish epic, the Kalevala; on the other hand, a tone poem such as Tapiola conjures up the mystery and terror of Finland’s forest landscapes, illustrating the lines from the Kalevala with which the composer prefaced the score:

Wide-spread they stand, the Northland’s dusky forests,  
Ancient, mysterious, brooding savage dreams,    
Within them dwells the Forest’s mighty God,  
And wood-sprites in the gloom weave magic spells.

Together, Sibelius’ tone poems served to give to the relatively novel idea of a Finnish nation a sense of heroic antiquity in a distant past and of rootedness in the wild and brooding nature of ‘its’ homeland.

This same national feeling found heightened expression and dramatic outlet in a variety of operas, from Weber’s Der Freischutz to Smetana’s Bartered Bride and Borodin’s Prince Igor. Perhaps the most intense and consistent in this respect was Modest Mussorgsky, whose historical dramas, Boris Godunov (1868–72) and Khovanschina (1872–80), portrayed the deeds and conflicts of Russian monarchs and aristocrats...
in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively, but whose main achievement was to present the hopes, fears and sufferings of the Russian people as the central ‘character’ of a heroic national–historical drama. In Mussorgsky’s depiction of the spiritual aspirations and sacrifice of the Old Believers led by the archpriest Dositheus in *Khovanschina*, as contrasted with the miserable fate of the Streltsi’i Guards and the exile and death of the various scheming aristocrats, Mussorgsky gives a sense of national continuity and poetic meaning to what, in reality, was a series of disparate events before and during the early years of Peter the Great’s reign, highlighting what he saw as the essential goodness of the suffering Russian nation, which had become the inevitable victim of the violent struggles between the great aristocratic families and the young Tsar Peter.¹⁰

We can trace similar themes of heroism, sacrifice and national rootedness in the work of painters and sculptors, but almost a century earlier. Already in the seventeenth century, in the Netherlands and Denmark, paintings of ancient or medieval national episodes were commissioned by monarchs such as Christian IV of Denmark or oligarchs such as the Amsterdam Regents; Rembrandt’s *The Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis* (1661), painted for Amsterdam’s Town Hall, is a well-known, if ill-starred, example. But it was from the mid- to late eighteenth century that a more rigorous type of ‘history painting’ flourished, particularly in France and Britain. In London and Paris, on the walls of the Royal Academy, the Royal Society of Arts and the Salon, pride of place was given to historical and religious paintings that represented acts of virtue, courage and sacrifice. As the century proceeded, these became progressively didactic in tone – heroic exempla virtutis designed to stimulate admiration and encourage emulation. The subjects were often taken from English or French translations of Greek and Roman authors such as Livy and Plutarch: Socrates drinking hemlock, Dentatus refusing bribes, Scipio displaying modesty, Torquatus sacrificing his son who had betrayed the Republic. But, alongside these austere classical themes, there were also medieval national moralities: Nicolas Brenet’s powerful rendering of the homage paid to the dead French hero of the Hundred Years War, in his *The Death of Du Guesclin* (1778), Louis Durameau’s *Continence of Bayard* (1777) and Benjamin West’s series of the reign of Edward III commissioned by George III (1787–89).¹¹
Benjamin West, the American Quaker who became court painter to George III, provides a perfect illustration of that ‘historical mobility’ and concern for ‘archaeological verisimilitude’, which for Robert Rosenblum were key qualities of the arts in the late eighteenth and, one might add, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. West painted scenes from Persian, Jewish, Greek, Roman, Germanic, medieval and modern English, as well as American, history, paying great attention to period accessories of dress, furnishings, buildings and the like, and leaving the spectator in no doubt as to the moral he wished to impart. Works such as Agrippina with the Ashes of Germanicus (1768), with its severe neo-classical lines based on antique reliefs, and the looser, more ‘Gothic’ Burghers of Calais before Edward III (1788), as well as his celebrated depiction of the Death of General Wolfe (1770), a modern-day Pietà, offer lessons in the supreme virtue of self-sacrifice, which was to become such an integral part of the drama of the nation in the following two centuries.\textsuperscript{12}

In France, Ingres’ historical and mythological works were only a little less ‘historically mobile’, but a good deal more imaginative and resonant. Like Girodet before him, Ingres was fascinated by the contemporary fashion for Ossian and, in his Dream of Ossian (1813), the hallucinatory vision of the ancient bard conjures ghostly armed figures of crystal caught in an icy silence. Renowned for his portrayal of Greek myth and Roman history, Ingres’ forays into medieval French and Spanish history (The Dauphin entering Paris in 1358, of 1821; The Duke of Alba at St Gudule, Brussels, of 1815–19) reveal his penchant for nostalgic reconstructions of jewel-like precision, which evoke a ‘Gothic’ world of national histories researched from original contemporary documents such as Froissart’s Chroniques. This quest reached its culmination in the peculiar combination of the sensuous and the spiritual in his depiction of Joan of Arc at the Coronation of Charles VII in 1429, painted in 1854 as part of the resurgence of religious nationalism in France, where the saintly but militant warrior Maid stands at the bejewelled altar and gazes ecstatically heavenward in recognition of the fulfilment of her national mission.\textsuperscript{13}

National themes and sometimes ‘national’ styles (usually mediav-lising Gothic or a pre-modern equivalent) became popular among artists in countries as far apart as Finland and India, Russia and Mexico, where such painters as Akseli Gallen-Kallela, Ravi Varma,
Vasily Surikov and Diego Rivera endeavoured to give shape and character to the idea of the nation through the depiction of formative events, personalities and landscapes in the traditions of a national history. Their task was twofold: to make the idea of the nation palpable and accessible to all its members, and to help in the recovery and evocation of ethnic memories, symbols, myths and traditions. Epics, chronicles, sagas and narrative histories furnished the point of departure, and modern novels and dramas the particular episodes, but it was the artist’s, poet’s or composer’s interpretation and iconic representation that gave expression to and set the seal on a given scene, or on a succession of tableaux in the tale of the nation, turning legend and history into popular theatre and memorable imagery. How far such visual representations of historic ethnic memories, myths, symbols and traditions penetrated public consciousness, beyond the Academy and Salon-going elites and upper middle classes, is unclear, although the wide circulation of prints permitted their seminal national images to reach a much wider audience. In the case of the Mexican Muralists, too, the use of familiar and centrally located public buildings for their frescoes of episodes of the national myth, notably those of Mexican history by Diego Rivera, helped to disseminate and popularise the ideas of the national fusion of ‘races’ across the periods of Mexican history propounded by Jose Vasconcelos, the Minister of Education in Obregón’s government. But, given the leadership, cultural and political, of the upper classes in most cases, the part played by artists of all kinds in ‘realising’ and disseminating the ‘authentic’ image and ideals of the nation has been indispensable. If the schools and armies provided the conduits and vehicles of the national idea, it was the poets, artists and musicians who infused it with imaginative content and gave it tangible, and often memorable, form.  

Symbolic resources of the nation

But, what exactly were the memories, traditions, myths and symbols that furnished the content of the idea of the nation, providing artists of all kinds with their stock of cultural resources for forging the national idea? And how far do these resources continue to underpin a sense of national identity in the contemporary world?
In general terms, the kinds of resource on which artists drew answer to the fundamental dimensions of nationhood: ancestry; community; territory; history; and destiny. With one exception, each of these dimensions is related, in turn, to the social and symbolic processes of nation formation outlined in Chapter 3. Myths of ancestry and origins translate into symbolic terms the process of self-definition; myths of communal election comprise the most influential element in myth-and-memory cultivation; devotion to sacred landscapes is perhaps the most intensive and affecting aspect of territorialisation; and myth memories of ethno-history, and especially of ethnic golden ages, present an idealised image of distinctive public cultures. The exception is the dimension of national destiny through individual or collective sacrifice. This is linked less to the observance of laws than to the rites and ceremonies of public cultures. I shall consider each of these in turn.

Myths of ancestry

As we saw in Chapter 3, one of the key elements of collective self-definition was the presence of one or more myths of origin. Here, we need to make two sets of distinctions: first, between general myths of creation and the golden age of humanity, such as we find in Hesiod or the Book of Genesis, on the one hand, and specific myths of the origins of particular communities, on the other hand. Within the latter, we again need to distinguish between myths of ethnic ancestry and the civic foundation myths of particular communities. Of these, the ethnic–genealogical myths are the most common and recurrent. They can record the ancestors and lineages of families and clans, tribes and ethnies; examples include the ancient Greek myth of descent from Hellen, the Japanese myth of imperial descent from the Sun goddess, the Turkish myth of ethnic descent from Oguz Khan, the Jewish myth of descent from Abraham, and the Armenian descent myth from their ancestor Haik. Myths of civic foundation have also proved influential. In the West, the prototype is that of ancient Rome with its legend of the She-Wolf and the twins, Romulus and Remus. It was followed in the Middle Ages by various myths among the Italian city-states, as well as by the foundation myth of the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft, dated to the Bundesbrief of 1291, which was celebrated in style on its
600th anniversary – as was the millennium of the foundation of the Hungarian kingdom in 896. In the modern period, too, we encounter civic foundation myths in the bicentennial celebrations of the foundations of the United States, Australia and the French Republic, held in 1976, 1988 and 1989 respectively.¹⁵

Occupying a middle position between ethnic and civic origin myths are those that date national foundations to conversion. Prime examples include the conversion of Russia under Vladimir to Christianity in 988, and of Gaul under Clovis in 496, which subsequently provided an ethnic origin myth for France, in contrast to its civic foundation myth of Bastille Day. In the case of the Scots, too, we can distinguish both an ethnic and a civic myth, the one deriving the Scots and Scotland from Egyptian Scota, as recounted in the mythic history of the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320, and the other dated to the unification of the kingdom in the ninth century and symbolised by the Declaration itself.¹⁶

Irrespective of their historical accuracy, the primary function of such myths has been to enhance a sense of collective belonging and provide security, dignity and continuity for successive generations of the nation’s members. The fact that, well into the modern period, they have been invoked and, in some cases, still are is testimony to their continuing significance, even in those cases where most people have ceased to believe in the legends themselves or the genealogies traced back to them. It would appear that the conviction of ancestral self-hood and of difference between members of the nation and those outside its frontiers, which these myths symbolised and enhanced, remains largely intact – an issue to which I shall return.¹⁷

Myths of election

Origin myths are but one of several kinds of myth, memory, symbol and tradition that have been cultivated across the centuries and have provided cultural resources for the members of the community. In pre-modern epochs, it was the priests, scribes and bards who collected and interpreted these symbolic resources; today, artists and intellectuals have taken over the role of myth-makers and memory-recorders. In the past, priests formulated and enacted the ritual of ethnic election; today, it falls to the intellectual, the teacher and
the politician to proclaim the values of the community and the uniqueness of its heritage. In the past, it was God who chose the community; today, it is more likely to be History or Nature that has selected ‘us’ to be the bearers of ‘irreplaceable culture values’, in Weber’s phrase, and to achieve ‘our’ unique mission, whether to be a beacon of liberty and equality, to bring the blessings of parliamentary democracy or to provide a model of industrial development, social progress and multi-culturalism. Secularisation has not changed the dynamic of national election, only its direction: from the holiness of separation from an idolatrous world, as in the example of ancient Israel, to an engagement with and intervention in the world, such as we see in the modern West, the conviction of ethnic election has remained the bedrock of national differentiation, cohesion and persistence.18

Historically, there have been two kinds of election myth, the covenantal and the missionary. The first, chronologically, was the ideal of a covenant between the deity and the ethnie. In the Israelite prototype recorded in the Pentateuch, the people are chosen by God and undertake to follow His commandments, moral and ritual, and, to this end, they must become entirely separate from the profane world, a world of idolatry. The Israelite ideal is holiness, to be a ‘holy nation and a kingdom of priests’, and thereby bring blessing to all peoples. It proved to be an influential ideal. Armenians, Ethiopians, Puritan English, Scots and Dutch, Ulster Scots, American colonists, Swiss city-states and Afrikaners all subscribed to variants of the covenant, and built strong ethnic and national communities on its basis.19

Missionary election myths derived from the earlier covenantal kind, but became even more widespread. In these cases, kingdoms and peoples were entrusted with a God-given task or mission: to be a bulwark of orthodoxy, to convert the heathen and infidel, to expand the borders of the righteous kingdom, even to conquer the whole world for the one, true God. Most of the kingdoms of medieval Christian Europe from Ireland and Scotland to Poland and Russia, not to mention the Arab tribes converted to Islam, undertook these and other divine tasks and thereby secured glory and superiority for their rulers and peoples. After the Reformation, the conviction of missionary election became even more pronounced among both Protestants and Catholics, endowing European rulers and peoples alike with
supreme confidence in their doctrinal faith and worldly conduct – dispositions and beliefs that, with the French and American Revolutions, passed into the secular narratives of nations in the modern world. The power of such myths lies in their ability to link the community to its history and destiny, and to bind it to its God and its ‘fate’ – a quality that is especially marked in monotheistic traditions, where the ethnie or nation is seen as the carrier of sacred ‘truths’.20

Sacred homelands

We saw how the process of territorialisation of memories and attachments created ethno-scapes, and over time a demarcated symbiosis of people and land, regarded by the members as an ancestral land or ‘homeland’. The process may be carried further through the sanctification of territory. Here, the homeland is not only ‘ours’, it is ‘sacred’, and its landscapes become places of reverence and awe. It is these inner meanings that resonate so widely among the members of the community, and which for ethno-symbolists possess such importance for a deeper understanding of the ‘national homeland’.

There are several ways in which this sanctification of the homeland comes about. The most common is through the presence and activities of saints, prophets and sages. For example, St Gregory’s missions to the various provinces of the kingdom of Armenia endowed them with a novel sanctity, binding them together as a union of Christians. Similar functions were performed by St Patrick in his missions across Ireland and St David in Wales, as well as by the shrines of the Virgin of Yasna Gora in Poland, and of the Virgin of Guadelupe in Mexico. Of course, many of the saints were more localised – St Cuthbert in Northumbria, St Genevieve in Paris, SS Boris and Gleb in Kiev – but some of them became patron saints of dynasties and, in the course of generations, of delocalised territories and their populations. As places of pilgrimage, too, the shrines of these saints became renowned as objects of communal devotion, with trade and wealth often following in their wake, but also stronger shared attachments to these sites.21

Heroic deeds can also attract a measure of sanctity, and the arena of their performance partakes of the resulting veneration. In particular, the exploits of virtuous heroes such as El Cid and of chaste heroines
such as Joan of Arc, defenders of both the faith and the kingdom, may confer blessing on the land. Places of battle and treaty, assembly, celebration and remembrance, like the buildings, shrines and monuments that commemorate them, can also be invested with deep significance and awe, and later they may come to feature in memorable works of art. It was, for example, the historical sites, as well as the natural features, of the Hebrides, notably Fingal’s Cave on the island of Staffa, that evoked Mendelssohn’s fine musical landscape painting in his *Hebrides Overture* (1830), just as the Bohemian lands and castles inspired Smetana’s celebrated Romantic musical portrait of his homeland, *Ma Vlast* (1872–79). Equally, the shores of Lake Lucerne stirred the imagination of Heinrich Füssli in his preparatory drawings of the representatives of the three original forest cantons rowing across the Lake of Lucerne in 1291, for his *The Oath of the Rütli* (1779–81) commissioned by the Zürich Rathaus.22

But perhaps the most potent source of sanctity lies in the tombs of communal heroes and heroines, and more especially of ‘our ancestors’. To be sure, the cenotaphs and cemeteries of the many soldiers who fell in battle defending the homeland possess an additional aura of sanctity and, as we saw, are commemorated in public ceremonies. But the more immediate and personal attachments and memories are those generated by the last resting-places of our kin. Multiplied across the land, these memories hallow every town and village graveyard; the memories, symbols and traditions of each contribute to the sanctity of ‘our’ land and of its ‘soil’, which gives ‘us’ both sustenance and final rest.23

**Golden ages**

In the ‘land of heroes’, ‘our history’ has been played out across successive centuries, with its successes and failures, high and low points. Those periods remembered by later generations as moments of heroism and glory, the ‘golden ages’ of the community, recorded in epic and chronicle, art and song, are not only a source of collective pride and confidence, they also inspire action and emulation. The aim of many of the neo-classical ‘history painters’ I mentioned earlier was not simply faithful rendering of an historic event, but the teaching of moralities through the image of *exempla virtutis* – a teaching
aimed at individuals who were citizens (or citizens-to-be) of a nation. That was surely the primary intention of Jacques-Louis David in his series of classical paintings from Belisarius (1781) through the Oath of the Horatii (1784), the Death of Socrates (1787) and Brutus (1789), to the Sabines (1799) and Leonidas at Thermopylae (1814). David was here following a tradition pioneered by British painters in the 1760s – Gavin Hamilton, Robert Pine, Nathaniel Dance, John Mortimer and Alexander Runciman among them – and taken up by Nicolas Brenet, Jean-Francois Peyron and Louis Durameau in France in the 1770s, as well as by the Americans, Benjamin West, John Singleton Copley and John Trumbull. Their ‘moralities’ were drawn as much from medieval and modern national history, as from classical antiquity, a trend encouraged, if not controlled, by the patronage of the state whose leaders sought to instil national pride at a time of heightened Anglo-French commercial rivalry and military conflict.24

But there was another deeper function of these memories of ‘golden ages’. By the later eighteenth century, the cult of authenticity had begun to take hold, following on from a longer tradition of personal sincerity and the ‘honest soul’. Not only individuals, but also cultural groups were to be subjected to the hard test of authenticity: by seeking in the golden age of its heroes and geniuses the character and virtues of the community, the ‘true’ nature of the nation in its original state would be revealed. It was an enterprise that became even more apparent as the various movements of Romanticism and the cults of Nature ‘returned’ the European educated classes back to the ‘primeval origins’ of their nations, to discover therein their ultimate ‘essence’ and their unique attributes. In the panorama of a nation’s ethno-history, depicted as a series of colourful tableaux, at once didactic and picturesque, the distant golden age represented that period, or moment, of pristine glory when the creative energies of the nation were at their most vigorous and their virtues most apparent. This was, for example, very much the purpose and spirit in which Elias Lonnrot and his circle collected and edited the ancient Karelian ballads and went on to compose and publish the first edition of the Kalevala in 1835, thereby revealing to modern Finns who they had been and, as a result, who they ‘really’ were. In this sense, the golden age holds up a mirror to the ‘true’ lineaments of the nation, and invites emulation of its original spirit.25
Of course, there might be more than one such age and, as a result, more than one kind of national virtue and national destiny. For the Greeks, there was the brilliant efflorescence of artistic creativity and philosophy in ancient Athens, the learning and wisdom of Hellenistic Alexandria and the lawcodes, theology and architecture of Byzantium. In the case of the Jews, the Mosaic period saw a quest for holiness, the Davidic kingdom for power and glory, the Talmudic era for Torah law, the golden age of Spain for poetry … For all that, the successive myth-memories of the golden ages revealed what for later generations were the inward, and ‘innate’, qualities of the nation, its ‘true substance’ beneath the many later accretions and corruptions. In these various traditions, myths and memories, we can find the different, and sometimes antagonistic, conceptions and ideals entertained by successive generations of the community as well as by rival political factions – leading to ideological conflicts resolved only by reinterpretations and syntheses of the history and ‘essence’ of the nation or, where that failed, by a social and ideological revolution.26

**Destiny through sacrifice**

Perhaps the most potent of the cultural resources of the nation was the ideal of a national destiny that required ceaseless striving and sacrifice on behalf of the community. Struggle was, of course, a key ingredient of political Romanticism. Some have even claimed that regular blood sacrifice of the nation’s youth is essential to the creation and preservation of the nation. Without going so far, we can easily see how the ideal of public sacrifice could inspire in successive generations a desire to emulate their ancestors and repair or strengthen the bonds of political solidarity. Such a view shifts the emphasis away from the act of sacrifice itself to its mythic and symbolic consequences for the future direction of the nation, and to the successive representations of the ‘identity’ and goals of the national community.27

In other words, it is not sacrifice per se, but a powerful sense of national destiny grounded in sacrifice that is important for our understanding of the cultural resources of nations. This ideal of national destiny has repeatedly helped to mobilise the citizens for defence of the homeland, inspired heroic myths of battle and of the
noble death of the patriot-warrior, and has sought permanent expression through the commemoration of their actions in art and monumental sculptures that enfold the members of the nation and summon them to fulfil that destiny for which their compatriots laid down their lives. The fall of Jerusalem, the battles of Avarayr, Kosovo Polje, Orleans, Mohacs, the Somme, the Dardanelles, Dunkirk, Stalingrad: defeats perhaps even more than victories have become part of popular legend in verse and song and monumental art. Although the poignant themes of sacrifice, solidarity and sepulchre were already evident in Pericles’ Funeral Oration in 430 BC, it was with the advent of citizen armies in the late eighteenth century that they became widespread and began to furnish the historical contents for the most intense and dramatic of the nation’s public rites and ceremonies. By the early twentieth century, celebrations of the valour of individual heroes had given way at imposing cenotaphs and vast cemeteries to solemn annual national commemorations of the mass slaughter of the citizens who died, according to the official liturgy, so that ‘we might live’ and our nation fulfil its destiny. In the columns of inscribed names of officers and men on the more recent war memorials in the West, we find perhaps the most concentrated expression of the significance accorded by its members to the nation and its individual citizens and of the tacit acceptance of the nation’s unique foreordained path. In setting aside and dedicating pieces of earth to the slain in war, whether at home or abroad, the elites manifest a desire to enter into a compact – a latterday covenant – with all the citizens to place the image of the nation above current rivalries and conflicts, and self-reflexively to celebrate its destiny.28

It is important to bear in mind that, in speaking of the ‘cultural resources’ and ‘sacred foundations’ of the nation, we are dealing in ideal typical terms. Typically, a nation’s elites, as well as other groups of citizens, can draw on one or more of these cultural resources to uphold and sustain what they view as deficiencies in the moral fabric, and in the sense of cohesion and purpose of their national community. As I mentioned earlier, a sense of decline on the part of a nation’s members from some putative standard or ‘golden age’ often provides the impetus to revive the old belief in ethnic election, return the citizens to the intimate landscapes of their homelands, recall to their minds the examples of former great ages and of the
heroic deeds of their illustrious ancestors, and institute or strengthen
the public rites and ceremonies of the Glorious Dead. However,
whether and how far such resources will be used in practice, and to
what extent they are likely to exercise a hold over the hearts and
minds of the citizens, will vary not only between national commu-
nities, but also from period to period in the same community, and
will be subject to a variety of factors, some of them immediate, others
of a more long-term kind.

Transformation and persistence

In fact, reflection on the deeper meanings of public ceremonies of
remembrance and national war memorials inevitably raises the ques-
tion of the transhistorical nature of nations, especially in the modern
world. Is the ideal of nationhood likely to continue to command
the loyalties of men and women across the globe, or are we des-
tined to witness the early obsolescence and supersession of nations in
an allegedly ‘post-modern’ era, so long predicted and so vigorously
proclaimed?

There is no easy way to assess these alternatives. Theoretically, and
as a first approximation, we might hypothesise that the more the
cultural resources I have described are present in a given national
community, and the greater their scope and intensity, the stronger,
more vivid and more widely diffused is the sense of national identity
entertained by its members likely to be. Conversely, the smaller the
number, the more limited the scope and the weaker the intensity of
these cultural resources in a given community, the shallower and the
less vibrant and encompassing is their sense of national identity and
belonging likely to be.

Of course, this is only one part of the equation; cultural resources
are not the only indicators of national community. Material and
institutional factors, not to mention political agency, can play impor-
tant roles in strengthening or weakening the fabric of the nation and
upholding a sense of national identity. On the negative side, the sal-
cience of alternative and rival cultural–political communities can easily
undermine the cohesion and vibrancy of a sense of national identity
by dividing the loyalties and attachments of the citizens. Nevertheless,
it is only when we focus on the cultural resources of nations that we
can gauge the strength and vivid expression (or lack of it) of a sense of national identity among the citizens of a national community. Here, I shall focus mainly on Western and European nations, which are often thought to be undergoing cultural fragmentation and/or absorption into larger regional unions and associations, unlike many of the Asian, African and Latin American nations where a sense of national identity is still being forged.

Earlier, I discussed the continued relevance of myths of origin. It is true that most people in the West, as far as one can see, no longer believe, if ever they did, in the often arcane legends of distant tribes of Celts, Franks, Anglo-Saxons and Teutons that accompanied them. In contrast, what has retained its power for many people is the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, of national self-hood and difference from the outsider, a distinction legitimated in terms of shared origins and descent. It is worth recalling here Walker Connor’s distinction between factual and sentient history. He reminds us that, in the field of nations and nationalism, what counts is not what is, but what is felt to be. This sense of felt national history and of national self versus the other(s) has recently been reinforced by the great increases in, and varieties of, migration. Here, it is not simply a question of the sheer numbers of economic migrants and asylum-seekers, but of the varieties of cultures they bring and the differences between them and the cultures of the host societies. There is, of course, nothing new about migration or cultural difference; the experience of the Roma and the Jews throughout the European Middle Ages and the modern period provides ample testimony of the negative consequences of differences in ethnic identity and the stigmatisation of outsiders. But the extent and variety of these contemporary differences and reactions, especially in liberal democracies, is novel. We have seen hostility to North Africans in France, to Turks and Vietnamese in Germany, to Albanians in Italy, to Roma in the Czech Republic, to Pakistanis and other ‘Asians’ in Britain and to Muslims generally in the Netherlands and Denmark, not to mention revivals of anti-Semitism in several states. ²⁹

These sentiments and the resulting violence have prompted some passionate debates about the elements of national identities, and a re-examination of received traditions, notably in Britain. For some decades, attention was focused on the changing cultural make-up of the liberal democracies; and for many intellectuals and politicians,
'multi-culturalism', the celebration of cultural differences in education, religion and social life, became a fashionable prescription for creating accommodation and mutual understanding in polyethnic and multi-national states. However, more recently, there have been official reassertions of the need for social as well as political integration of all citizens, irrespective of differences in culture and religion, and popular calls for greater political solidarity and patriotism on behalf of the historic ‘nation-state’ and its traditional culture. The result is likely to be less the oft-predicted ‘hybridisation’ of the nation than a piecemeal transformation of traditional ideas and narratives of national identity tied firmly into the historical and cultural (especially its legal, linguistic and symbolic) framework of the existing national state, one that nevertheless respects the religious beliefs and includes the cultures of migrant communities.30

Similar considerations apply to the heritage of ethnic memories, myths, symbols and traditions. I argued earlier that the secularisation of myths of ethnic election has altered their direction, not their potency; and that their presence can be detected, in varying degrees, across the spectrum of national activities from politics and education to the media and sport. I should add that the power of such myths varies greatly between European and Western nations; comparatively weak in Italy and Belgium, their potency and salience are particularly marked in America, France, Greece, Israel and Russia, not to mention Japan. But, what of national memories? In an age when there are constant complaints about the lack of historical knowledge, especially in the school curriculum, and the irrelevance of so much of traditional ethno-history, and when a former single ‘national history’ has been broken down into ‘multiple’ histories of the different communities within the polyethnic nation, can we still speak of shared memories of a single national past across the homeland? Here, there appears to be a considerable generational divide. Many older citizens often cling to the sense of a sacred national past – from Clovis (or the Revolution) to de Gaulle, from Alfred to Churchill, from Washington to Kennedy. But, for many in the younger generation, the military and/or imperial history of the nation is anathema and, democracy apart, its political and cultural past is often unknown or burdened territory, suggesting a waning, or a refocusing, of a sense of national identity on the part of younger people.31
Transformation is perhaps less evident in relation to public symbols. Anthems may be less often played, and less respected, except on solemn or festive occasions. But, as Michael Billig reminds us, flags still fly, often unwaved, although always ubiquitous, and on solemn occasions their display is central to affirmations of the nation in its public rites and ceremonies. Trampling on or burning the flag of one’s country, for whatever reason, continues to be seen by most members as a serious breach of national solidarity, even a sacrilege; running it up to celebrate triumphs or deliverance is similarly lauded, even required. Fighting and dying for the flag, as the symbol of the nation, remain the highest forms of public sacrifice in most countries and are still accorded the greatest respect, even among the young.32

Can we say the same of the rites and ceremonies of the national public culture? Here there is greater variation, both in intensity of performance and in inclusiveness of citizens. Most national states have established a national holiday, to commemorate independence, the constitution or some historic battle or treaty. Sometimes, this is a sedate and largely official affair but, in many other cases – for example, Bastille Day in France, Remembrance Sunday in Britain, ANZAC Day in Australia, Independence Day in Israel and Norway – there is a strong popular element of public participation in the national salvation drama, heightening national consciousness and evoking a powerful image of national destiny. Here, it seems that we may have a particularly sensitive indicator of the degree and kind of national sentiment and of the vitality or otherwise of the sacred communion of the nation which it reaffirms; and if this is the case, on balance it suggests that, despite massive change, many national communities have retained their appeal to the hearts and imaginations of their members.33

It is perhaps otherwise with territorialisation. Among younger members, there appears to have been some waning of love and veneration for those sacred places and ‘poetic landscapes’ on which poets, musicians and artists drew so often in the past to render the abstract image of the nation concrete, tangible and accessible. This is in part the result of much greater mobility and rapid urbanisation of large numbers of the population in the modern West, and a consequent contraction of the agricultural sector and with it the traditional peasantry, the backbone of the idealised folk of nationalist lore.
For all that, continuing struggles between commercial developers and various heritage preservation societies and environmentalists suggest that ‘our’ historic landscapes and their unique scenic beauties are still matters of concern to many members of the nation – not to mention the many benefits accruing from the tourist industry. Moreover, romantic movements of ‘return to nature’ on the part of city-dwellers have periodically reaffirmed the centrality of intimate and regional landscapes to the ideal of the nation and its preferred life-styles. Although secularisation may have weakened some of the sanctity accorded to the homeland and its ancestral sites, the latter still retain their national significance and continue to kindle in many people a renewed attachment to the historic landscapes of the nation.34

**Conclusion**

It is true that, in some institutional spheres, the independence of the national state in Europe has been eroded, most obviously in the economic sphere, but also in varying degrees in legal, military and educational institutions, where there is a growing need for more uniform transnational agencies to tackle global problems. Of course, the processes of ‘harmonisation’ between European national states in the European Union are uneven, contested and in the eyes of many ‘incomplete’. But these are dimensions that pertain more to the ‘state’ component of the national state, whereas the focus of ethno-symbolists is on the ‘nation’ and its symbolic resources. Granted, the close linkage of state and nation in some cases means that institutional harmonisation and the resulting diminution of sovereignty may influence, in varying degrees, the employment and perhaps the educational transmission of the nation’s cultural resources, especially in those cases such as Great Britain where political symbolism has been a central component of those resources. On the other hand, inter-state harmonisation has far less effect on the content, production and resonance of those resources among the members of the nation. Hence, in asking questions about the erosion or persistence of nations, while making due allowance for these transnational influences on the state, we need to keep the national dimensions analytically separate.35
In two respects, perhaps, we can legitimately speak of a degree of erosion, or better transformation, of nations: ideology and religion. Despite some notable exceptions, there has been an abatement of nationalism – the ideology and movement – for many dominant-ethnic nations in Europe and the West, the result first of the Cold War and subsequently of the growing influence of the European ideal. However, the same cannot be said of nations in southeastern Europe, or of nations without states, for example, the Scots, Basques and Catalans – not to mention the Kurds, Palestinians, Sikhs, Tamils, Karen and others outside Europe; and, as we saw, strong national sentiments in the historic national states can be rekindled by large-scale immigration. The evidence of erosion of the sanctity of the national ideal is rather more ambiguous. The enlargement of the ‘profane’ sphere of consumerism, materialism and rationalism, and the cult of individualism, have undoubtedly undermined all kinds of collective allegiances. This partial erosion of the sacred has meant that more people, especially in the younger generations, tend to be sceptical about myths of origin, ethno-historical memories of ‘golden ages’ and even some national ceremonies. At the same time, there are voices that seek to restore the sanctity of the historic ties that continue to underpin the national state in Europe and North America, and that act as a brake on further erosion of a sense of national identity among dominant ethnies.\textsuperscript{36}

Moreover, many people remain strongly attached to the poetic landscapes of their homelands and even to the preservation of their borders, despite the ease with which capital, personnel, goods and services flow across them. Much the same is true of secularised myths of election. If anything, these have been reinforced by successive waves of migrants of different cultures. Under their impact, to be sure, traditional ideas of national identity are being redefined, and the ethnic mix of populations is being transformed, as it was in ages past. But we are also witnessing strong reassertions of the historic distinctiveness of the nation, and this feeds into many members’ visions of national destiny. It is noticeable how much respect and sanctity are felt in the presence of those who fell in battle on behalf of the nation, and in the rites and ceremonies accorded to the memory of their sacrifice. In these self-reflexive and self-celebrating ceremonies, the national ideal remains vibrant and self-perpetuating.
6 Pro et contra

As with other perspectives on the study of nations and nationalism, ethno-symbolic approaches have won approval in some quarters, while coming in for a fair amount of criticism in others. It may therefore be useful to reconsider their common themes by addressing some of the main objections to ethno-symbolism. There are several key issues; I shall concentrate on the more theoretical criticisms. These include an overly positive image of nationalism; a tendency to conflate state and nation; overemphasis on ethnicity and failure to demarcate nation from ethnic community; a relatively static understanding of nations and nationalism; an allied emphasis on continuity and concern with national persistence; use of the problematic concept of identity; and, finally, its alleged theoretical basis in evolutionism, holism and idealism.

The ethics of nationalism

For many people today, nationalism, if not the nation, has an essentially negative image. Some cosmopolitan intellectuals go so far as to regard it as virtually synonymous with fascism and Nazism, if not with racism which, at the very least, in their eyes, it encourages; and for many others, it is the source of many of the world’s greatest ills from national homogenisation and ethnic conflict to genocide. As a result, any approach that appears in the eyes of these critics to take the basic propositions of nationalism seriously must itself be seen as lending some respectability, if not approval, to the doctrine and movement.¹
Indeed, for one such critic, Umut Özkirimli, ethno-symbolists are at once naive and irresponsible – ‘reticent nationalists’ – unable to disclose what they feel. Adopting a position of political neutrality and scientific objectivity, they embrace a romantic nostalgia for the past, and their analyses, however well intentioned, can be used to legitimate discrimination and oppression. Insofar as they suggest that Western states promote a more civic and territorial version of nationalism, ethno-symbolists evince a political naivete that refuses to recognise the continuing strong ethnic and exclusive elements in these states. As for the ‘hot’ nationalisms outside the West, ethno-symbolists play down their iniquitous and dangerous effects insofar as they argue that nationalists generally seek to unify the members of the nation rather than aim for outright cultural and social homogenisation. For Andreas Wimmer, too, ethno-symbolists, building their arguments on a ‘romantic ontology’, are unable to grasp the central importance of politics and conflicts of interests that drive internal debates about national inclusion and exclusion. This in turn leads to a failure to see that the spread of nationalism, with its demand for a state for each nation, was one of the most important sources of modern conflict and war.

These criticisms depend, in turn, on the hostile portrait of nationalism associated with the work of Elie Kedourie. For Kedourie, nationalism is a subversive ideology, a fanatical quest for perfectibility which subjects the many to the Will of the few who represent the ‘nation’. For ethno-symbolists, this is a one-sided and reductive portrayal. Not only does it overlook the cultural benefits of nationalism, it omits the stimulus and the legitimation that nationalist ideologies can provide for modernisation and social change. It also fails to comprehend the popular appeal of both ethnic and anti-colonial nationalisms, and the democratic will that nations may embody. To understand this appeal, we need to uncover the sources, past and present, of nationalism in the diverse symbols, memories, traditions, myths and values that resonate among various populations. This is no romantic nostalgia for the past, much less a reticent or concealed nationalism. Ethno-symbolists do not yearn for or recommend a return to the past, even if that were possible. Rather, it is a question of offering a research strategy and programme for understanding the widespread popular appeal of nationalism, leaving aside, as far as is possible, value preferences in favour of rigorous analysis.
A related criticism holds that ethno-symbolists fail to recognise nationalist intolerance of cultural diversity. But, given the importance of Herder and his followers in the genesis of nationalism (and allegedly for ethno-symbolists), this charge is, to say the least, perplexing. This is in no way to excuse nationalists. After all, nobody can be in any doubt about the often brutal and destructive effects of nationalist professions of ‘fraternity’ and ‘love’, nor about the capacity for cynical manipulation of popular needs and sentiments that nationalists – along with other kinds of ideologues – display. Ethno-symbolists are only too aware of the capacity of various groups to discriminate against, cleanse and, ultimately, exterminate minority ethnic communities in the name of the nation and its ‘needs’. Even so, it is vital to treat nationalist excesses separately from those committed by, say, communists, fascists or imperialists, and not to confuse nationalism with racism or a catch-all ‘tribalism’. It is also important to recognise the many non-nationalist sources of civil conflicts – whether political, religious, regional or factional. Here, we may note conflicting interpretations of the relations between nationalism and war among modernists themselves: for Andreas Wimmer, on the basis of quantitative analysis, the nation-state (not the same as nationalism) is responsible for most twentieth-century wars, whereas for David Laitin, using the ‘most complete’ Minorities at Risk data set, it is the weak state that is responsible for most wars and rebellions rather than ethnic differences or nationalism. Although designed to neutralise the bias in selecting cases that fit different approaches, whether modernist or ethno-symbolist, it is clear that quantitative models and surveys are not without their own methodological problems; and this suggests the continuing need for comparative historical studies of different kinds of nationalism and nation formation. Similarly, for the purposes of analysis, we need to distinguish between those nationalisms, mainly in Western states, that have become habitual and, in Michael Billig’s term, ‘engrained’, where state elites seek a more inclusive ‘civic’ kind of nation, despite many instances of their persisting ethnic exclusiveness and discrimination; and those that he calls ‘hot’ nationalisms, often of an ‘ethnic type’, where we encounter outright oppression and virulent conflict. 4

In short, ethno-symbolists, along with modernists such as Gellner, seek a balanced view of the consequences of nationalism and, while
refusing to take nationalist assertions at face value, are prepared to treat nationalist ideologies with a degree of seriousness. In this, they differ from those who, like Michael Freeden, treat nationalism as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology with a restricted core and a narrow range of political concepts, unable to deal with major social and political issues, with the result that they regard it as a peripheral ideology filling out more mainstream political ideologies. This is to offer a reductive analysis that ignores the array of concepts which lend to nationalisms their rich variety; I refer to such concepts as national autonomy, identity and unity, the cult of authenticity, the ideas of the homeland, collective dignity, continuity and destiny, which I discussed in Chapter 4.5

State and nation

Besides, as I also argued in Chapter 4, nationalism is much more than a political ideology. For many, it represents a particular kind of culture and species of secular religion, as is so evident in the ideas and activities of the cultural nationalists which John Hutchinson explores. The goals of nationalists are as much cultural as political; they focus on language and customs, ethno-scapes, ethno-history and myths of ethnic or civic origin. Does this mean, then, that nationalism is always and solely ‘ethno-nationalism’, a devotion to the ethnically defined nation – as opposed to a ‘patriotism’ that invokes allegiance to the territorial state?6

This is the burden of Walker Connor’s critique of the ethno-symbolist conflation, or confusion, of nationalism and patriotism and state and nation, which I touched on in Chapter 4. Connor is right to say that nationalism is a doctrine about the nation, not the state, and ethno-symbolists share his belief in the primacy of ethnic ties as the basis of nationhood. But it seems unduly restrictive to insist, in the interests of logic, on presumed ancestral ties as the sole defining criterion of the nation, thereby ruling out as nations those communities that are defined on the basis of shared memories, historic territory and shared public culture, as in the case of, say, Switzerland or the United States. Besides, as the term patria itself suggests, kinship and territory are closely interwoven; while on the other side, the concept of the nation, despite its kinship etymology, needs to be differentiated
from that of the ethnic community (or ethnie) and to reflect its greater complexity. Nations are often composite, consisting of a dominant and one or more minority ethnies, as with the original German-speaking ‘Alemannic’ and the later French- and Italian-speaking ethnic communities in the Swiss Confederation, or the original English-speaking settlers in the United States and the subsequent waves of immigrant communities. In the Swiss case, there is an admittedly fictive myth (as are all such myths) of ‘Alemannic’ ethnic origins, as well as a better attested ‘civic’ foundation myth (the Oath of the Rütli in 1291, as evidenced in the Bundesbrief of that date). Connor’s rigorous dichotomy does not appear to allow for such cases. As in other fields of social science, conceptual precision can be bought at too high a cost.7

If we were to accept Connor’s dichotomy, this would exclude the possibility of any reference to the state in our definition of the nation; and that also seems to be the thrust of the critique of Montserrat Guibernau, directed specifically against my earlier definition of the concept of the nation which had included a reference to ‘common rights and duties’. She rightly contends that that definition was incapable of establishing a clearcut distinction between the concepts of nation and state, and hence of encompassing ‘nations without states’; and she appears to approve of Connor’s definition of a nation as a group of people who feel they are ancestrally related, although elsewhere she provides a more extended definition that includes ‘objective’ dimensions such as territory and common culture. But then, when she goes on to discuss my earlier definition of the concept of national identity, Guibernau seeks to bring the two concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ together, albeit solely in relation to modern ‘nation-states’ which, she argues, often pursue policies of cultural homogenisation.8

There are several points here. To begin with, I have supplied a revised, and more ‘ethno-symbolist’, definition of the popular concept of national identity as the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of individuals with that heritage and its cultural elements – a definition that does not refer to the modern national state. Second, as argued earlier, I find the essentially psychological definition that Guibernau appears to favour somewhat restrictive – despite her reference to various elements (cultural, territorial,
historical, etc.) on one or more of which the feeling of national identity may be based. And third, I remain unconvinced that a definition of the concept of the nation must exclude all reference to ‘politics’ in the shape of public culture (public symbols, rituals, codes and values) – as opposed to specific reference to the modern state. One can still talk about nations continuing to exist despite repression and the loss of an independent state, because their members continue to have common customs and share a distinctive culture that had been public – in the manner that Rousseau in 1772 advised the Poles to hold on to, and as stateless peoples such as the Catalans, Jews and Armenians possessed over several centuries.9

There is a more fundamental point. As I argued in Chapter 3, we need to see the nation in ideal typical terms as a form of historical community of a particular kind, to which given instances in the world approximate. The nation in this perspective is best viewed as a precipitate of certain social and symbolic processes that are variable in extent and intensity, rather than as having an ‘essence’ that is either present or absent. This means that, by tracing the development of these variable processes, we can demonstrate how near to, or far from, the ideal type of the nation a particular concrete instance may be. The fact that the intensity or extent of one or other of these processes is reduced, as with Poland’s public culture after the Partitions or Catalonia’s public culture under Franco’s repression, does not entail the disappearance of the nation, only its (perhaps temporary) greater distance from the ideal type. This, to my mind, helps to overcome the rather static quality of my earlier definition of the concept of the nation, and allows for major historical changes – as when a nation such as the Armenians or Jews loses its homeland but its members, scattered in semi-autonomous enclaves across many lands, retain their attachments to their homeland, along with their former self-definition, myths, symbols and memories, laws and customs, and parts of their distinct public culture – for example, their rites, codes and festivals.10

Ethnie and nation revisited

The relationship of ethnicity to nationalism, and especially ethnie to nations, is, in many ways, the core of the argument over ethno-symbolism. There are two major objections. The first concerns the
ethno-symbolists’ insistence on the central role of ethnicity; the second their alleged failure to demarcate ethnie from nation, and ethnic sentiment from nationalism.

It is certainly true that, for ethno-symbolists, ethnic ties play a major role in the formation of nations, and that, in some cases, and those historically important ones, nations have been formed on the basis of prior ethnic communities, or ethnies. But not in all cases. There is no one-to-one correspondence of nations with anterior ethnies. Moreover, even if we were to agree with Walker Connor that nations ought to be defined purely in ethnic terms (e.g. of felt ancestral relatedness), their formation could still be explained as the result of non-ethnic factors. Or at least the formation of some nations. In this respect, ethno-symbolists are far from being dogmatic. In fact, they have been assiduous in charting the impact of other, notably political, factors, as a glance at John Armstrong’s massive volume will confirm, as well as the more recent book by John Hutchinson, Zones of Conflict. For example, one could argue (pace Connor) that the United States was originally formed on the basis of a dominant ethnie (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant immigrants), but that its later development was the result of successive political and economic decisions of American elites and the varied cultural contributions of waves of non-Protestant and non-Anglo-Saxon immigrant communities; and that, as a result, the basis of American nationhood shifted away from a sense of common Anglo-American ethnicity and its heritage to the broader common values, memories, myths and symbols enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Founding Fathers and the memorialisation of the war dead. One might go further, and with present-day Eritrea and Tanzania in mind – states inhabited by a range of ethnic groups – argue that, were these groups to be united and integrated over a few generations into a single self-defining and territorialised community, with a fund of common symbolism, a distinct public culture and common laws and customs, at least some nations could and would be formed – and defined – in non-ethnic terms. This would suggest that our definitions of phenomena such as nations cannot be so easily separated from our explanations. On the other hand, it might still be argued that, even if these ethnically heterogeneous states were to form recognised ‘nations’, their members would still have to develop a shared ethno-cultural heritage and a
sense of historical and political ‘kinship’ – just as, after all, so many latterday nations such as the English or French whose members originated in past ages from a variety of ethnic groups, had to create over several generations, if not centuries. So, although the sequence might alter, that would seem to confirm the central importance of ethnic elements, in the broader sense of the term, in the definition of the concept of the nation.11

Does this insistence on the explanatory significance of ethnicity justify Andreas Wimmer’s contention that ethno-symbolists are ‘romantic ontologists’ in the Herderian mould? On the contrary. As John Hutchinson argues, it is the case

... that nationalists are typically outsiders, who sometimes work against ethnic traditions, that their movements are often weak and divided, that they typically achieve power only by default because of a collapse of the state in war, and that the most secure means of nation-formation is a state of your own.

Moreover, ethnic identities are often destroyed and are more likely to survive for long periods when embedded in multiple institutions, especially religious ones, and they persist because they are carried into the modern era by states, armies, churches and legal systems. So, I would add, can the myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions associated with them, particularly if they are encoded in sacred or secular texts. What is vital for ethno-symbolists is, as Hutchinson puts it, the history and content of the ethnicity in the name of which nationalists act; and here it is highly advantageous ‘to have both a bank of “historical” memories and a solid popular heritage on which to build’ (sc. their nations), thereby providing the existential ground on which politics rests.12

This, of course, raises the issue of what exactly is meant by the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic identities’, and how they are to be distinguished from the concepts of nation and nationalism – points made forcibly by Eric Hobsbawm and Ross Poole when they criticise scholarly attempts to explain the nebulous concepts of nation and nationalism in terms of the equally ambiguous and vague concepts of ethnicity and ethnic ties. While it is difficult to come up with precise concepts in this complex field, some of the ambiguity can be reduced
by distinguishing between the two most common meanings of ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’; and, in fact, here I have argued that we should embrace the wider meaning – ‘ethnic’ as ‘ethno-cultural’ – rather than confining ethnicity simply to ‘descent’. What is important for ethno-symbolists is a myth of descent, or presumed ancestry, rather than biological ties. But a myth of origins and descent is only part, albeit a crucial one, of the ensemble of myths, symbols, memories, values and traditions that form the heritage of nations. It is crucial because the distinctive cultural heritage of the nation is often thought and felt by the members to derive from shared origins – of time, place and kinship. On the other hand, insofar as the population of the nation becomes more varied and culturally differentiated, that belief and that feeling begin to wane, and the myth of common origins becomes only one part of the symbolic ensemble; and while it may not be discarded, it cedes place to other myths and memories, as in the case of the United States mentioned above.13

But, even with these caveats, the ambiguity of concepts such as ethnicity does not end there. It spills over into the question of defining the concept of the nation and the delimitation of national phenomena. This reflects the close links, and even some degree of overlap, between ethnic and national phenomena in popular, as well as academic, understandings – apparent in the processes of ethno-genesis such as self-definition, boundary-making, symbolic cultivation and the like, which are also involved in the formation of nations – as we saw in Chapter 3. So, can a hard-and-fast line be drawn between the concepts of ethnie and nation?

I fear that, in practice, no clearcut boundary can be established between such cognate phenomena, as is evident from the many ethnies whose members decided to secede and form their own independent national states, as the Norwegians, Slovenes and Bangladeshis succeeded in doing, and as the Kurds and Tamils are still fighting to attain. But, then, is it simply a question of the aspiration and capacity for attaining independence – of a nation being simply an ethnie with its own sovereign state? Did the Poles cease to be a nation when they lost their independence? Such an equation would exclude the many ethnies whose members see themselves, and are seen by others, as constituting nations, even though, as ‘nations without states’, they continue to lack formal independence – making nationhood conceptually
dependent on political success. So that, on this reckoning, Anguilla and St Kitts and Nevis would constitute nations, but Catalans, Scots and Kurds would not, and could not.14

But, once again, this is to see nations as states of being rather than precipitates of processes, which vary over time. In the latter perspective, individual cases are measured against an ideal standard or touchstone, in which the key social and symbolic processes have developed and combined to encourage the formation of communities that approximate to the pure type of the ‘nation’. The processes in question include, but go beyond, those that help to create ethnic communities, highlighting the roles of territorial attachments and memories, the dissemination of a distinct public culture, and the observance by members of standard laws and shared customs. These are the processes whose development serves to mark off nations from ethnies and to encourage their members to seek political autonomy, if not independence. So, it is not the quest for political sovereignty per se, so much as the development and combination of key territorial, cultural and legal processes, over and above the symbolic and definitional ones that were at the heart of ethno-genesis, that differentiates nations from ethnies.

Conflict and change

This account of the formation of nations goes some way towards countering the charge that ethno-symbolism cannot cope with change. Process and change are built into its approach, and this also extends to change brought about by social conflict.

Two kinds of conflict are relevant here. The first is external. For Daniele Conversi, ethno-symbolism’s weakness is revealed in its inability to explain ethnic conflicts which, since the end of the Cold War, have received a new lease of life. In his eyes, it also fails to address the wider contexts and the different outcomes of various ways of mobilising ethnic myths and symbols. For Andreas Wimmer, too, ethno-symbolists pay too little attention to different kinds of conflict, including those with other forces such as communism, ultramontane Catholicism and panIslamism, because they assume all nations and their histories are shaped in the same way. More generally, ethno-symbolists may be charged with taking the Other as a given and
therefore failing to accord sufficient weight to relations with neighbours and great powers in their accounts of the formation and change of nations and nationalism. For Anna Triandafyllidou, ethno-symbolists as well as modernists fail to see how ethnic communities and nations are crystallised through constant encounters with the significant Other and, as a result, have left this key dimension of the creation of national identity largely untheorised.15

Now, it is true that ethno-symbolist, as well as modernist, approaches were not designed to deal with the problems of (renewed) ethnic conflicts, a vast subject that has been extensively studied by others. Rather, their object was to account for the formation, change and persistence of nations and the role of nationalism in the modern world. But this does not mean that they assume that all nations and their histories are shaped in the same manner. While John Hutchinson has offered a general account of nation formation, as I have also sought to do here, there is no sense in which ethno-symbolists think that the development of particular historical nations can be uniform, given the great variety of external factors and circumstances that influence the development of the processes and layering of nation formation. Nevertheless, although the study of ethnic conflicts constitutes a different, if adjacent, field, ethno-symbolic insights can be and are being used to throw light on some of the most intractable ethnic and national conflicts, such as those in Belfast and Jerusalem, as the recent perceptive book, The Endurance of Nationalism, by Aviel Roshwald attests. Moreover, both John Armstrong and John Hutchinson have emphasised the vital role played by armed conflict and warfare in the forging of nations. For Armstrong, these effects were most visible in the shatter zone occupied by antemurale kingdoms on the boundary between the great civilisations of medieval Islam and Christianity, which witnessed repeated encounters with significant Others. Hutchinson goes even further and proposes a theoretical basis for relations both within and outside nations. He argues that nations are themselves to be understood as ‘zones of conflict’ forged through inter-state antagonisms and engaged in cultural wars, as well as struggles between rival elites and with other forces. Moreover, as Triandafyllidou confirmed, I too have recognised the significance for nation formation of relations with other nations, noting the reciprocal effects of war and ethnicity, the importance of
protracted conflicts between pairs of longstanding ethnic foes, and the
mythic and social psychological dimensions of conflict that help to
bind together the members of both ethnic communities and nations.
More recently, I have emphasised the importance of outsiders in
helping to define the ethnic ‘self’ and demarcate the boundary
between ‘them’ and ‘us’, as part of a processual approach to ethno-
genesis and nation formation.\textsuperscript{16}

Ethno-symbolists devote even more attention to internal conflicts.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the reciprocal relationship between elites and
non-elites is central to their concerns. The vision of the nation pro-
posed by one or other elite may or may not strike a chord among
members of the non-elites, eliciting a weak or a strong response;
alternatively, the latter may reject or amend it, preferring another
project offered by a rival elite. There is also the ever-present possibility
of conflict between various segments of the non-elites, each with
their different needs, outlooks and traditions, which may again be
reflected and amplified by conflicts between elites. Inter-elite conflicts
have been the most visible in the historical record, notably between
rival factions of the intellectuals and professionals. But, as ethno-
symbolists have repeatedly made clear, their struggles are not to be
regarded as separate from the cleavages among the non-elites, whose
support they so often need and seek. None of this suggests that ethno-
symbolism proposes a model of ethnic determinism, or that it can be
regarded as an agency-less approach, unable to address the dynamics
of elite power and conflict, as critics allege, even if these recurrent
phenomena are not the main objects of their enquiries. Such charges
reflect a limited reading of the early writings of the ethno-symbolist
approach.\textsuperscript{17}

Typically, as we saw in Chapter 2, different visions of the nation,
complete with their opposed readings of its ethno-histories, are
espoused by rival elites seeking to promote their particular cultural
and political projects and ideals of national destiny, and appeal to
rival sets of symbolic resources, whether of history, religion or lan-
guage. Internal change often comes about in periods of perceived
decline from a mythical ‘golden age’ of national purity and authenti-
city, through the conflict between alternative visions of national des-
tiny carried by rival elites and their non-elite constituencies who
invoke different, and sometimes opposed, sets of symbolic resources.
Such conflict may eventuate in social revolution. But, more commonly, it is contained through radical reinterpretations of received traditions of national identity and destiny, which answer to the needs and interests of new alignments of classes, regions and ethnic and religious communities. Alternatively, new interpretative syntheses emerge that select elements of received traditions and shared symbols, and combine them with the more radical agenda of new elites and classes, as we saw in the Greek case. Even the more revolutionary kinds of change may be ‘guided’ by accommodations between old and new alignments of beliefs, symbols and interests, themselves reflecting alternative ethno-histories and visions of national destiny.18

The question of continuity

Despite this emphasis on conflict and change, ethno-symbolists are accused of focusing almost exclusively on continuity between antecedent ethnies and modern nations. They buttress their claims by recourse to a biased selection of cases, which I mentioned earlier apropos of the criticism of Andreas Wimmer, and by a ‘scissors and paste’ method of linking identical proper names in a range of texts from quite different periods of history. For John Breuilly, ethno-symbolists pay little or no attention to the contexts and functions of such names and, as a result, the alleged historical links become meaningless or spurious. And he concludes:

It is important that there were earlier usages of national terms, ethnographic and political. But that is all. Just as building materials limit the range of possible buildings, but do not determine (or make it possible to predict) just what buildings will be constructed, so do historical legacies relate to political ideologies.

This is certainly an advance on the previous modernist position that any ‘shred or patch’ from the past would do in the creation of modern nations. But it is hardly sufficient. It still leaves open the question of the content of these historical legacies, and why some legacies, such as the civic–republican tradition of classical antiquity (and its ‘rediscovery’ following, for example, the publication of Tacitus’ Germania), should have had such a powerful effect on the
shape of the subsequent ‘building’. Moreover, it seems too neat to say that it is all simply a matter of ‘legitimation’ for this or that elite. Why bother to dress things up in Roman garb? Why appeal to the Covenant of the ancient Israelites? Again, it is not a matter of simple continuity between ethnies and nations, or even between earlier and later ethnic memories, myths and symbols, as nationalists themselves often imagine. Ethno-symbolists are well aware of historical ruptures, the succession of epochs and the very different meanings of symbols, memories, rituals and concepts in different periods of history. But they are equally conscious of traditions – changing traditions, certainly – but nevertheless traditions that are continually cultivated by elites, notably by priests, monks and scribes, particularly if these traditions are encoded in sacred or prestigious texts. They are also persuaded of the importance of pre-existing clusters of population (or ‘ethnic cores’) centrally located in a territorial polity and sharing myths of ancestry, historical memories and one or more features of common culture (usually language and/or localised religion) for furnishing some of the contents of subsequent nationalisms and the ensuing nations. These are not determinants but enablers and shapers of the building of the nation, albeit often through the selective mediation of nationalists and their followers.19

Moreover, ethno-symbolists are perfectly happy with the idea that some ethnic names (Visigoths, Lombards, Burgundians) disappear, while others survive, and that this cannot be explained in terms of deficient ‘myth–symbol’ complexes. Proper names are only one aspect of ethno-genesis, a starting point perhaps; but ethnic categories, networks and communities, along with their names, come and go for all kinds of reasons. What matters is the degree of overall significance of the history and content of ethnic traditions, both in general and in specific cases, which may, of course, vary considerably, as discussed earlier. When, as modernists such as John Breuilly argue, demotic nationalists seek to appropriate the past, they can indeed draw on a fund of ethnic myths, symbols and memories, which include languages, customs, rituals and traditions; and while, as he contends, the nationalist movement generally starts with elites or subelites, it spreads through their linguistic, literary, musical and artistic labours to other segments of the designated population, exactly because there exist available ethno-cultural resources – similar to Wimmer’s
‘historically constituted cultural frames’ – which help to shape, through processes of subelite selection and reinterpretation, the new building.\(^2\)

As regards Wimmer’s charge of selecting cases to fit the alleged thesis of continuity – as he himself notes, this is not confined to ethno-symbolists. It is a widespread practice of historical and comparative sociology. It is certainly not ideal, and can be guarded against to a certain extent by the choice of like and unlike cases. But there are sound practical reasons for this widely used method. After all, very few scholars possess the linguistic competence and the historical knowledge to cover the vast range of possible cases of ‘ethnic groups’, ‘nations’ and ‘nationalist movements’. Even then, quantitative surveys conducted even by teams of researchers come up against problems of definition, and no more so than in this hotly contested field; one has only to recall the conflicting outcomes of the surveys by David Laitin and Andreas Wimmer cited earlier to see how intractable these problems can be.

Hence the ethno-symbolists’ preference (not to mention that of several modernists) for a series of historical and contemporary case studies, which can be illuminating and exploratory rather than hypothesis testing. What we can hope for, through the comparative method, is the elucidation of contrasting patterns of nation formation, nationalist movements and the like; as well as the provision of that ‘historical context’ desired, inter alia, by Breuilly and so lacking in quantitative analyses. Unless we confine ourselves to single case studies, we are inevitably faced with the familiar limitations of space, time and knowledge (of language and archival history) when we seek to generalise about the formation and the persistence and change of different types of nations and nationalisms, whether in the past or in the present. Despite these limitations, the macro-historical and comparative enterprise may provide useful insights and broader understanding of ethnic and national phenomena.

**Erosion and persistence of nations**

For many scholars, nations and nationalism are historically embedded in the era of modernity, and hence are destined to wither away in a post-modern age. This, of course, reflects a modernist periodisation of
nationalism. For many modernists, and most scholars of ‘post-modernity’, under the impact of ‘globalisation’, nations and nationalism are even now being superseded by more local and more global identities. At the very least, global pressures for democracy have led to the replacement of the homogenising ‘classical’ nation-state by a more inclusive ‘post-classical’ national state that can accommodate the needs and aspirations of its various ethnic communities and nations, as in the cases of Britain and Spain.21

While ethno-symbolists do not espouse a common perspective on the fate of nations or national states, their concerns with the longue durée and with the ethnic and cultural antecedents of nations predispose them to a much more sceptical view of the supersession of nations and nationalism than those who adopt a ‘short chronology’ which regards these phenomena as novel products of modernity from the late eighteenth century onwards. Although, as I argued at the end of the last chapter, radical social and political changes in the contemporary world are altering a number of our received ideas of national communities, many of their symbolic and institutional forms (as opposed to meanings) remain largely intact, along with their members’ shared territorial attachments, secularised myths of national election and commemorations of sacrifice. It is still true to say that we live in a ‘world of nations’, if by this we mean that large numbers of men and women across the globe perceive themselves first and foremost as members of national communities, and that these communities, even without the benefit of a protective state, continue to command powerful symbolic and institutional resources.

To the oft-repeated objection that ‘post-modern’ ‘globalisation’, in all its ramified forms, has curtailed the power of the state and fragmented the cohesion of nations, ethno-symbolists point to the ways in which global challenges have for some centuries periodically revitalised ethnic ties, and even now continue to encourage among many members reinterpretations of received traditions of national identity and regenerations of national communities and their historic cultures – in the absence of anything that may be called a ‘global culture’. This remains the case, even when national states surrender aspects of their sovereign powers to new supranational associations such as the European Union – as has been revealed by strong popular national reactions in France and the Netherlands to some of the European
leaders’ political initiatives, such as the European Constitution. Two factors are significant in this respect. The first is both the memory and the recurrence of armed conflicts across the globe, whether these are simply local wars or proxy confrontations between the great powers that may lead to military interventions, or armed peace-keeping operations, and which are amplified by continual media exposure and mass communications. The consequent human loss in battle, vividly purveyed by television and the internet, continues to feed national sentiments on both sides, and to keep alive nationalist mythologies of blood sacrifice and national regeneration, which are then often re-enacted in periodic ceremonies of remembrance. In many cases, these rituals have become the fulcrum of national public cultures and the focus of mass participation in the destiny of the nation, thereby continuing to underpin the sense of unity, if not the cohesion, of the nation in a global era.22

The second factor is migration. Vastly expanded in scale and numbers, largely as a result of visible global inequalities coupled with mass communications, and involving a much greater variety of people of different faith and culture, migration so often calls into question received traditions and narratives of national identity and community. But the results, as we saw, are often ambiguous. On the one hand, the new diversity that immigrants bring to the nation may be welcomed and celebrated, and a debate about the nature of received traditions of community may ensue. On the other hand, pressure on labour and housing markets, coupled with fear of terrorism, may cause leaders and elites to rethink, not just their policies on immigration in the wake of ethnic disturbance and racial riot, but their readiness to jettison elements of received national traditions in favour of novel multicultural ‘hybridised identities’. The result may be a reformulation of traditional concepts of national identity and a revitalisation of national community closer to the received pattern and heritage of memories, myths, values and symbols than earlier more radical departures seemed to promise – something that ethno-symbolists have underlined. Add to these factors the resilience and the social and cultural penetration of the modern and more inclusive state in a global era, and we can appreciate the claim of ethno-symbolists that we may continue to speak of the persistence of nations and a sense of national identity in a ‘post-modern’ world.23
Identity and community

Does this entitle us, then, to regard national identity as an essential building block of modernity and the stuff of modern, and some would say ‘post-modern’, politics? For Siniša Malešević, in what is to date probably the most sustained theoretical critique of ethno-symbolist approaches, this assumption is regarded as one of its more egregious errors. This is because of the inherent vagueness of a concept that he considers to be theoretically incoherent and politically dangerous. I should add that modernists are by no means immune from this accusation; after all, Ernest Gellner claims that a man’s culture today is his identity, and Eric Hobsbawm also speaks of forms of popular identification. John Breuilly, too, focuses at some length on the symbolism of self-referential nationalist ideologies, such as the Afrikaner variety; while for Montserrat Guibernau, popular national identity is central to much of modern politics. For Malešević, this current fashion for the language of identity is relatively new (since the 1950s). Its provenance is to be found in the fields of logic and mathematics, where the concept is useful and has a precise meaning of similarity-cum-difference. But, transposed to the social sciences, its current widespread use has only served to create confusion, being at times too rigid, at other times too fuzzy and nebulous, and in both cases of no use for analytical purposes. Like Rogers Brubaker, who on similar methodological grounds wants to reject the substantial and fixed ‘groupness’ and essentialism of concepts such as nation, ethnic group and diaspora, Siniša Malešević would like us to dispense with a concept of unbridled self that is so problematic and open to political manipulation. Indeed, his main purpose is to reinstate the older and, in his eyes, more sociologically useful concept of ‘ideology’ in place of currently fashionable but highly misleading concepts such as identity, national identity and identity politics.24

There appears to be something of a misunderstanding here. No doubt it would be desirable, in the interests of scientific rigour, to engage in an exercise of ‘linguistic cleansing’ by which our analytical concepts could be sealed off from popular practices and ideas. Alas, this is rarely possible in the social sciences, especially in political and historical sociology. Most sociological concepts – class, gender, ethnicity, the state and so on – tend to be simultaneously analytical
concepts and participants’ categories of practice; and this is equally true of the concept of ‘ideology’ itself. All these concepts can be, and have been, reified and used to denigrate, exclude and oppress others – as have named collectivities from ancient ‘Persians’ and ‘Greeks’ to modern ‘French’, ‘Germans’ and ‘Russians’. Vague and all-inclusive the latterday concept of ‘identity’ may be, but as an object of analysis we simply cannot dispense with it, nor with the popular ideals of authenticity and distinctiveness that it tries to summarise; and the same applies to the related concepts of nation, national community, and ethnic and national identity. Nor, in my view, should we seek to do so. In the social sciences, our concepts must stay close to empirical reality, not seek separation in the rarefied tower of pure and abstract analysis. That, too, is why ‘identity’ must figure, along with (the equally catch-all ideals of) ‘autonomy’ and ‘unity’, as one of the goals of the ideological movement of nationalism – and indeed it has always done so since the rise of that movement in the eighteenth century, when the quests for cultural distinctiveness and authenticity became so widespread. ‘Identity’ as distinctive ‘essence’ and difference is something that many people have felt they needed to find and have sought to create and pursue, and even to die for. One may lament the fact, but purist theoretical objections have never been able to dissuade most people from their beliefs and ideals; and these are, after all, what the historian and social scientist must address. The pursuit of ‘national identity’ has become a vital concern not just for ideologues and state elites, but for large numbers of people, even when they recognise that not all members of a state may share it or do so in varying degrees or ways. As Malešević himself argues, ‘identity’ has tended to replace older collective concepts such as ‘social consciousness’, ‘race’ and ‘national character’, and has tried to fulfil the same all-purpose goal of expressing collective difference and individuality in terms that everyone can understand and feel.25

Nor is the concept of identity only a modern one. We can already find a classic expression of it in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos, where the main protagonist asserts that ‘I will know who I am’ (a Corinthian, a Theban, a slave, or … ), just before the final shattering revelation; and another in the Book of Jonah, where the sailors in the storm ask Jonah who he is, and discover that he is a ‘Hebrew’. Notions of
identity can be found in the Religious Wars in Europe, and a perfect summary expression is Polonius’:

This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it doth follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

*Hamlet* (Act I, scene iii)

As Joep Leerson has shown, the same concern with self and identity reappears from at least the sixteenth century, some would say much earlier, forming ethnic stereotypes that helped to lay the cultural and psychological basis for the later political divisions of Europe and the world. And Lionel Trilling brings together many other examples of the ‘true’ self or ‘honest soul’ and its disintegration from Moliere and Diderot to Hegel and Conrad, thereby tracing the origins of our concern for sincerity and authenticity. This is the selfsame historical lineage that ethno-symbolists seek to explore.26

Further misunderstanding appears in the charge that I and others in the field have operated with static, ‘billiard ball’ definitions of ethnicity, nations and nationalism, rather than, as we thought, simply seeking a measure of clarity in the *explanandum*. In my case, definitions of ethnic and national phenomena conceived as ideal types act as yardsticks and touchstones, no more; and their utility is partly measured by their ability to help us to differentiate between categories of phenomena. At the same time, they summarise social and symbolic processes, as I have been at pains to demonstrate, insofar as the concrete cases of community which approximate more or less to the ideal type of the nation do so in virtue of the development of many of these processes. In fact, for many scholars, myself included, the main object of explanation has always been the types of community we call the ‘nation’ or ‘national community’ and the *ethnie* or ethnic community – their origins, prevalence, persistence and change. The concept of (national, ethnic) ‘identity’ is significant but subordinate; it derives its importance from constituting a summary of a community’s felt difference, distinctiveness and individuality, and in John Armstrong’s usage, for example, where ‘ethnic identity’ slides into ‘class identity’ and ‘religious identity’, it draws attention to the malleability of the attachments to different types of community. Not that phrases such as
a ‘sense of national community’ or Weber’s ‘sense of common ethnicity’ would be any more acceptable to critics like Malešević; the question would always be ‘whose sense of national community?’. But, such an enquiry does not require us to dispense with the concepts of community and identity; we simply have to specify the holders of the sense of national community and identity in this or that historical context, and thereby demonstrate the utility of these concepts for their holders and for our understanding of them. It is really only in more shorthand, theoretical statements that the problems Malešević detects arise.27

A neo-Durkheimian theory?

The second part of Malešević’s comprehensive critique is directed more exclusively against my own approach, which he insists on calling a ‘theory’, and judges it as such – this, despite my own repeated and clearly stated view that it amounts to no more than a conceptual approach. This is an important issue to which I shall return. The specific charges levelled against my ethno-symbolic approach are three: my view of the rise of nations from ethnies is termed ‘evolutionist’; my approach to types of social groups is characterised as ‘holist’; and my description of their properties is deemed to be ‘idealist’. In all three respects, according to Malešević, my understanding of the social world is fundamentally Durkheimian (or rather neo-Durkheimian, insofar as I introduce a second route and form of modernity, the ethnic, as opposed to the civic, form); and for this reason it is profoundly wrong. It is in this characterisation, I think, that his crucial misconception occurs.28

1. Let me start with evolutionism. Now it is quite true that my point of departure in studying the formation of national communities – as also of John Armstrong’s and John Hutchinson’s – is an analysis of the role of ethnic ties and types of ethnies. And, along with the modernists, as well as the classical sociologists, ethno-symbolists acknowledge the vast changes summed up by the term ‘modernity’ and contrast the results of modernisation with the condition of pre-modern societies. There is nothing peculiarly Durkheimian, or evolutionist, about this. Besides, neither I nor other ethno-symbolists argue that ethnies must develop into nations, or that there is a one-to-one correspondence.
between ethnies and subsequent nations. There are plenty of current ethnic categories, ethnic networks and ethnic communities that do not develop into nations, even when they engage in the political sphere; one has only to think of the strategies employed by leaders and elites of ethnic categories or communities in the United States or in the states of sub-Saharan Africa, whose members have not sought to be autonomous, much less to turn themselves into territorialised national communities. There is no predetermined path along which they must travel, no unalterable necessity in this process, and no ineluctable stages of history; these alleged ontological assumptions of determinism, fatalism and finalism are ones that ethno-symbolists simply do not share. Rather, ethnie and nation are to be regarded as ideal type formations, and one of the tasks of ethno-symbolism is to chart the relations between them and the possible routes travelled by cultural communities in different historical circumstances. For ethno-symbolists, there is no ‘mission’ of historical development, no one-way process in history and no end in history. A good deal of room is left to chance and the interplay between external events (wars, colonisation, religious movements, etc.) and internal processes, as I argued long ago in my work on social change. This means that different directions and reversals are possible, both in general and in specific cases between types of community such as ethnie and nation – as indeed occurred, one might argue, in the case of Armenians and Jews when they became diasporas. It is rather the modernists, and here we must include Siniša Malešević on the evidence of his chapter on Gellner’s perspective, who are wedded to the idea of history moving along a one-way process of change, and indeed through an evolutionary development – in particular, of the means of extraction and the scope of coercion.29

I should add that there are many other equally important kinds of social change – economic, political, social and cultural – which scholars can and do investigate. But the one and only kind that interests ethno-symbolists is that concerned with the rise of and transformations of nations and nationalism; hence the focus on ethnie and nation as particular kinds of community. (And here again, unfortunately, we have a concept – the nation – that has analytic uses while at the same time it functions as the object of the ideology of nationalism, and of many people’s everyday speech and emotion.)
This relatively narrow focus accords with my general contention that ethno-symbolism does not pretend to offer an overall theory of nations and nationalism, much less of social and political change.

2. Turning now to the charge of holism: that there is a holistic element in my own writings is undeniable. (This is not true of all ethno-symbolists. John Armstrong adopts a much more phenomenological approach, seeing ethnic identities as bundles of shifting attitudes and perceptions, although it is qualified by the importance he gives to mythomoteurs and ‘myth–symbol complexes’.) Methodological individualism is clearly useful if one wishes to explain why individuals join or adhere to nationalist movements. But, for my own purposes, exploring the large-scale problems of the historical bases of national communities and the origins and impact of nationalisms, it seems to be of limited use. Social life and community appear to be much more than the sum total of individual interests, preferences and dispositions; they also consist of shared norms, values, memories, symbols and the like that can be codified and handed down from generation to generation. This does not mean that morality is premised on the existence of collective life, or that ethnies and nations have an aura of timelessness, because they possess a transhistorical power shaping human action over centuries – the basic error of the Herderian ‘romantic ontology’ of ethno-symbolists, in the eyes of Andreas Wimmer. Nor does it mean that nations are substantial, homogeneous and tangible groups. Indeed, many nationalists also do not hold to such a quasi-organicist view, which may go some way towards explaining their strenuous intellectual and aesthetic activity to create an ideal of the nation that appears palpable to all. They realise, after all, however regretfully, that, except in moments of grave crisis, the members of ‘their’ communities are unlikely to share a single understanding of the nation; and, as I have demonstrated here and elsewhere, in any given period, there are often rival interpretations of the history and destiny of the community. In fact, there is nothing fixed about ethnic and national communities, and conflict is a frequent feature of national politics and relations – although it is not perhaps as universal as Malešević’s Thucydidean Weltanschauung assumes.30

Malešević also exaggerates the importance of ‘groupist’ statements in the work of ethno-symbolists, when he erroneously argues that I
attribute moralities to ethnic communities or nations. Similarly, he misunderstands the import of my characterisations of Finns, Ukrainians and Slovaks ‘returning to their golden ages’. These are shorthand statements about the symbolic concerns of their intellectuals and professionals at the inception of their nationalisms, and their influence on wider segments of the population through education and propaganda – and will, I think, be understood by most people as such.\footnote{31}

Many scholars, apart from ethno-symbolists, have felt the need to resort to the collective, symbolic level to analyse the formation and persistence of nations, and to treat ‘nation’ as both an analytic category and a specific historical form of community. If ethnies and nations were only ‘fluid, complex, overlapping, cross-cutting and superimposed networks of multiple relationships’, as Piotr Sztompka asserts, we should be quite at a loss to explain their enduring elements, and the power they exert over the hearts and minds of so many people. To couch the argument simply in terms of (nationalist) ideology, backed by modern forms of state coercion and elite manipulation, as Malešević does, if it is not in part circular, hardly does justice to the problem and over the long run is clearly insufficient. After all, why did this particular kind of ideology emerge, why did it persist and find so many fervent adherents across the globe, and why have so many people been prepared to die for ‘the nation’? What is it about the national form of community that so many men and women find so appealing? To answer these questions, it is not enough to cite state coercion, elite manipulation and the intrinsic nature of human conflict, in the manner of Thucydides, much less ‘some universal, transhistorical qualities’ of human agents (which fits ill with a modernist paradigm and the thrust of Malešević’s argument). Rather, we must enquire into the symbolic world in which the intellectuals’ ideology of nationalism could strike a responsive chord, and into the cultural and historical basis of that world.\footnote{32}

3. Malešević is equally mistaken in characterising my ethno-symbolic approach as ‘idealist’. Elie Kedourie may have believed in the determining power of ideas, but ethno-symbolists do not. The ethno-symbolic approach is a species of historical sociology, and it does not presuppose an idealist frame of reference. At the outset, in The Ethnic Origins of Nations, I defined the ethnie as a form of socio-cultural
community, not as an intellectual or ideological system. As such, ethnies take different historical forms – horizontal, vertical, fragmented – which provide starting points for distinct routes that may, given favourable circumstances, be traversed by the members of these three kinds of ethnic community. There is no necessity about these paths; they can always be reversed, and there may well be other types of ethnic community and different routes. Above all, it requires other external factors – the rise of strong, centralised states, the emergence of an intelligentsia, migration and colonisation – to create the conditions for the members of each of these types to experience and activate the development of the social and symbolic processes of nation formation.33

As I have explained, the overall aim of an ethno-symbolic approach is to provide a social and cultural understanding of nations and nationalism, and the emphasis on culture stems, in large part, from the perceived need to supplement modernist approaches that focus on political and economic factors – although even a cursory glance at the range of factors invoked by John Armstrong is sufficient to dispel any simple notion of the preponderance of ideologies or cultures. It is true that, in my more recent work on Chosen Peoples, where I consider the relations of nationalism to religion and characterise nationalism as a religion of the people and nations as sacred communions of citizens, there is a greater ‘culturalist’ (but not idealist) emphasis, and a greater, although limited, debt to Durkheim, which I acknowledge. But, even here, I am more interested in public rites and ceremonies, as well as in traditions and memories of golden ages, symbols of homeland and myths of chosen peoples, than in ideas or beliefs as such.34

Nevertheless, it is here that Siniša Malešević purports to find the closest affinity between my own overall ethno-symbolic approach and Durkheim’s. But, in doing so, he tends to confuse my approach with Durkheim’s theory. The tight relations between the social and the sacred that one may find in Durkheim’s sociology of religion are not part of an ethno-symbolist approach, and the idea that nations are in some sense ‘divine’ (which cannot be found in Durkheim who, as Malešević admits, wrote very little about nations) is a serious exaggeration of my view. In tracing the links between ancient and medieval myths of chosenness or memories of golden ages into the modern
period when they were taken up and used by nationalist intelligentsias for political ends, I am not implying that they have not been secularised and altered, only that they have provided important cultural resources and often ethnic networks for the subsequent creation of nations. Nor do I share Durkheim’s belief that religion and the sacred can be ‘reduced’ to the social. My point is simply that nationalism was always more than a political ideology; it also had an important cultural and religious aspect, manifest in its adherents’ fervent devotion to the idea of the nation through regular performance of public ceremonies and rites, and in the adaptation of myths, symbols, traditions and memories of earlier cultures and ethnic communities. Beyond my use of Durkheim’s functional approach to religion in *Chosen Peoples*, there is nothing particularly neo-Durkheimian here. Nor is there any suggestion, in any of the ethno-symbolic analyses, that the political religion of nationalism and the sacred communion of citizens of the nation are ‘eternal’. That may be Durkheim’s view of some elements of religion, but it is not mine. Malešević himself asserts that nationalism ‘exhibits a quasi-religious appeal’, that it borrows spiritual language and imagery, and portrays nations ‘as semi-divine entities’. Moreover, the notion that the ideal of the nation could offer its members a sense of immortality through posterity can also be found in other scholars’ accounts such as those of Carlton Hayes and Benedict Anderson. I would simply claim that some cultural communities have indeed been much more durable than others, and that some elements of some ethnic communities, notably their symbols, myths, memories and traditions, have persisted over generations, even in some cases over centuries; and this is made abundantly clear from the historical record. But eternal, no.35

Finally, it is worth noting that ethno-symbolists have drawn as much on Weber and Simmel (and others such as Barth) as on Durkheim; and that is true of my own work, taken as a whole. Certainly, I feel honoured by this association with so eminent a sociologist; but by binding my version of ethno-symbolism so closely to Durkheim’s theory, Malešević seeks to underpin his central argument that my perspective and approach constitute a similarly rounded theory. In this way, it can then be shown to be erroneous and judged to be a ‘profundely inaccurate’ jigsaw, and to have been prevented ‘from developing a fully fledged explanation of nation-forming processes’.36
Conclusion

Once again, I can only reiterate my opening caveat: ethno-symbolism, including my own version of it, does not aim to furnish an overall theory and a ‘fully fledged explanation’ of nations and nationalism, desirable as that might be. To pretend otherwise would surely be presumptuous.

The aims of ethno-symbolism are distinctly more modest. It cannot and does not seek to offer a rounded and overarching theory of ethnic and national phenomena, largely because of the enormous variety of movements, communities, attachments, symbolism and ritual that comprise its objects of investigation. Rather, through their theoretical and socio-historical analyses, ethno-symbolists hope to provide concepts and heuristic tools for research into the social and cultural history of nations and nationalism. Theirs, as I said, is at once an historical sociology and a comparative history of nations and nationalism, with particular emphasis on the cultural and symbolic dimensions, and on the history and contents of ethnic traditions so often neglected by others. In this, ethno-symbolism stands in the traditions of classical sociology as well as of comparative history, and seeks to build on their insights. To what extent ethno-symbolists have been successful in this enterprise must be left to the judgement of students and scholars in the field.
Epilogue

Ethno-symbolism and the study of nationalism

The study of nationalism has today arrived at a critical juncture. For the last fifty years, it has been dominated by a modernist orthodoxy, which, after the Second World War, replaced the ‘perennialist’ assumptions of the transhistorical recurrence and longevity of nations with a near consensus on the modernity, not just of nationalism, but also of nations. During this period, there have been important challenges to modernism, by sociobiologists and by cultural primordialists. Latterly, the historiographical controversy over the dating of nations, if not of nationalism, has been rekindled by some ‘neo-perennialist’ historians, notably in England and France, albeit in a more circumspect manner and on a limited scale. For all that, and from the wider perspective of the social sciences, the ‘classical debates’ and their narratives of nation and nationalism have been heavily slanted towards modernist chronologies and modernist sociological interpretations.

But this is only part of the story. The last two decades have witnessed a number of new, often overlapping departures in the field: ‘rational choice’ approaches to nationalism, which are particularly popular in the United States; feminist and gender interpretations; cultural studies of ‘hybridised’ national identities and multi-culturalism; post-national and globalisation approaches; and the study of ‘everyday nationhood’ and the consumption of nationalism. Together, these developments testify to a radical reorientation and shift in the existing landscapes of the study of nations and nationalism, creating something of a chasm between the novel interpretations and the earlier ‘classical debates’ and narratives. With the exception of rational choice theories and globalisation approaches, these developments,
influenced by discourse analysis and the ‘post-modernist’ turn, have eschewed the grand narratives of their predecessors and, to a large extent, also the causal–historical methodology that underpinned them. Instead, they have embraced constructivist and anti-essentialist conceptions of national phenomena, mainly ethnographic investigations of their popular expressions, and micro-analysis of specific contemporary cases.

This is particularly true of cultural studies which have taken as their subject matter the interpretation of hybridised national identities and of the consumption of ‘everyday nationhood’. Reacting against what they consider to be the exclusively elite-based, if not official, narratives of nations and nationalism analysed by modernists and their opponents, the scholars of everyday nationhood and cultural hybridity have sought instead to infuse new life into the field by focusing on the national beliefs, tastes and activities of ‘the people’ — the non-elites — who constitute the ostensible subject of the nationalists’ aspirations, making them central to the study of nations and nationalism.

As I have argued, ethno-symbolists share much of their concern for the beliefs, activities and attitudes of non-elites who often need to be persuaded, if not mobilised, by rival nationalist elites or subelites. They too have rejected the ‘top-down’ approaches of most modernists and their often exclusive emphasis on state elites. As they are concerned to enter into the ‘inner world’ of meaning of the non-elites who make up the bulk of ‘the people’, ethno-symbolists seek the sources of nationalist appeals in the various symbolic elements of their shared historical and cultural milieu — be they myths and symbols, or memories, traditions and values. But, unlike the scholars of ‘everyday nationhood’ whose micro-analyses investigate the tastes, choices and sentiments of the inhabitants of contemporary national states with little or no regard for their historical background, an historical ethno-symbolism is concerned as much with ‘historic nationhood’ as everyday nationhood, that is, with the way in which the various cultural legacies and traditions of previous generations of ethnic and national communities provide essential frames of reference for subsequent generations whose members adapt them to changing conditions and new challenges. This means that the beliefs, sentiments and activities of non-elites cannot be divorced from their wider cultural setting, or from the narratives and cultural projects of their
elites, and must be treated as essential parts of a broader investigation of the whole national community in relation to other communities.

From this, it is clear that, in certain respects, ethno-symbolic approaches straddle the divide that I identified between the earlier historical grand narratives and the current cultural micro-analyses of ‘ordinary people’. On the one hand, ethno-symbolists are keen to understand the national meanings of popular sentiments, beliefs, tastes and activities; on the other hand, they feel that this is only possible within a wider analysis of the historical background and cultural setting of the community, with its particular set of values, memories and traditions.

But, in other respects, ethno-symbolism remains part of the ‘classical debates’ through which it emerged. It shares with many modernists a grand narrative relating the formation of nations and the emergence and development of nationalism. Its arguments and periodisations may differ, and it is distinctive in its emphasis on the ethnic shaping of nations, but the form of its historical narrative and the framework of its explanations are similar, if not identical, to those of modernists. Moreover, ethno-symbolists are equally committed to a causal–historical methodology. They seek to combine an understanding of the meanings attributed by individuals and groups to their national activities, choices and beliefs, with a causal account of the grounds of popular mobilisation in response to the appeals of nationalist leaders and movements at given historical junctures. Among the reasons that ethno-symbolists are wont to give, the role of symbols, traditions, memories, values and myths figure prominently in explaining the causes and shape of the formation of nations and the success or otherwise of nationalist movements. This is not to deny the importance of elite political, economic and military factors, especially in the timing and success of nationalist movements, only to seek a more rounded and adequate explanation through attention to the historical social and cultural factors that form the matrix for both these movements and the responses of the non-elites – the people – to whom their appeals are so often directed.

Ethno-symbolism arose out of dissatisfaction with the purely structural accounts of modernism and their failure to pay attention to the cultural and symbolic elements that play so important a part in the formation and shape of nations and nationalism. In the ongoing
debates between modernists and perennialists of various kinds, ethno-symbolist approaches offered a middle way that aimed to avoid the problems associated with each, while addressing issues of the shape and place of nations omitted by both kinds of account. In doing so, they sought to bring together the conceptually and empirically adjacent but intellectually separate fields of ethnicity and nationalism, with their distinct scholarly traditions, and thereby broaden the study of nations and nationalism.

But this is not the only service that ethno-symbolism could offer. If it provides a link with the field of ethnic studies, it could by the same token do so for some of the novel departures I have mentioned. If the current study of nationalism presents a shifting, fragmented set of landscapes that cannot easily be mapped onto a single field of understanding, ethno-symbolism can be seen as an approach that helps to bridge the gulf between the older classical debates with their emphasis on history and causality and the novel departures in the field which focus on multi-cultural, gendered national identities and contemporary popular attitudes and beliefs. Certainly, ethno-symbolists adhere to a macro-analytic framework and a causal–historical methodology. But they also seek to interpret the meanings of their actions for the participants by reference to their symbolic milieu and the influence of shared myths, memories and cultural traditions. By singling out the significance of symbolic and cultural elements in the formation, development and shaping of nations and nationalisms, ethno-symbolists may be able to offer an approach that brings together some of the different concerns of earlier and later generations of scholars, and to point the way towards a more rounded and nuanced account of the formation and development of nations and the appeal of nationalism.
Notes

1 Perennialism and modernism

1 For Renan’s lecture, see Thom (1990); and for Treitschke, see Guibernau (1996, 7–12). Max Weber also linked the nation to a state of its own, but found on his well-known visit to the Museum of Colmar that the sympathies of the people of Alsace were decidedly French, despite the fact that they spoke a German dialect. See Weber (1948, 176–77); also Beetham (1974).

2 Kohn (1944, 2nd edn 1967) spoke of ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’, not ‘Eastern’, nationalisms, with the Rhine as the dividing line – at a time when the distinction had urgent political force. Clearly, it remains relevant, despite the obvious geopolitical and normative flaws. See the perceptive essay on Kohn in Calhoun (2007, ch. 6). For early typologies of nationalism, see Hayes (1931) and L. Snyder (1954); also Hertz (1944).

3 Deutsch had pioneered his ‘cybernetic’ approach in 1953, but amplified it in the second edition (Deutsch 1966). For the concept of ‘nation-building’, see Deutsch and Foltz (1963) and the critique by Connor in 1972 (Connor 1994, ch. 2).

4 I have conflated here the early and later versions of Gellner’s theory. The later version is at once more abstract and more materialist; it is also more structural and determinist. See Gellner (1964, ch. 7, and 1983). The transition to a more structural theory can be seen in his article (Gellner 1973), which places the emphasis on the modern kind of generic and specialist education.

5 Breuilly (1993); Hobsbawm (1990) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, Introduction and ch. 7); Anderson (1991, especially chs 1–3). For an evaluation, see A.D. Smith (2004a, ch. 3).
6 Kedourie (1960 and 1971, Introduction). Others who have emphasised the role of intellectuals include Shils (1972), Berlin (1979) and Hutchinson (1987).
8 Deutsch (1966), Gellner (1964, ch. 7) and Nairn (1977, ch. 2). For his critique of ‘substantialism’, see Brubaker (1996, ch. 1).
9 In the Warwick Debate of 1995, Gellner (1996) cited the Estonians as a case of a wholly modern nation. However, the evidence suggests an earlier sense of ethnic difference, reinforced by literature and education since the Reformation; see Raun (1987).
10 For the role of the modern state, see Breuilly (1993, especially 367–80) and Mann (1993). For nation-building, apart from Deutsch and Foltz (1963), see Bendix (1964), Eisenstadt (1973) and Rokkan et al. (1973).
11 See van den Berghe (1978 and 1995).
12 For his typology of orientations, see Shils (1957). For Geertz’s essay, see Geertz (1973). For a generally positive appraisal of the cultural primordialists, see Horowitz (2004).
14 See Grosby (2002, especially ch. 5).
16 For powerful critiques of neo-perennialist and ethno-symbolist positions on historical grounds, and a vigorous statement of the modernist thesis, see Breuilly (1996 and 2005a and b).
18 See Billig (1995) on engrained or banal nationalism; and Brubaker (1996) on Soviet nationality practices.
19 Various dimensions of everyday, popular nationalism are explored and illuminated by Edensor (2002). For the processes of naturalisation of ethnicity, see Balibar and Wallerstein (1991); and for ‘hybridised identities’, see Bhabha (1990, ch. 16).
20 See Hechter (1975) and (2000); Breuilly (1993); Anderson (1991); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983); Gellner (1983); Nairn (1977); Deutsch (1966); Kedourie (1960).
22 This circularity in the definition of the concept of nations can be found in Kumar’s otherwise excellent account of the creation of English national identity; see Kumar (2003, 53).
23 See Gellner (1996) and note 9 above.
25 Hobsbawm (1990, 75); Gellner (1983, 91, n. 1); Nairn (1977, ch. 2).
26 Anderson (1991, chs 2 and 3); Hobsbawm (1990, ch. 2); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, ch. 7); Nairn (1977, chs 2 and 9); Deutsch (1966); Gellner (1964, ch. 7).
27 Breuilly (1993, ch. 2 and Conclusion); Anderson (1991, chs 4 and 5); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, Introduction and ch. 7); Nairn (1977, ch. 9); and Gellner (1964, ch. 7).
28 Hutchinson (2005, ch. 3) on ‘cultural wars’.

2 Basic themes of ethno-symbolism

1 See Armstrong (1982 and 1995) and Barth (1969); and see the discussion in A.D. Smith (1998, ch. 8).
4 On ethno-symbols in Israel, see Gal (2007); on symbolism generally, see Roshwald (2006); and for the symbols of European nations, notably their flags and national holidays, see Elgenius (2005).
5 On dominant ethnic communities, see the essays in Kaufmann (2004b); and for minority ethnicity in the West and outside, see Glazer and Moynihan (1975). For more general readers, see Hutchinson and Smith (1996) and Guibernau and Rex (1997).
6 For the levels of ethnicity, see Handelman (1977) and Eriksen (1993). For the definition of ethnie, see A.D. Smith (1986, ch. 2).
7 See Weber (1968, Vol. I, ch. 5 on ‘Ethnic groups’); on war and ethnicity, see A.D. Smith (1981b) and Hutchinson (2007).
8 For the origins of the kingdom of Scotland, see Broun (2006); for the effects of colonialism in Eritrea, see Cliffe (1989).
9 Armstrong (1982, chs 1 and 9); on the creation of a strong polity on the basis of north-central French ethnic myths and culture, see Beaune (1991); and for a similar process in Norman England, see R. Davies (2000). For the idea and uses of ethnic cores, see A.D. Smith (2004c).
10 The argument is much more fully set out in Hutchinson (2005) and A.D. Smith (2008a). See also Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot (2005, Part I).
There is a large literature on definitions of the concept of the ‘nation’; see especially Deutsch (1966, ch. 1), Connor (1994, ch. 4) and A.D. Smith (1973b, Part I, and 2001, ch. 1).

For historians, and historical embeddedness, of nationalism, see Hayes (1931), Kohn (1944, 2nd edn 1967), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), Breuilly (1996) and A.D. Smith (1999a, ch. 1). For fuller discussion of methodological issues, see A.D. Smith (2008a, ch. 1) and Hutchinson (2008).


For the pre-existing cultural materials and the novelties of the Italian Risorgimento, see Doumanis (2001). For the use by French patriots of pre-Revolutionary symbolism, see Herbert (1972) and Schama (1989).

On aesthetic politics in Western and Central Europe, see Mosse (1994). David was perhaps one of the first public artists commissioned to ‘represent’ the nation through memorable images of oaths and martyrs; on which, see Herbert (1972) and Vaughan and Weston (2003). For later European imagery, especially statuary, see Hargrove (1980) and Hobsbawm’s essay in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, ch. 7); and for poetry in the British Isles, see Aberbach (2007).

For the imperial ideal of Meiji Japan, see Oguma (2002). The challenge posed by the Hindutva philosophy and parties is comprehensively analysed by Jaffrelot (1996); see also Chatterjee (1993) for the different versions and voices of the nation. For a penetrating analysis of the conflicting accounts of Turkish/Ottoman history and destiny, and the rival understandings of what constitutes ‘Turkishness’, see Cinar (2005).

For the ‘Norman yoke’ and Anglo-Saxonism, see MacDougall (1982). The Danish social reform model and Nicolai Grundtvig’s concept of popular community, folkelighed, and his folk high schools are analysed by Jesperson (2004, 103–13). On Slavophilism in nineteenth-century Russia, see especially Thaden (1964) and Hosking (1997). The varieties of Zionism are comprehensively analysed by Shimoni (1995). The rise of Croatia is charted, and its various nationalist ideologies analysed, by Uzelac (2006).
19 See Gildea (1994, ch. 3) on French ‘grandeur’. For a comparison with England, see Kumar (2006); and for the problems of post-imperial England, see Kumar (2003, ch. 8).

20 On ‘national identities’ in the West today, see Guibernau (2007); cf. the critique of the concept of ‘(national) identity’ by Malešević (2006, chs 1–4), and Chapter 6 in this volume. For nations as ‘zones of conflict’, and for ethnic renewal and its long-term consequences, see Hutchinson (2005 and 2000).

21 Various myths of the ‘golden age’ are described in the essays in Hosking and Schöpflin (1997). See also my discussion of these myths and their role in ‘linking’ past to present in A.D. Smith (2003a, chs 7 and 8).

22 See Armstrong (1982, ch. 9, and 1995). Armstrong sees the introduction of nationalism, the ideology and theory, as a watershed, marking a new era in the emergence of nations.

23 The modernist idea of appropriation of ‘the past’ (a very selective reading of some of the past) by nationalists is found in Breuilly (2005b). For the Slavophiles, see Hosking (1997, 270–75). Perceptive analyses of the role of Arab intellectuals in the genesis of a sense of Arab national identity can be found in Choueiri (2000) and Suleiman (2003). On the roots of the Iranian revolution, see Keddie (1981).

24 On the idea of ‘blocking presentism’, see Peel (1989). For a critical discussion of ethno-symbolic approaches to the uses of the ethnic past, see Özkirimli (2000, ch. 5).

25 For a strong attack on nationalist uses of the past, notably the post-Roman ‘Dark Ages’, and especially in Germany, see Geary (2001, ch. 1); although this leaves the much better documented and more plausible later Middle Ages unexamined, on which see Scales (2000 and 2005).

26 On all this, see Armstrong (1982). But cf. the attack on any such linkage or influence in Breuilly (2005a).

27 For a fuller discussion of the three kinds of distinctive public cultures, see A.D. Smith (2008a, chs 4–7). See also Hutchinson (2005, ch. 3) for national ‘culture wars’.

3 The formation of nations


3 Weber’s brief analysis of the nation is treated under the rubric of ‘Structures of Power’ in Weber (1948, 171–79). The idea of the nation
as a discursive formation is advanced by Calhoun (1997). On the various ways in which the idea of the nation is talked about, chosen, consumed and re-enacted symbolically, see Edensor (2002). For nations as mechanisms of blood sacrifice, see Marvin and Ingle (1999).

4 For Rousseau’s view of Moses, as well as of Lycurgus and Numa Pompilius, in his Considerations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne of 1772, ch. II, see Watkins (1953, 162–67, at 162). Here Moses is conceived of as a ‘constructionist’, avant la lettre, although hardly a modernist! The modernist view that nationalism ‘invents nations where they do not exist’ is enunciated by Gellner (1964, ch. 7), although this formulation does not rule out the possibility of some nations existing prior to nationalism, and acting as models for subsequent nationalist enterprises of nation-building.

5 For an analysis of steps by which intellectuals formulated the category of the nation, especially in the Habsburg empire, see Argyle (1976). On the genesis of East European nations, see Hroch (1985) and Sugar (1980, notably the essay by Hofer). The factors involved in the formation of nations in Asia are analysed in the essays in Tønnesson and Antlöv (1996, especially that by Winichakul).

6 For vigorous refutations of the idea of pre-modern nations, see Breuilly (2005a and 2005b). A similar rejection of any medieval English nation can be found in Kumar (2003, chs 3 and 4).

7 The Armenian and ancient Judean cases are analysed by Grosby (2002, ch. 1); see also Goodblatt (2006) who explores elements of ancient Jewish nationalism and nationhood, and Roshwald (2006, ch. 1) who also argues for an ancient Athenian nation. For a penetrating overview of the ancient Mediterranean world, see Garman (2007). Mendels (1992), too, speaks of a ‘political nationalism’ in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds, but distinguishes this ethno-political outlook and sentiment from modern nationalism. On the possibility of nations in medieval Europe, see the essays in Smyth (2002) and, allowing for important differences from modern nations, Reynolds (1984, ch. 7, and 2005). For the French case, see Beaune (1991). England is often regarded as the strongest case of a medieval nation; the Anglo-Saxon kingdom, undoubtedly a strong state for the period, is treated as a nation by Wormald (1984) and Foot (2005), although again not in the same sense as a modern nation. For a similar approach to Norman England, see Gillingham (1992 and 1995).


9 Connor (1994, ch. 8). For Connor, this conviction also characterises nations, which he considers as self-aware ethnic groups.
On the Phoenicians and their lack of a collective proper name, see Ap-Thomas (1973); also, more critically, Routledge (2003): the various Phoenician city-states had similar cultural practices and language, but no religious or political unity, and no ethnic consciousness of cohesion. For the Slovaks, see Brock (1976); and for the Ukrainians and their tangled relations with the Russians in the early modern period, see Saunders (1993).

On war, ethnicity and nationalism, see Howard (1976) and A.D. Smith (1981b); and especially the illuminating essay by Hutchinson (2007). On relations between Venice and Genoa, see Norwich (2003, chs 16 and 18).

The Roman myths of origins are explored by Fraschetti (2005) and Garman (1992). Kumar (2003, ch. 3) casts a sceptical eye over the English origin myths in Gildas, Bede and Geoffrey of Monmouth; but see also Howe (1989). For Icelandic and Nordic myths, see O’Donoghue (2006).

For a penetrating analysis of the nature and functions of Greek genealogies and myths of origin, see Finkelberg (2006). The Eddic sagas are described in their historical context by Magnusson (1977) and O’Donoghue (2006).

For ‘archetypal’ diasporas, notably Armenians and Jews, see Armstrong (1976 and 1982, ch. 7). For the role of the Torah among the Jews, see Schwartz (2004); and for the Qu’ran and Hadith among Arabs, see Suleiman (2003).

For the bardic contests in medieval Wales, see Morgan (1983).

Grosby’s argument is most fully set out in Grosby (1995), although it informs all his work; see also Grosby (2006). For the idea of ‘ethno-scape’, see A.D. Smith (1999a, ch. 5, and 1999b).

Schama (1987, ch. 1) analyses and illustrates the influence of the landscape on Dutch history and mentality in the seventeenth century; while Zimmer (1998) traces the ways in which growing interest in the Alpine landscape affected the sense of Swiss national identity.


On the case of ‘nations without states’, see Guibernau (1999). Breuilly (1996) argues that, without strong institutions such as the state, a sense of ethnic identity is localised and ephemeral. But this is to forget the pervasive role of religion and the power of traditions in pre-modern periods. For examples of that power, in the relative absence of ‘hard’
institutions, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 7) on the millennial Armenian and Jewish diaspora communities; and on the Jewish case in Eastern Europe, even after being denuded by the Tsars of their communal councils, see Bartal (2005).

20 On gender and nationalism, see Sluga (1998) and Yuval-Davis (1997), who notes with regret the absence of gender dimensions in most approaches to nations and nationalism. On this, see A.D. Smith (1998, 205–10). For the case of Marianne in France, see the artefacts in South Bank Centre (1989).

21 The New Year ceremonies in the Mesopotamian empires are described in the classic study of Frankfort (1948). For the ceremonies of the Doge casting a golden ring into the Adriatic as a token of Venice’s marriage to the sea, see Norwich (2003, 55, 116). More generally on religion and nationalism, see Coakley (2004) and Grosby (1991).

22 For the rise of colonial nationalisms in the former British dominions, see Eddy and Schreuder (1988). The history of white settlers in the United States is analysed by Kaufmann (2004a), and their Protestant values are discussed by Huntington (2004). On the Afrikaners, see the comprehensive history by Giliomee (2003) and Keegan (1996, 184–200). On relations between the British state, the settlers and the aboriginal peoples in Australia, see Palmer (2000). More generally, on ‘plural’ nationalisms, see A.D. Smith (1995, ch. 4).

23 For the Afrikaner case and the myths of the Great Trek, see Giliomee (1989), Akenson (1992) and Cauthen (1997).

24 This distinction is fully elaborated in A.D. Smith (1986, ch. 4, and 2004a, ch. 7).

25 On the English and the Normans, see Thomas (2005). For the Western states, see Marx (2003) and, for Russia, see Kappeler (2001).

26 The thesis that the earliest ‘exclusionary’ form of nationalism was pioneered in sixteenth-century England, France and Spain is argued by Marx (2003); for a critique, see A.D. Smith (2005a). On the French case, see Bell (2001) and, for Britain, the essays in Bradshaw and Roberts (1998).


28 For Eastern European diversity, see Sugar (1980) and, for the Balkans, Roudometof (2001). See also A.D. Smith (1986, ch. 6).

29 For the thesis of thwarted or ‘blocked mobility’ in relation to the nationalist intelligentsia, see Kedourie (1971, Introduction) and Gouldner (1979).
I have discussed the typical responses of the intellectuals in A.D. Smith (1983, ch. 10, and 1986, ch. 8).

30 For the role of intellectuals in Europe, see Hofer (1980), Hroch (1985) and Leersen (2006). The route of ‘vernacular mobilisation’ is elaborated in A.D. Smith (2004a, ch. 7).


32 On the role of religion and nationalism in the Balkans, see Petrovich (1980); and more generally, Hastings (1997) and Juergensmeyer (1993). For the Buddhist traditions, see Kapferer (1988) and Sarkisyanz (1964).

33 On this art in Canada and Switzerland, see Kaufmann and Zimmer (1998); on the responses to the wilderness vistas of the United States, see Wilton and Barringer (2002).

4 The role of nationalism


2 For nations as communities of prestige, see Weber (1948, 175–76). For the relations of states and nations, see Tilly (1975, Introduction), Breuilly (1993) and Mann (1995).

3 Of course, their starting-points are quite different: Connor (1994, ch. 4) stresses the proximity of nationalism to ethnic groups and ethnic self-awareness, whereas Viroli’s (1995) essay is concerned to contrast the ancient and Italian civic tradition of republican patriotism with the German ethno-cultural provenance of nationalism.

4 The formation of the modern Swiss nation on the basis of the old Eidgenossenschaft is the subject of the careful and balanced study of Zimmer (2003); see also Im Hof (1991). For a wide-ranging assessment of the nature of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant America, its origins, efflorescence and decline, see Kaufmann (2004a) and the incisive thesis of Huntington (2004). For the importance of German Romantic doctrines of philology and history, see Leersen (2006).

5 I summarise here the various themes and motifs of nationalism that are more fully discussed in A.D. Smith (1991, ch. 4, and 2001, ch. 1), as well as by Leersen (2006).

6 There is a large literature on the social composition of nationalist movements; see especially Nairn (1977, chs 2 and 9), Gouldner (1979), A.D. Smith (1983, ch. 6), Greenfeld (1992) and Breuilly (1993, ch. 1).
7 For discussions of the nature and seminal role of the intelligentsia in nationalism, see the early analysis in J. Kautsky (1962), A.D. Smith (1981a, chs 5 and 6), Pinard and Hamilton (1984), Hroch (1985) and Hutchinson (1987 and 1992). A more sceptical view can be found in Zubaida (1978) and Breuilly (1993, 46–51).

8 On nationalism as ‘political archaeology’, see A.D. Smith (1999a, ch. 6). The historical and ideological links between archaeology as a discipline and nationalism are explored in Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996) and Jones (1997). See also the essays in Nations and Nationalism (2001), and for the evolution of archaeology in the nineteenth century, the comprehensive analysis of Diaz-Andreu (2007).


10 See Hutchinson (2005). For Romanticism in various countries, see Porter and Teich (1988). The German case of early medievalist Romanticism, as compared with England, is analysed by Robson-Scott (1965). Nevertheless, the differences between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, for all their uses as ideal types, should not be exaggerated, given the high degree of overlap in individual cases and the presence of an ethnic dimension in most cases; on which, see Yack (1999); cf. Balibar and Wallerstein (1991).

11 For Rousseau and nationalism, see Cohler (1970). David, Ingres and French painting in this critical period from 1775 to 1830 are discussed and illustrated in Detroit (1974), Brookner (1980), Rosenblum (1985) and Vaughan and Weston (2003). Mythologies of Saxon, Celtic and Trojan ‘race’ in the constitution of English national identity are analysed by MacDougall (1982), and for national sentiments of Britishness, see Colley (1992). The contribution of Norse mythology in the Edda is explored by O’Donoghue (2006). For Füssli and Bodmer’s circle, see Antal (1956), and for the rise of Swiss national identity in this period, see Zimmer (1998 and 2003). Romantic currents in American painting are discussed by Wilton and Barringer (2002) in the Catalogue of the Exhibition on the ‘American Sublime’.

12 On ‘cultural wars’ and revivalism, see Hutchinson (2005, ch. 3). For Herder’s ‘cultural populism’, see Berlin (1976) and Barnard (2003). The wider revolution of Romanticism is analysed by Berlin (1999). For the Nibelungenlied, see Robson-Scott (1965); for the Kalevala, see Branch (1985).

13 For a perceptive literary analysis of the related concepts of sincerity and authenticity, see Trilling (1972), although he is more interested in ideas of individual than of collective authenticity. The cult of sincerity in

14 The cult of Nature in the eighteenth century is explored in Charlton (1984); for Rousseau and romantic ideas of landscape, see Schama (1995). There are interesting parallels in Russian nineteenth-century painting, on which see Ely (2002).

15 On Pompeii, Herculaneum and the opening up of the Greco-Roman world in archaeology, see Dyson (2006, chs 1 and 2); and for the parallel exploration in ancient Egypt, Reid (2002). On the excavations in Persepolis, see Wilber (1969) and Nylander (1979). On Teotihuacan, see Katz (1972, 43–55), and for the discovery of Great Zimbabwe, see Chamberlin (1979). The cult of heroes and the exemplum virtutis in art are analysed and illustrated by Rosenblum (1967, ch. 2). On the Kalevala, see Branch (1985).

16 On intellectuals and West African nationalism, see Geiss (1974, ch. 15). Kedourie (1971, Introduction) exaggerated the independence of the intellectuals in the colonial setting. More generally, for intellectuals constrained by the state, see Gouldner (1979) and A.D. Smith (1981a, ch. 6).

17 See the discussion of the limits of elite selection from the past(s) in A.D. Smith (2000a, ch. 2, and 2003a, ch. 7). For the view that nationalists have, and continue to invent, a suitably tailored past for their political ends, see Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, Introduction and ch. 7), Hobsbawm (1990) and Özkirimli (2003 and 2008). For critiques, see A.D. Smith (2003b and 2004a, ch. 3) and Hutchinson (2008).

18 On the diversity of peoples in Eastern Europe, see Sugar (1980), Snyder (2000) and Hupchik (2002, ch. 9). For Iran, see Higgins (1986); and on Burma and the Karen, see Gravers (1996).

19 The Greek intelligentsia are discussed in Koumarianou (1973) and Kitromilides (1979); and for the role of the Greek clergy, see Frazee (1969) and Hatzopoulos (2005). Juergensmeyer (1993) paints an overall portrait of radical religious nationalisms and the clergy, mainly in Asia; and for Indian nationalism, see Brass (1991), van der Veer (1994) and Jaffrelot (1996). On Arab nationalism, language and Islam, see Suleiman (2003).

20 See Billig (1995). For the recent British debates, see Kumar (2003, ch. 8).

21 The strongest case for, and prospectus of, a separate field of study of ‘everyday nationalism’ is set out by Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008). An illuminating study of popular nationalism in Britain is that of Edensor (2002).
See also the interesting essays in Yoshino (1999) on the ‘consumption’ of nationalism.

22 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see A.D. Smith (2008b).

23 For Kedourie (1960), the intellectual lineage was through Kant, Fichte and the Romantics, although Herder’s concern for cultural diversity presupposed God’s plan for humanity. Others such as Cobban (1964) and Bell (2001) emphasise the contribution of Rousseau and the French eighteenth-century intellectual tradition, in which the belief in God has become increasingly privatised.

24 On territory and national identity, see the essays in Hooson (1994). For theories of the doctrine of nationalism, see Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot (2005, Part I).


26 For this ‘religious nationalism’ in India, see van der Veer (1994) and Jaffrelot (1996); and on Iran, see Keddie (1981). While Juergensmeyer (1993) emphasises religious aspects, the essays in Tønnesson and Antlöv (1996) see religion as only one of several dimensions. For the impact of religious revivalism worldwide, see Kepel (1995).


28 On nationalism as a secular religion, see O’Brien (1988a) and A.D. Smith (2003a, ch. 2). For the French case, see Bell (2001, ch. 1).

29 For Rousseau’s advice, see Watkins (1953, 159–274). The rituals and ceremonies of some of the great Revolutionary fêtes are described by Herbert (1972), and the ceremonies at the Wartburg Castle are analysed by Mosse (1975, ch. 3) as an early form of the civic religion of the masses.

31 For Spencer’s Resurrection at Burghclere, see K. Bell (1980, 96–113). The symbolism of the Cenotaph in Whitehall and other First World War cenotaphs is analysed by Winter (1995, ch. 4). For the cult of the War Experience and, more generally, the role of cemeteries for the fallen, see Mosse (1990). The idea of ‘blood sacrifice’ and the symbolism of the American national flag are explored by Marvin and Ingle (1999), and in relation to American nationalism and shared memories by Grant (2005).

32 For nationalism as a religion of individual heroism and of the long-suffering masses, see A.D. Smith (2003a, ch. 9). For his reflections on the nation and nationalism as akin to religion, see Anderson (1991, ch. 1, and 1999). Similar ideas about the heroism of the common soldier, apropos of the ill-starred Gallipoli landings in the First World War, inform Australian commemoration ceremonies on ANZAC Day, particularly at the National War Memorial in Canberra; on which see Kapferer (1988). For nationalism as a civic form of religion, see Mosse (1994).

33 Differences in ideological orientations have been explored already by Hayes (1931), Kohn (1944[1967]) and Plamenatz (1976). For cultural and political nationalisms, in particular, see Hutchinson (1987) and Dieckhoff (2005). Other more global typologies appear in L. Snyder (1968), Gellner (1983) and A.D. Smith (1983, chs 8 and 9).

34 For the three traditions of public culture, see A.D. Smith (2008a, chs 4–6). The impact of the international system is analysed by Mayall (1990).

5 Persistence and transformation of nations

1 In fact, only a few national states remained intact, the long established states of England, Scotland, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Russia, with Poland being restored in 1918, on which see Seton-Watson (1977). But, for the period in question, they were among the world leaders and pace-setters of the national state. On global trends, see McNeill (1986) and Hutchinson (2005, ch. 1). For the intertwining of class and nation, see Mann (1993, ch. 7). For a critique of an alleged ‘global culture’, see A.D. Smith (1995, ch. 1).


3 On the fluidity of language and dialect, see Haugen (1966) and Fishman (1972); and for the role of linguistic ‘fault-lines’ in Europe, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 8). Leersen (2006, especially Appendix) explores the role of language and particularly philology, while Laitin (2007, ch. 2) presents a theory of national identity as coordinated choice, and the
adoption of language, its most obvious indicator, as a ‘tipping game’. For the role of Arabic language in providing a sense of panArab identity, despite deep historical and political divisions, see Suleiman (2003). All these accounts draw in some measure on Herderian assumptions about cultural diversity and language as the keys to national identity.

4 For the historical development of museums, see Boswell and Evans (1999, Part III). A particularly illuminating example is the Mexican National Museum of Anthropology, on which see Florescano (1993). For the relationship between the formation of a sense of national identity and of state galleries in France, Spain and England in the early nineteenth century, see Tomlinson (2003).

5 On the Mask of Agamemnon, see the engaging study by Gere (2007), and for the Ardagh Chalice and the Irish artistic revival, see Sheehy (1980). The Danish Lurs and ‘Golden Horns’ are illustrated and discussed in Sorenson (1996); and the Declaration of Arbroath is reproduced and discussed in Duncan (1970); see also Cowan (2003). The search for ‘authentic’ Romanian architecture is discussed by Carmen-Elena Popescu (2003), and Hungarian self-representation at international exhibitions by Terri Switzer (2003). See also Hirsh (2003) on late nineteenth-century Swiss self-images.

6 For Leersen (2006), philologists and lexicographers have played a seminal role in the formation of a sense of national identity, notably in Germany and Eastern Europe. He cites in particular the work of Jakob Grimm (see pp. 122–24, 146–52, 179–85). But an equally strong case could be made for the research of national(ist) historians from von Ranke and Michelet to Palacky and Paparrigopoulos. Poets, too, have helped to voice the national aspirations of their contemporaries in certain cases, notably in Ireland with Yeats and Israel with Bialik; on which see Hutchinson and Aberbach (1999); and more generally, Hutchinson (1994 and 2005).

7 For the neo-classical simplification of architectural forms, see Rosenblum (1967, ch. 3). For early Romantic music in Germany and Austria, see Whittall (1987, ch. 2). The interpenetration of ‘neo-classical’ and early ‘romantic’ art is discussed in A.D. Smith (1976b).

8 Chopin’s national Romanticism is briefly discussed in Whittall (1987, ch. 6); see also Samson (2007). For the contrasts between Verdi’s and Wagner’s national operas, see Arblaster (1992, chs 4 and 5), Rosselli (2001) and Whittall (1987, chs 7 and 8); also Einstein (1947, ch. 16). For a fascinating account of the Nordic myths, their modern reception and their reworking by Wagner, see O’Donoghue (2006, chs 6 and 7, especially 132–45).
The tone poem as a musical–literary form is discussed in Whittall (1987, ch. 7 on Liszt, and chs 9 and 10 on a variety of national(ist) composers). See also Maes (2003, chs 7 and 8) on Tchaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov; and for Sibelius’ tone poems, see James (1983, ch. 3; for the lines at the head of the *Tapiola* score, see p. 111). For the English renaissance and Elgar, see D. Martin (2007).

Both versions of Mussorgsky’s *Boris Godunov*, as well as *Khovanschina*, are analysed in detail by Maes (2003, ch. 6); see also Emerson (1998, ch. 4). Russian historical drama continues into the next century, in the work of Prokofiev (his *War and Peace*) and, in film, Sergei Eisenstein, notably *Alexander Nevsky* (1938) with a memorable score by Prokofiev, and the two parts of *Ivan the Terrible* (1942, 1946), on which see Eisenstein (1989) and Leyda (1974); see also Taylor (1998) and A.D. Smith (2000b).

On Rembrandt’s rejected painting of *The Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis*, who was the leader of the Batavian revolt against Rome in 69 AD, see Rosenberg (1968, 287–82); the full history of the Batavian revolt, as recorded by Tacitus in his *Histories* (books IV and V, on which see R. Martin 1989, 95–98) and embellished in a republican mode by Grotius’ *Liber de Antiquitate Republicae Batavorum* (1610), had been painted in twelve panels by Otto van Veen in 1612–13; see Schama (1987, 76–77). For French ‘history paintings’ of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see Detroit (1974). The nature and types of history paintings in late eighteenth-century Europe are analysed by Rosenblum (1967, ch. 2), and for the types and quantities exhibited at the Paris Salon and Royal Academy in London in this period, see A.D. Smith (1979b). For Benjamin West and his series of Edward III for Windsor Castle, see Erff and Staley (1986, 192–203, cat. nos 57–76).

On West’s early historical paintings, see Abrams (1986); also Erff and Staley (1986). It might be said that West’s later and looser style reverted to the Baroque but incorporated a medieval flavour through his careful study of armour and costume in the royal collections at Windsor; see Irwin (1966, 94–96).


On the recreations of the *Kalevala* scenes by Akseli Gallen-Kallela, see T. Martin and Siven (1984), Boulton Smith (1985) and Arts Council (1986, 104–13). On Raja Ravi Varma, see Mitter (1994, ch. 5); for Vasily Surikov’s historical paintings, see Kemenov (1979), and for Diego Rivera’s murals, see Ades (1989, ch. 7).


17 As Billig (1995) has demonstrated for Western nations. On the functions of myths of origin, see the essays in Hosking and Schöpflin (1997) and A.D. Smith (1999a, ch. 2).

18 On myths of election, see the essays in Hutchinson and Lehmann (1994); also A.D. Smith (1999c and 2003a, chs 3–5). For patterns of religious identification and nationhood in Europe, see D. Martin (1978, ch. 3).

19 There is a large recent literature on covenantal myths of ethnic election. For the Jewish myth, see Nicholson (1988) and Novak (1995). The Armenian myth is analysed by Nersessian (2001) and Panossian (2006). For the impact of such myths on Ulster Protestants, Afrikaners and Israeli Jews, see Akenson (1992); on the Afrikaners, see also Cauthen (1997). For the influence of the Pentateuchal Covenant in post-Reformation England, Scotland and the Netherlands, see A.D. Smith (2007a); and for the religious use of parallels with ancient Israel in official sermons in England, Sweden and the Netherlands, see Ihalainen (2005).

20 For these antemurale missionary nationalisms in Europe, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 3). On missionary election myths in general, see A.D. Smith (2003a, ch. 5) and Perkins (1999). For the secularisation of ethnic election narratives after the French Revolution, see Perkins (2005). For Roshwald (2006, ch. 4, especially 234, n.79), missionary election myths are rooted in the covenantal type.

21 For St Gregory’s missions to the provinces, see Nersessian (2001, ch. 2); and for Patrick’s mission, see Moody and Martin (1984, ch. 4). On the history of Yasna Gora, see Rozanow and Smulikowska (1979). On early French national saints, see Beaune (1991); and for those of medieval Russia, Milner-Gulland (1999, ch. 3).
22 For Mendelssohn and Smetana, see Whittall (1987, chs 3 and 9). Füssli’s Oath of the Rütli is analysed in Antal (1956); see also Tate Gallery (1975, 57, cat. no. 16). Sacred landscapes are discussed by Hastings (2003) and A.D. Smith (1999b).

23 For the French memorials, see Prost (1997); and for the great cenotaphs of the First World War, see Winter (1995, ch. 4). On American war monuments, see Gillis (1994, chs 7 and 9). On the political uses of statuary in nineteenth-century France, see Hargrove (1980) and, more generally, Michalski (1998, chs 1–3).

24 This was particularly true in France, where from 1774 Louis XVI’s minister, d’Angiviller, set about restoring art to its former status in the Grand Siècle by linking it to the great themes of French national history; on which, see Detroit (1974) and Leith (1965). George III played a similar role in England, encouraging Benjamin West to tackle themes from English medieval and modern history; on which, see Abrams (1986) and Erffa and Staley (1986). For David’s great series of neo-classical paintings, see Brookner (1980) and Crow (1985). On British ‘history painting’, see Irwin (1966), Kenwood (1974) and Pressly (1979).

25 The literary meanings of sincerity and authenticity are explored by Trilling (1972), and in eighteenth-century England, by Newman (1987). For the pursuit and meanings of the ‘golden age’, see A.D. Smith (2004a, ch. 8). On the Kalevälä, see Branch (1985), and for its impact on Finns, see Honko (1985).

26 For diaspora Jews and their myths, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 7). Rival Greek nationalist interpretations are analysed by Kitromilides (1979). On these cultural rivalries, see Hutchinson (2005, ch. 3); and see Chapter 2 in this volume.

27 For the view that the nation is a killing machine that periodically requires the sacrifice of its youth in war for its sustenance, see Marvin and Ingle (1999). A more moderate version, the Myth of the War Experience, is analysed by Mosse (1990), especially in relation to the early German nationalist movement.

28 This is the theme of the civic religion of the masses whose nature and history Mosse (1975, ch. 3, and 1990) explores. For the rites of commemoration of national mass conflict in the aftermath of the American Civil War, see Grant (2005). The mass civic religion of nationalism culminated in the First World War; its mass cemeteries and cenotaphs are poignantly described in Winter (1995, ch. 4). More generally, for the ideal of national destiny through sacrifice, see A.D. Smith (2003a, ch. 9).

29 See Connor (1994, ch. 8) for ‘felt history’. On the ill-effects of earlier belief in mythologies of descent from barbarian tribes in the Dark Ages,
see Geary (2001, ch. 1), although I think he exaggerates the extent to which most people knew about, let alone accepted, these myths of origin. On the patterns of migration within Europe after 1989, see Carter, French and Salt (1993). For later analyses of reactions to Muslim migration, see Alba (2005). Reactions to immigrants in southern Europe are analysed by Triandafyllidou (2001).

30 The thesis of hybridisation was advanced by Bhabha (1990, ch. 16). The more recent situation in Britain is surveyed by Kumar (2003, ch. 8); see especially pp. 256–62 for his analysis of community relations and the ‘Parekh Report’ (Runnymede Trust 2000). For a different interpretation of England’s continuing national identity, see A.D. Smith (2006).

31 For changes in the pattern of French historiography, set by Ernest Lavisse in the late nineteenth century, see Citron (1989). The debate on history in Britain is discussed in Gardiner (1990); and for the forging of ‘traditional’ Englishness in the later nineteenth century, see Dodd (2002). American shared myths and memories are explored in Huntington (2004) and Cauthen (2004). See also the more extended discussion of the recent transformation of nations in A.D. Smith (2007b).

32 For the unwaved flag, see Billig (1995). The symbolism of the flag, particularly in the United States, is fully explored by Marvin and Ingle (1999); and the history of flags in Europe is analysed by Elgenius (2005).

33 For a detailed treatment of national holidays in Britain, France and Norway, see Elgenius (2005). The Australian ANZAC Day celebrations are fully described by Kapferer (1988). On British Remembrance Day ceremonies, see also A.D. Smith (2003a, ch. 9).

34 See the essays on heritage and national identity in Boswell and Evans (2002, Part II). For landscape and national identity, see the essays in Hooson (1994); also Kaufmann and Zimmer (1998).

35 On the effects of European integration, see Delanty (1995); and for popular scepticism, see Deflem and Pampel (1996). More historical approaches to Europe can be found in some of the essays in Pagden (2002).

36 For dominant éthnies, see the essays in Kaufmann (2004b). But see Cauthen (2004) for the nationalism of the United States. On the sentiments of members of nations without states, see Guibernau (1999).

6 Pro et contra

1 For Nolte (1969), for example, fascism was built on the nation and its nationalism. For attempts to differentiate between nationalism and fascism, see Zimmer (2003, ch. 4) and A.D. Smith (1979a, ch. 3).
2 For a careful critique of ethno-symbolism, see Özkirimli (2000, ch. 5 and, in more polemical vein, 2003). See also Wimmer (2008) and Breuilly (1996).

3 See Kedourie (1960 and 1971, Introduction) and my critique in A.D. Smith (1979a, ch. 2). For my reply to Özkirimli’s (2003) article in the same issue, see A.D. Smith (2003b). Some recent developments of ethno-symbolic approaches in different areas of the world are explored in the essays in Leoussi and Grosby (2007).

4 For the idea that nationalism is a form of ‘tribalism’, see Popper (1961). For the notion of habitual or ‘engrained’ nationalism, see Billig (1995). Yack (1999) disputes the validity of ‘civic’ nationalism, thereby undermining the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms. On this, see also A.D. Smith (1995, ch. 4). Wimmer (2008) argues a negative evaluation of the consequences of nationalism, whereas a more positive assessment is propounded in Laitin (2007, ch. 1).

5 See Freeden (1998). Gellner (1964, ch. 7) offered a more positive view of nationalism as providing a necessary boost for developing societies that sought rapid modernisation.


8 For this critique of my definition, see Guibernau (2004). For the more extended definition of the concept of the nation, see Guibernau (2001 and also 2007, 23–25).

9 On Rousseau’s advice to the Poles, see Watkins (1953). For her most recent definition of the concept of national identity, see Guibernau (2007). For my definition, see A.D. Smith (2001, ch. 1), and for a revised definition of the concept of the ‘nation’, see A.D. Smith (2002).

10 The growth of a Polish national identity despite the loss of independence and territorial unity is described by N. Davies (1982, Part II). The repression of Catalan culture under Franco is analysed by Guibernau (1999, 116–19). For the diaspora conditions of Armenians and Jews, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 7), and A.D. Smith (1999a, ch. 8).

11 See Armstrong (1982, chs 4 and 5) and Hutchinson (2005) for the political aspects of ethno-symbolic approaches; also Roshwald (2006). For Eritrea, see Cliffe (1989), and for nationalism in the United States, see Kaufmann (2004a), Grant (2005) and Calhoun (2007).

12 See Wimmer (2008, 12–13) and the reply by Hutchinson (2008, 20, 22–23). However, for Özkirimli (2008, 5–9), John Hutchinson leads a double life, as a post-modernist ethno-symbolist! For the latter’s reply,
see Hutchinson (2008, 23–26), where he shows how Irish elites were
not free to select from the past(s) as they pleased or as their present
preoccupations led them, but had to take into account several pre-existing
Irish ethnic traditions and build upon them.
13 For Hobsbawm’s criticisms of ethnicity as descent and as culture, see
Hobsbawm (1990, ch. 2); for similar objections, see Poole (1999).
However, for Eriksen (2004), shared metaphorical place and kinship are
significant for collective, especially national, identities. For the utility of
the idea of dominant ethnies, see Kaufmann and Zimmer (2004).
14 For arguments against independence and the attainment of state sover-
eignity as the criterion of nationhood, see A.D. Smith (1998, ch. 4); and
for studies of ‘nations without states’ in the West, see Guibernau
(1999).
15 These criticisms are voiced by Conversi (2007), Wimmer (2008) and
16 See Armstrong (1982, especially ch. 3, and 1997); Hutchinson (1994,
2005 and 2007); Roshwald (2006); and A.D. Smith (1981b and
2008a, ch. 2).
17 For these objections, see Malešević (2006), Conversi (2007) and
Wimmer (2008). Cultural wars are discussed in some detail by
Hutchinson (2005, ch. 3).
18 Elite symbolic competition is the focus of Brass’s (1991) analysis of
political development in pre-independence India. For the historian
Paparrigopoulos’ intellectual synthesis of Hellenism and ‘Byzantinism’,
see Kitromilides (1998).
19 See Gellner (1983) for the idea that any ‘shred or patch’ of the past
suffices to create the nation. The quote about building materials comes
from Breuilly (2005a, 93; see also Breuilly 2005b). Similar criticisms are
voiced by Wimmer (2008); cf. the reply by Hutchinson (2008). On
indeed makes culture the necessary focus of projects of modernisation.
For arguments about the limits of proper names and ethnicity in me-
dieval Europe, see Breuilly (2005b, 31–4), A.D. Smith (2005b, 106–7)
and Smyth (2002).
21 See Hobsbawm (1990, ch. 6), Laitin (2007, chs 4 and 5), Giddens
Anderson (1991) is an example of a modernist who thinks nations and
nationalism are not being superseded by global trends. For Guibernau
(2001), the classical nation-state is being superseded by a looser,
polyethnic, ‘post-classical’ national state.
22 The absence of any ‘global culture’ that could appeal to hearts and minds is argued by A.D. Smith (1995, ch. 1). On blood sacrifice, see Marvin and Ingle (1999); and for the cult of the war dead and national regeneration, see Mosse (1990), Winter (1995, ch. 4), Prost (1997) and the essays in Winter and Sivan (2000). More generally, on the links between war and nationalism, see Hutchinson (2007).

23 The idea of ‘hybridisation’ of identities is associated with analyses of ‘post-modernity’ and a ‘post-national’ order, on which see Bhabha (1990, ch. 16), Giddens (1991) and Soysal (1994). The conflicting pressures in a modern multinational society such as Britain are analysed by Kumar (2003, ch. 8); and see Chapter 5 in this volume, note 31.

24 For this critique, see Malešević (2006, chs 1 and 2); see also Brubaker (1996, ch. 1, and 2005). See Breuilly (1993, 64–67) for Afrikaner identity; and for an extended analysis of national identities, see Guibernau (2007).


26 For this penetrating analysis, see Trilling (1972). Leersen (2006, 25–70) explores the ethnic stereotypes in medieval and early modern Europe, which he argues form the psychological basis for the subsequent creation of modern nations.


28 Chapter 5 of Malešević (2006) is devoted to a Durkheimian analysis of my ethno-symbolic approach.

29 See Malešević (2006, 129–30) and A.D. Smith (1973a). For the Armenians and Jews, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 7) and for their nationalisms, A.D. Smith (1999a, ch. 8).

30 For a methodological individualist strategy applied to nations and nationalism, see Hechter (2000) and Laitin (2007). The critique of holism and essentialism is pursued by Brubaker (1996, ch.1). Yet, Malešević (2006, 141) speaks of the ‘intrinsically conflictual nature of human life’; and he claims that human agents ‘have some universal, transhistorical qualities’ which, although transformed by modern conditions, ‘can never be obliterated’. For this critique of holism in my work, see Malešević (2006, 130–32); and on the ‘romantic ontology’ of ethno-symbolists, see Wimmer (2008).

31 See Malešević (2006, 131–32). It would otherwise be impossible to use collective proper nouns in scholarly work; even Rogers Brubaker resorts
to ‘Hungarians’ and ‘Rumanians’ in his study of ethnic relations in Cluj (Brubaker 2006); see the critique in Csergo (2008).

32 Sztompka (1993, 187) is cited approvingly by Malešević (2006, 131). Yet, at the end of chapter 4 (107), we find that these fluid relationships are heavily constrained – by the power of the modern state which is as fixed and tightly regulated as the game of chess.

33 See Kedourie (1971, Introduction) and my critique in A.D. Smith (1979a, ch. 2 and 1983, chs 1 and 2). For my characterisation of the ethnie and its types, see A.D. Smith (1986, chs 2 and 4); and for the different paths open to the modern intelligentsia in a situation of ‘dual legitimation’, see A.D. Smith (1983, ch. 10).

34 See A.D. Smith (2003a and, even more, 2008a).


36 See Malešević (2006, 128, 135). For the links between classical sociology and nationalism, and my debt to Simmel, see A.D. Smith (2004a, chs 4 and 6). Armstrong (1982, ch. 1) acknowledges his debt to Fredrik Barth.
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